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Abstract
This thesis focuses on three issues. First, it investigates the impact of fluctuations in
international trade competitiveness on employment in the UK manufacturing sector over
the period 1999 to 2010. We find statistically significant effects of a shock to international
trade competitiveness on the level of employment. We suggest that the adjustment process
in employment mainly works through job creation. We also find that compared to large
firms, small firms contribute more towards job creation than job destruction. Our results
show that changes in GDP growth rate and average wages are significantly related to
employment, suggesting that the UK labor market responds significantly to market forces.
Finally, we find that the effect of changes in the real exchange rate on both job creation
and job destruction differs for exporting and non-exporting firms.
Second, the thesis empirically examines the impact the financial dependence, specifi-
cally during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, on the UK exports using monthly data over the
period January 2002 to September 2011. We find that the UK exports are highly sensitive
to the fluctuations in the cost of capital. The UK tends to export relatively less in the
sectors which depend more on external finance than the sectors which are less dependent
of external finance. These effects became stronger during the 2007-2009 financial
crisis. We also find that adverse credit conditions affect both the supply and
demand sides of exports and play a significant role in determining the supply
and demand for UK exports. We find that along with the financial condi-
tions in the trading partners, the volume of GDP and capital labor ratios of
the importing countries are the main factors in determining the demand for
the UK exports, whereas the supply of the UK exports is driven by financial
conditions, GDP and the capital-labor ratio of the UK.
The third issue examined in the thesis is the impact of the 4th and 5th
extensions in European Union (EU) on the trade flows of member and non-
member countries. Specifically, the thesis tests whether 4th and 5th extensions
EU causes trade diversion or trade creation. Moreover, we test that whether
the trade creation and trade diversion effects of these extensions are same
across the extensions and across the new members joining in these two exten-
sions. Applying the correctly specified fixed effect gravity model on the data
of imports and exports of the EU countries spanning from 1988 to 2008, our
results show that, in most of commodity groups, the EU boosts trade among
member countries at the cost of lowering the trade with non-member coun-
tries. However, the increase in trade with member countries is more than the
decrease in the trade with non-member countries. Moreover, we found that
iii
trade creation and trade effects vary across the extensions in the EU, across
the commodity groups and across the members joining the EU in 4th and 5th
extensions of the EU.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Research Questions
World economies are endowed with several different socio-economic resources which they
use for the welfare of their people. However, the welfare of a country mainly depends on
efficient allocation and use of these resources. The interdependence of world economies
makes the efficient allocation and use of economic resources among countries indispensable
to achieve the goal of welfare maximization. In this context, international trade has played
a key role in promoting the efficient allocation of resources. Therefore, a great deal of
attention has been paid to facilitating international trade, both at the global and country
level. As a result, global trade has increased tremendously. Specifically, over the last three
decades, reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade have led to a fivefold increase
in the volume of world exports (WESS, 2010). Similarly, WTO (2011) reports that volume
of global trade in 2010 is $14, 855 billion worth. Moreover, Makwana (2006) reports that
trade accounts for around 55% of global economic growth, and as much as 75% of GDP
growth in the EU.
The advocates of trade argue that global trade increases the incomes of nations by
increasing efficiency of the productive resources through specialization and transfer of
knowledge and technology from one country to another country. In addition, they say that
trade adds to the welfare of nations by providing a wide range of products to consumers at
relatively lower prices. However, along with the benefits, international trade also has some
disadvantages, which may reduce the net benefits of the trade. In fact, international trade
requires the redistribution of productive resources among different sectors depending on
the comparative advantage of the country. This trade-led redistribution of the resources
may lead to the loss of some productive resources which is one of the main disadvantages
of international trade. Specifically, labor market adjustment costs are very prominent
and may end up in net loss of employment in trading partner. Workers who become
unemployed in contracting sectors may not get employment in expanding sectors. As a
result, the net benefits of international trade may fall.
The adjustment process during the trade-led redistribution of the resources highlights
the importance of the adjustments in the labor market due to the fluctuations in real
exchange rate. Therefore, in Chapter 2, we examine the impact of real exchange rate on
the UK labor market and test whether in response to variations in real exchange rates
employment adjusts through job creation or job destruction. Moreover, we check whether
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the effect of the real exchange rate of the UK relative to the EU and non-EU trading
partners on the employment is the same. Finally, we test whether the impact of the real
exchange rate on employment in exporting and non-exporting industries differs.
Different economic and non-economic factors impede trade flows. For example, fluc-
tuations in the real exchange rates, access to trade credits, custom duties, rules and time
required to enforce a contract in a country, and custom procedures in a country may affect
trade flows significantly. The availability and ease in accessing trade credit plays an im-
portant role in the growth of trade. Unexpected events happening in the financial markets
may also cause a severe damage to the cross border flows of the goods and services. In
particular, small and financially constrained firms’ exports are at stake during periods
of financial crisis as their access to funds from formal banking channels is considerably
reduced. In this context, WTO (2010), reports that unfavorable financial conditions dur-
ing the financial crisis of 2007-2009 led to a 12% decrease in the overall volume of trade.
Similarly, Berman and He´ricourt (2010) and Manova et al. (2011) have shown that finan-
cial constraints hinder trade flows significantly. Moreover, the intensity of the decline in
trade flows caused by the financial constraints increases during financial crisis (Chor and
Manova, 2011). In fact the drop in international trade exceeded the drop in real GDP
during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. According to WEO (2010) annualized quarter-
over-quarter drop in the global real GDP averaged under 6% from the last quarter of 2008
to the first quarter of 2009, whereas the drop in global real imports was five times as large
and averaged over 30% during the same time period. Baldwin (2009) reports that imports
and exports collapsed for the EU27 and 10 other nations that together account for three-
quarter of global trade, was more than 20% from second quarter of 2008 to second quarter
of 2009 and trade flows of many of them fell by 30% or more during this period. Similarly,
Mora and Powers (2009) reports that nominal global merchandise exports dropped by 32%
between the second quarter of 2008 and second quarter of 2009. In the words of Jacks
et al. (2009) the largest trade collapse in the last 150 years occurred between the early
2008 to mid 2009.
Mora and Powers (2009) consider the decline in trade financing as the major contrib-
utor towards the decline in the world trade during the second half of 2008 and early 2009.
Summarizing the findings of the 6 surveys of international banks, suppliers, and govern-
ment agencies Mora and Powers (2009) point out that trade financing is the number two
cause of the decline in the global trade after falling international demand. In these sur-
veys, among international suppliers, 30 % consider reduced supply of trade financing as
a key factor in lowering foreign sales, and 57 % of the banks reported that lower credit
availability contributed to trade decline between the second half of 2008 and early 2009.
Banks reduced the supply of trade financing in last quarter of 2008 and the value of letters
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of credit fell by 11% in this quarter. Furthermore, the global impact of the crisis on trade
financing peaked in the first half of the 2009.
Similarly, quoting the surveys of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Bankers
Association for Finance and Trade (BAFT) now merged with International Financial Ser-
vices Association (BAFT-IFSA), Chauffour and Malouche (2011) reports that about 40
percent of trade finance was bank intermediated whose prices increased considerably dur-
ing the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Mora and Powers (2009) report that the price of letter
of credit increased by 70 base points and the price of export credit insurance increased
by 100 base points during the crisis. The trade cost on average increased by about 11%
between second quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009 (Jacks et al., 2009). This rise in
the costs of the trade in general and the increase in the cost of trade finances in particular
played their role in the collapse of global trade. Thus, it appears that the reduction in
the availability of the trade finance, and the rise in the cost of the trade finance resulted
in the fall of the global trade. So, it is worthwhile to analyze whether trade finance was
indeed a major factor driving the fall in UK trade during the recent financial crisis.
Therefore, in Chapter 3 we explore how firms dependence on external finance affects
the UK exports. Particularly, we test whether the effect of financial dependence on the
UK exports became stronger during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Moreover, we also
examine whether financial dependence affects the exports of different sectors differently,
particularly during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. In doing this, we use four different
proxies for financial dependency and two different proxies for the cost of the capital. To
examine how financial crisis affects the impact of financial dependence on exports, we use
an interaction term between financial dependence, cost of capital and the financial crisis
dummy.
The proponents of the trade always favor trade liberalization. Their idea of free trade is
based on efficiency of the market outcomes and on the principle of comparative advantage.
Theoretically free trade adds to the welfare of trading countries only if domestic markets
are working efficiently and are not distorted. But in the real world, markets do not work
efficiently and are distorted through different kinds of policy interventions. Different kinds
of economic and non-economic factors such as custom duties, international environmental
and labor standards impede the movement of factors of production and goods and services
across the borders. Therefore, instead of global free trade, regional free trade is flourishing
very quickly.
Several years ago, Viner (1950) presented the concept of the regional trade liberal-
ization which is known as the theory of the Second Best in the trade literature. This
theory presents analysis of the regional integration. Indeed, regionalism has become a key
development in international trade relations. As of January, 2012, 511 Regional Trade
3
Agreements (RTAs) have been notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO) web site,
of which 319 RTAs are in force. Most trade takes place among countries that are asso-
ciated with these RTAs. Clarete et al. (2003) reports that 97 percent of the world trade
in the year 2000 was among the countries that have joined at least one RTA. Asia-Pacific
Economic Co-operation (APEC) economies account for 44 percent of world trade and the
European Union (EU) accounts for 17 percent of global trade (EUCOM, 2009).
The rapid growth of RTAs in the world and an unprecedented increase in the share of
global trade taking place among the members of these RTAs induce researchers to analyze
the impact of an RTA on trade flows of member and non-member countries. The empirical
studies mainly test the hypothesis of whether an RTA creates or diverts trade. Most of
the existing studies have estimated the effect of an RTA on trade flows with reference to
a single commodity or single sector or with regard to aggregate trade. However, findings
are mixed. Furthermore, the analysis based on a single commodity or single sector may
not give clear picture of the impact of an RTA on trade flows. Hence, generalization of the
findings of such analysis may lead to wrong policy implications. Therefore, it is important
to know how does an RTA affect the trade flows of different commodity groups.
In the context of RTA, the European Union members have initiated Single European
Market (SEM) program to promote intra-EU trade and to create a competitive environ-
ment for firms operating in the EU member countries. In this program member countries
have agreed on free flow of goods, persons and capital among the member countries. They
also have agreed to adopt a common external tariff. These measures may enhance intra-
EU trade volume and raise the welfare of the people living in the EU. However, they may
prove detrimental for the welfare as well as trade flows of the rest of the world.
Thus differing from the existing studies, in Chapter 4 we analyze the effects
of the 4th and 5th extensions in European Union (EU) on member and non-
member countries trade flows. Specifically, we test whether the 4th and 5th
extensions in EU creates or diverts trade from the member countries. We
also test whether 4th and 5th extensions in EU increase trade among members
without affecting trade with non-member countries. Furthermore, we test
from the new members joining the EU in 4th and 5th extensions how many
members increase trade with members at the cost of decreasing trade with
non-members. Finally, we test whether 4th and 5th extensions in EU creates
trade in all the commodity groups.
1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Thesis
This thesis is initiated with the following objectives.
Keeping in view trade-led redistribution of the productive resources, and in order to
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formulate a comprehensive and effective labor policy to mitigate the distress of labor
generated by trade-led fluctuations in employment, this thesis aims to estimate labor
adjustment costs resulting from expansion of international trade. Particularly, in this
study we look into the adjustments costs generated by fluctuations in international trade
in the UK labor market. In addition, we are keen to determine whether the changes in
global trade led to job creation or job destruction in the UK manufacturing sector.
The relationship between the financial resources available to firms and international
trade flows provides the basis for another objective of this thesis, which is, to explore
the impact of the 2007-2009 financial crisis on the UK exports. We intend to estimate
the effects of the 2007-2009 financial crisis on UK sectoral exports to determine which
sector’s exports were severely damaged during the crisis time period. For this purpose,
we take into account both the demand side as well as the supply side of UK exports while
estimating the impact of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis on UK sectoral exports.
Regional integration or free trade within the bloc and restricted trade out-
side the bloc is rapidly growing in the world. So, one more objective of the
thesis is to estimate the impact of an RTA on trade flows of member and non-
member countries. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that whether the 4th
and 5th extensions in the European Union creates trade or diverts trade taking
into account all ten sectors classified by the Standard International trade Code
(SITC).
1.3 Methodology
To estimate the impact of fluctuations in real exchange rates on the UK labor market, we
use a modified version of the Moser et al. (2010) framework, which is a reduced form of
the Klein et al. (2003) model. The modified framework enables us to examine the impact
of fluctuations in real exchange rates in the European Union and non-European Union
markets simultaneously on job flows (job creation, job destruction, net job flows and gross
job flows) in the UK manufacturing sector. In order to compute job flows (job creation,
job destruction, net job flows and gross job flows) at the industry level we have followed
the procedure adopted by Davis et al. (1996). Following Moser et al. (2010) we have used
a real exchange rate based on trade weighted hourly wage costs. Finally, we apply the
Generalized Method Moment (GMM) to estimate the empirical model.
To examine the impact of financial dependence on the UK exports during the 2007-
2009 financial crisis (in Chapter 3) we modify the Chor and Manova (2011)’s empirical
model that considers only the supply side of exports. However, our modified version takes
into account both demand and supply of the exports. We use four different proxies, namely
external finance, buyer-supplier trade credit, tangible assets and leverage for the financial
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dependence of the firms of external resources, and two proxies: the lending interest rate
and the overnight interbank rate for the cost of capital. We calculate proxies for financial
dependence at the firm level and then match these with the sector level where we take the
median of all the firms operating in a sector because our analysis is at the sector level.
We use fixed effects and instrumental variable techniques to estimate the parameters of
the model to control for unobservable sector specific effects.
To estimate the impact of the 4th and 5th extensions in the European Union
on trade flows of member and non-member countries, we apply the correctly
specified gravity model. Specifically, we use the modified version of the cor-
rectly specified gravity model used by Kandogan (2005) to estimate the impact
of extensions in the European Union on trade flows. We estimate the empiri-
cal model by applying the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method and control
importer, exporter, time and bilateral fixed effects by using dummy variables.
1.4 Summary of the Thesis Results
With regard to the impact of competitiveness on labor markets we find that the compet-
itiveness significantly affects employment in the UK manufacturing sector. We find that
an appreciation of the real exchange rates distorts the competitiveness of goods in inter-
national markets and significantly reduces employment. We also observe that adjustments
in the labor market work through job creation rather than job destruction. Moreover, our
findings suggest that the response of job creation and job destruction to fluctuations in
real exchange rates is different. The real exchange rate affects job creation negatively and
significantly but job destruction negatively and insignificantly.
In Chapter 3, we find that financial dependence significantly determines UK exports.
Specifically, the impact of financial dependence on UK exports is negative and statistically
significant. Moreover, our findings show that the negative relationship between financial
dependence of a firm on external resources and its ability to export became relatively strong
during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. We also find that sectors that rely more on external
finance, have limited access to buyer-supplier trade credit and lower collateralizable assets,
export less relatively. Our findings are robust and do not change when we change the proxy
for financial dependence or change the proxy for the cost of capital.
With regards to the impact of 4th and 5th extensions of the European Union
on the trade flows of member and non-member countries, we have the following
observations: The results provide evidence that the effects of the 4th and 5th
extensions of the EU on trade flows are mixed. In some product groups the EU
creates trade among members without affecting their trade with non-member
countries and in some other product categories EU diverts trade from the
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rest of world to member countries. Specifically, we find that both the 4th
and 5th extensions of the EU cause import diversion. After the 4th and 5th
extensions of the EU, the member countries have decreased their imports from
non-member countries and have increased their imports from the member
countries. However, the decrease in imports from non-member countries is
lower than the increase in imports from member countries. Moreover, we find
that trade creation and trade diversion effects of the extensions in the EU
vary across the extensions, across the new members joining the EU in these
extensions and across the commodity groups. In addition, we found that the
geographical distance between importer and exporter country’s significantly
affects the trade flows of the EU member countries.
With regard to new members joining the EU in the 4th and 5th extensions,
our findings indicate that from new members joining the EU in the 4th ex-
tension in 1995 Austria and Sweden led to import diversion and Austria and
Finland cause the export diversion. Similarly, from the countries who became
members of the EU in the 5th extension of the EU in 2004, Cyprus, Hungary,
Lithuania Malta and Slovenia increase their imports from member countries
but decrease their imports from non-member countries. Moreover, after join-
ing the EU in 2004, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia have decreased
their exports to non-member countries and their exports to member countries
have increased. Finally, in this chapter, we show that the major share of “food
and live animal” products is imported from non-member countries and the EU
is the net importer of the food and agriculture products. Furthermore, the
analysis shows that “machinery and transport equipments”, “chemical and re-
lated products” and the “manufactured goods chiefly classified by material”
are the major contributors in the excellent export performance of the EU.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the analysis of the
impact of the trade competitiveness on the UK labor market. Specifically, this chapter
analysis is based on how real exchange rate led variations in the competitiveness of the
UK goods affect employment in the UK manufacturing sector. Chapter 2 also determines
how the adjustment process in employment works, whether it works through job creation
or through job destruction. Finally, Chapter 2 presents this analysis for exporting and
non-exporting industries of the UK manufacturing sector.
Chapter 3 presents the analysis of the impact of the financial dependence on the UK
exports, particularly during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Chapter 3 also presents a brief
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review of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. This chapter employs four different proxies for
financial dependence and two different proxies for the cost of capital to check the sensitivity
of the results. Finally, Chapter 3 determines which sector exports were severely damaged
during the financial crisis.
Chapter 4 examines the impact of the 4th and 5th extensions in the European Union
on the trade flows and determines whether 4th and 5th extensions in EU results in trade
creation or in trade diversion. Chapter 4 also provides details of the commodity groups
in which the EU increases trade among member countries without affecting the trade
with non-member countries and commodity groups in which the EU increase trade with
non-member countries. Furthermore, Chapter 4 provides a brief history of the EU.
Finally, Chapter 5 presents the summary of the thesis results and key conclusions of
the thesis. Chapter 5 also presents some policy implications based on our results.
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Chapter 2
Trade Competitiveness and Employment: Job Creation or
Job Destruction ?
2.1 Introduction
Over the last three decades, reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade have led
to a fivefold increase in the volume of world exports. The global export of goods and
services grew at an average rate of 6.3 percent per year from 1980 to 2008 (World Eco-
nomic and Social Survey WESS (2010)). The proponents of international trade claim that
international trade positively contributes to the welfare and income of nations by exploit-
ing economies of scale through specialization, enhancing the efficiency of the productive
resources, and the sharing of the knowledge and technology across countries. Further,
they argue that trade increases the choices available to consumers by providing them with
a broader range of products at relatively lower prices. As a consequence, countries are
opening their borders through the multilateral trading system, by signing regional trade
agreements or by exposing their economies to international competition as a part of their
reform programs.
However, the potential benefits of trade are obtained through the re-allocation of
resources to their most productive uses. But the redistribution of productive resources is
not free, different types of adjustment costs are involved in it. These adjustment costs
reduce the net benefits linked with international trade. Therefore, while assessing the
advantages of trade openness, one should keep in mind the size of the adjustment cost
arising from it. A prominent trade-led adjustment costs is adjustments in the labor market
arising from changes in employment and wages (Klein et al., 2003).
One source of trade-led labor adjustment costs is the frequent changes in real exchange
rates. Klein et al. (2003) describe how movements in the real exchange rates affect employ-
ment both within and between industries. Large swings in real exchange rates change the
relative prices of internationally traded goods by changing their demand and comparative
advantage in international markets. As a result the firms or industries, those are sup-
plying these products in international markets, adjusts their production. Consequently,
employment adjustment occurs in those industries in which these commodities are pro-
duced. However, the response of employment to a shock to the exchange rate varies across
industries because trade patterns and the degree of openness to trade vary significantly
across industries.
In the context of the impact of exchange rate shocks on trade, Krugman (1987) presents
businessmen’s views regarding competition which imply that a temporary shock, such as
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swings in the real exchange rate, can have a permanent effect on trade. He says that a
nation can be driven out of some of its businesses in response to temporary real exchange
rate shocks. This loss of the business generates unemployment. Thus, Krugman suggests
that the change in real exchange rates generates labor adjustment costs.
Moreover, shocks to the real exchange rate generate labor market adjustment costs
in the form of job flows in different sectors of the economy which may end with net
losses/gains in employment by changing the incentives to produce tradable versus non-
tradable goods. Actually, the change in incentives to produce tradable versus non-tradable
goods changes the relative prices and demands for tradable and tradable products which
in turn generate fluctuations in output and employment. As a result some sectors expand
and some other sectors contract. Workers losing their jobs in a contracting sector do
not necessarily get employment immediately in the expanding sectors due to a lack of
information and difference in skills required to fill the jobs in the expanding and contracting
sectors. This mismatch in available opportunities and skills required to fill the vacant posts
creates spells of temporary unemployment. Consequently, welfare gains linked with trade
fall. Thus, governments may wish to intervene to reduce the massive job destruction.
Another important aspect of exchange rate-led labor costs is how the adjustment pro-
cess in the labor market works. It is important to understand whether the process works
through job creation or through job destruction because each of them has different welfare
impacts. If labor markets adjust through job creation, then it only reduces the jobs for
new entrants and the adjustment may be less detrimental to overall welfare. However, if
the labor market adjusts through job destruction, then not only does it reduce jobs for new
entrants but the adjustment also forces existing workers out of jobs, increasing the extent
of welfare loss. So, when estimating the labor market adjustment costs in response to a
shock to the real exchange rate, it is very important to analyze the process of adjustment
in labor markets.
In this chapter, we investigate the effects of exchange rate shocks to international com-
petitiveness on the UK labor market. Specifically, we explore the response of employment
to real exchange rate led shocks to international competitiveness using panel data for the
UK manufacturing sector. In addition, we examine whether the adjustment process of
employment works through job creation or job destruction. In other words, we explicitly
look into how job creation and job destruction respond to real exchange rate led shocks to
international competitiveness and, through this analysis, we determine whether the effect
of international trade competitiveness is asymmetric on job creation and job destruction.
Finally, we bifurcate our analysis into exporting and non-exporting firms, and to European
and non-European trading partners of the UK.
The results show that a shock to international competitiveness significantly and asym-
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metrically affects employment in the UK manufacturing sector. We find that an appre-
ciation of the real exchange rate distorts international competitiveness of goods in inter-
national markets and reduces the employment significantly. We observe that this effect is
relatively more intensive in more open firms. We also find that the adjustment in employ-
ment works through job creation rather than job destruction. Finally, our findings suggest
that the response of job creation and job destruction to changes in the real exchange rate
is asymmetric.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a brief literature
review followed by the methodology in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 discusses the results.
Section 2.5 provides the conclusions.
2.2 Literature Review
Many studies in the literature have analyzed the dynamics of labor markets. As a result,
several channels have been identified through which various economic factors influence
employment levels. In this section, we review the papers that have focused on examining
the impact of real exchange rates on employment.
Real exchange rates have exhibited large fluctuations over the post-Bretton Woods
era. It is well known that shocks to the real exchange rate affect employment in an open
economy. However, the magnitude of changes in employment and the speed of adjustment
in employment in response to a shock to the real exchange rate depend on the structure
of the underlying labor market, the degree of the firms’ openness to international trade
and on the degree of substitutability of foreign goods for domestic goods.
To understand the impact of movements in the exchange rate several authors have
modeled fluctuations in employment in response to exchange rate shocks. Most of them
measure the effects of exchange rate shocks on flows of workers. For example, Burgess
and Knetter (1998) evaluated the impact of an exchange rate shock on the net change in
industrial employment for G-7 countries, and found that the employment responds to the
shocks to exchange rates and adjusts slowly in the long run. Similarly, Greenaway et al.
(1999) estimated the impact of trade fluctuations on the net changes in flows of workers
in the UK and found that the import penetration significantly decreases the employment
in the UK. However, the net flows of workers underestimate the total impact of changes
in employment because exchange rate shocks destroy jobs in some sectors and generate
jobs in the other sectors. So the net change in employment may be zero but the gross
change is not. Hence, to determine the impact of shock to real exchange rate or any other
international factor on employment, net flows of the worker may not give a clear picture
of job turnover (Klein et al., 2003).
Keeping in view the above drawback of net flows, a number of recent studies have used
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the gross flows of jobs to measure the impact of swings in the real exchange rate. Their
measures of gross flows of employment increase the magnitude of labor adjustment, be-
cause, in these studies, gross flows of workers include both the movement of workers across
the firms and the movement of the worker within the firm (see for instance, Moser et al.
(2010), Gomez-Salvador et al. (2004)). Specifically, Moser et al. (2010) consider movement
of labor from one department to another department within a firm as job creation and job
destruction instead of calculating job creation and job destruction from the movements
of labor across the firms. Consequently, the size of job reallocation becomes large across
the firms because reallocation of jobs may occur without changing the employment level
in the firm.
Frequent changes in the real exchange rate produce labor adjustment costs associated
with trade because the volatility of the real exchange rate significantly decreases exports
(Chit et al., 2010). Thus, firms have to adjust their output and employment. Fluctuations
in the real exchange rate produce changes in relative prices which alter demand for ex-
ports and ultimately change the pattern of trade which re-allocates productive resources.
Consequently, once resource redistribution starts, firms have to bear the adjustment cost.
However, these adjustment costs vary from sector to sector and from industry to industry
depending on the degree of openness of the industry to international trade competition
(Knetter, 1989). With regard to the magnitude of change in relative prices in response to
an exchange rate shock, Campa and Gonzalez (2006) report that the pass-through rate
differs across industries in the short run and its magnitude is less than one. However, they
cannot reject the hypothesis of full pass through across industries and across countries in
the long run. Knetter and Goldberg (1997) report similar results.
In general, previous studies claim that a shock to the real exchange rate is an important
element in the set of variables that generates international labor market adjustment costs.
Specifically, researchers point out three potential channels through which movements in
the real exchange rate influence the labor market: export exposure, import competition
and cost exposure through imported inputs, see for example Campa and Goldberg (2001).
In the export channel, appreciation in the real exchange rate increases the
prices of goods for foreign customers which leads to a decrease in export de-
mand. Now firms producing goods being sold have two choices when they face
a decrease in export demand. One, they produce same level of output and
increase their inventories and stocks. Firms will go for increasing the stock if
they expect that appreciation in real exchange rate is just for a short period
of time or ready to give up a part of their profit. In this case there will be
no change in employment. Second, if firms expect that appreciation in real
exchange rate is not for a short period of time or they already facing a loss,
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or not ready to reduce their profit then they will reduce their output level
when the demand for their products decrease in international markets due to
appreciation in the real exchange rate. In this case, employment will fall. In
import channel, appreciation of the real exchange rate makes foreign good rel-
atively cheaper for the domestic consumers. So they increase the demand for
imported goods and decrease the demand for domestically produced goods.
Here again domestic firms have two choices either to decrease the output or
to increase their stock. In the first case employment decreases and in second
case there will be no change in the employment. In the import channel em-
ployment in response to appreciation in the real exchange rate decreases in the
firms whose products are close substitutes of the imported goods. In the case
of the imported inputs channel, appreciation of the real exchange rate makes
imported inputs cheaper and firms may reduce their cost by importing the
inputs they use to produce their products and reduce prices of their products.
This will increase the demand of their products in foreign and domestic mar-
kets leading to increase in employment. Through these channels swings in the real
exchange rate alter the relative prices of internationally traded goods and services, and
hence, distort their competitiveness in the international market. In contrast, non-traded
goods are less responsive to fluctuations in the real exchange rate (Engel, 1999). However,
the magnitude of exchange rate pass through is not similar across industries (Knetter and
Goldberg, 1997).
A substantial part of the recent literature argues that the speed of exchange rate pass-
through is slow and alters the composition of the exports which leads to reshuﬄing of
productive resources. Gust et al. (2010) and Corsetti et al. (2008) report that US imports
are less responsive to exchange rate volatility over the last two decades and exchange rate
pass through remains incomplete both in the short run and in the long run. However,
Campa and Gonzalez (2006) find that the pass-through rate differs across industries in
the short run and its magnitude is less than one. Moreover, they cannot reject the full
pass through across industries and countries in the long run. With respect to a change in
the composition of exports, Auer and Chaney (2009) predict that low quality good prices
are more sensitive to a shock to the exchange rate than prices of high quality goods. In
addition, their findings suggest that an appreciation of the local currency shifts the com-
position of exports towards higher quality and more expensive products. So, the existing
literature establishes the fact that fluctuations in exchange rates change the relative prices
of internationally traded goods, and alter their competitiveness in international markets.
Exchange rate-led gain or loss in competitiveness changes the demand for interna-
tionally traded goods and services, and accordingly, firms adjust their production and
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employment (Greenaway et al., 1999). However, exchange rate related adjustments in
production and employment differ across firms within an industry or across the industries
depending on their exposure to international competition and other institutional factors.
Industry characteristics like competitiveness in terms of prices of their products, compo-
sition of its labor force and production process also play their role in determining the
size of labor market adjustment costs in response to exchange rate fluctuations (Campa
and Goldberg, 2001). Thus, shocks to the exchange rate indirectly influence employment
levels.
Many researchers have quantified the magnitude of the labor market adjustment costs
resulting from changes in the real exchange rate and other international factors like quotas,
tariffs and preferential trade agreements. Their findings suggest a negative relationship
between changes in the real exchange rate and exports, employment and wages (Revenga,
1992). In addition, they indicate that the size of labor market adjustment costs in response
to fluctuations in the real exchange rate differs widely from country to country (Burgess
and Knetter, 1998), because domestic firms vary in their exposure to international compe-
tition (Buch et al., 2009). The findings of recent studies regarding the adjustment process
of labor markets in response to the exchange rate shocks also differ. Moser et al. (2010)
identified that adjustment process works through job creation in Germany. In contrast,
Klein et al. (2003) found that the adjustment process works through job destruction in
the United States. However, the magnitude of the labor adjustment cost in response to
changes in exchange rates in Germany is low as compared with the United States.
The literature also debates the responses of job creation and job destruction to fluctu-
ations in real exchange rate shocks to determine whether job creation and job destruction
react symmetrically. Moser et al. (2010) reported that shocks to the real exchange rate
do not foster job destruction but hinder job creation in Germany. Similarly, Abowd et al.
(1999) found that job creation is more sensitive to shocks than job destruction in France.
Likewise, Gourinchas (1999) suggested that real exchange rate fluctuations disturb job cre-
ation more as compared to job destruction. In the light of this evidence we can say that
the reaction of job creation and job destruction to real exchange rate shocks is asymmetric.
Overall, the existing literature indicates that the loss/gain in international competitive-
ness caused by swings in the real exchange rate is not identical across the board. Its mag-
nitude varies from firm to firm depending on their exposure to international competition.
Moreover, the adjustment costs associated with loss/gain in international competitiveness
differ from country to country because the comparative advantage and institutional fac-
tors that affect trade, output and employment vary across countries. Additionally, the
adjustment process in the labor market is not alike in all countries. Therefore, the results
of one country may not be generalized to other countries because the degree of openness to
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international trade, characteristics of labor markets and other institutions that influence
trade and trade related adjustment costs vary across countries.
Most of previous studies focus on the United States, Germany and other European
countries. In the UK case, the existing literature exploring the impact of real exchange
rate led shocks in international competitiveness on employment is very limited and is silent
with regard to the adjustment process in the labor market in response to fluctuation in
trade, whether it works through job destruction or job creation. Recently, Hijzen et al.
(2011) have analyzed workers turnover in response to trade for the UK. But Hijzen et al.
(2011) emphasize on the job flows in those firms of the UK that trade in services only.
Furthermore, Hijzen et al. (2011) focus on the employment in the firms that imports
services inputs. However, employment in the UK firms that export their products in other
countries are also important. In fact the UK economy is more open as compared to other
European countries, employment protection legislation in the UK is not as strong and
labor unions are weak especially since 1980. Therefore, it is worthwhile to explore the
effects of shocks to international competitiveness arising from changes in real exchange
rates on the UK labor market.
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it investigates the impact
of real exchange rate led loss/gain in international competitiveness on employment in UK
manufacturing sector. Second, it examines whether the adjustment process in employ-
ment works through job creation or job destruction. And finally, it determines whether
the effects of a loss/gain in international competitiveness in EU and non-EU markets on
employment in the UK are similar or different.
2.3 Empirical Model and Methodology
2.3.1 A Model of Job Flows and the Real Exchange Rate
In the literature many researchers have empirically analyzed the impact of trade and trade
affecting variables on job flows in different countries. For example Klein et al. (2003)
analyzed the job flows in US manufacturing sector, Hijzen et al. (2011) and Greenaway
et al. (1999) investigated the job turnover in the UK, Moser et al. (2010) looked into to
job flows in Germany, Abowd et al. (1999) analyzed job flows in France and Burgess and
Knetter (1998) examined cross country analysis of job flows for G-7 countries. In this
section we present theoretical model based on the Klein et al. (2003) framework which
serves our purpose in the best way to show how job creation and job destruction in the
UK manufacturing sector react to a real exchange rate shock. Primarily, changes in the
real exchange rate generate job creation and job destruction simultaneously by changing
the real wage rate which firms must pay. However, the extent of the effect of a given
change in real exchange rate on job flows depends on the openness of the industry. This
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framework provides a base for our empirical estimation.
We derive the theoretical model using the procedure adopted by Klein et al.
(2003). In fact, we reproduce the theoretical model of Klein et al. (2003).
However, the model we derive here differs from that of Klein et al. (2003) in
terms of definitions of the real exchange rate and openness. Klein et al. (2003)
define the real exchange rate as the ratio of the price of the products of the
firm to the domestic currency price of potential substitute products produced
by its foreign competitors. We base our definition of the real exchange rate on
trade weighted hourly wage costs in UK manufacturing sector relative to the
trade weighted hourly wage cost in UK’s trading partners. We think that it is
more appropriate to define real exchange rate based on wage costs to explore
the impact of real exchange rate on job flows.
Regarding openness, Klein et al. (2003) define openness as the average of
the ratio of imports plus exports to total sales, whereas we define openness as
the average of the ratio of total exports to total sales the period t and t−1. We
define openness in this way because we lack the data on industrial imports.
Let us assume that the cost function of pth firm in industry i is given by:
C(Wp, Hp;QP ) = W
α
p H
1−α
p Qp (2.3.1)
where Wp is the wage cost, Hp is the non-labor cost and Qp is the output of p
th firm
in industry i. Since the partial derivative of the cost function with respect to input prices
gives input demand, the demand for labor can be obtained by taking the partial derivative
of the cost function with respect to wages:
Lp =
∂C(Wp, Hp;QP )
∂Wp
= αWα−1p H
1−α
p Qp (2.3.2)
Taking the total derivative of the logarithm of the above equation, we obtain the
following:
L˜p = −(1− α)W˜p + (1− α)H˜p + Q˜p (2.3.3)
where X, X˜ = dlnX. Equation (2.3.3) gives labor demand conditional on the output
produced by the firm. How much this firm will produce depends on demand for its product
in domestic as well as in international markets. So, we assume that the demand for product
of the firm in industry i is
Qp = ApY
βΠkj=1[E
−µΩi
j Y
∗βΩi
j ]w
i
j (2.3.4)
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where Ap is an idiosyncratic demand shock facing this firm, Ej is the real exchange rate
with country j. Y is domestic income and Y ∗ is income of the country j. We assume that
wij and Ωi, Ωi(with 0 ≤ Ωi ≤ 1), are trade weights and openness parameters respectively,
and both are common to all the firms in industry i. The product of the wi and Ωi, wiΩi,
gives the openness of the industry i with respect to trade with country j. Now we take
the total differential of the logarithm of equation (2.3.4), which gives us equation (2.3.5).
Q˜p = A˜p + βY˜ − µΩi
∑
j
wijE˜j + βΩi
∑
j
wij Y˜
∗
j (2.3.5)
To simplify we define the difference in logarithm of the trade weighted exchange rate
for all firms in industry i as E˜i =
∑k
j=1 dw
i
jE˜j and the difference in trade weighted foreign
output as Y˜ ∗i =
∑k
j=1 dw
i
j Y˜
∗
j . Substituting equation (2.3.5) into equation (2.3.3) yields
the labor demand equation for the pth firm.
L˜p = −(1− α)W˜p + (1− α)H˜p + A˜p + βY˜ − µΩiE˜j + βΩiY˜ ∗j (2.3.6)
This equation shows that other things remaining constant, a depreciation of the trade-
weighted real exchange rate increases labor demand because E˜i < 0.
However, other things will not remain constant because a depreciation of the real
exchange rate will increase demand for labor in the whole industry and as a result of the
industry-wide rise in demand for labor, the wages that this particular firm must pay will
rise as well. To incorporate this we assume that all firms in the industry i pay the same
wage rate wi. In other words wp = wi. Moreover, we assume that workers can move
from industry i to the rest of the economy. It means that some substitutability among
the workers of industry i and the workers in the rest of the economy exists. With these
assumptions, the labor supply function which firm p in industry i faces becomes:
Lp = (
Wi
Γ
)γ (2.3.7)
where Γ is the wage rate prevailing in the rest of the economy, γ represents labor
supply elasticity and  shows the cross elasticity of the labor supply between industry i
and the rest of the economy. Moreover, γ > 0 and  < 0. With this specification, the total
differential of the log of labor supply function of the firm p is
L˜p = γ(W˜i − Γ˜) (2.3.8)
Now for simplicity and to focus on the role of the real exchange rate, assume that
H˜p, Y˜ and Y˜ ∗i are equal to zero. Further, all firms in industry i pay the same wage Wi.
When we insert these values into equation (2.3.4), the labor demand function of the firm
p becomes:
17
L˜p = A˜p − (1− α)W˜i − µΩiE˜i (2.3.9)
To get industry-wide change in labor demand, let us assume that an industry i has n
firms and relative employment size of the pth firm of the industry i is ϕ
i
p, where Σ
i
p=1 = 1.
This specification gives industry-wide change in employment as:
L˜i =
n∑
p=1
ϕipL˜p (2.3.10)
Similarly, define the weighted average of the proportional change in demand shock
among the n firms in industry i, A˜i, as:
A˜i =
n∑
p=1
ϕipA˜p (2.3.11)
Putting the value of L˜p in equation (2.3.10) gives industry-wide change in labor de-
mand, which is expressed as follows:
L˜i = A˜i − (1− α)W˜i − µΩiE˜i (2.3.12)
Now set labor demand in the ith industry equal to labor supply in that industry to get
W˜i in terms of E˜i, Γ˜i and A˜i. For this we substitute equation (2.3.8) in equation (2.3.12)
and rearrange the resulting equation we get the following expression:
W˜i =
A˜i
(1− α) + γ +
γεΓ˜
(1− α) + γ −
µΩiE˜i
(1− α) + γ (2.3.13)
Now we insert the value of W˜i in equation (2.3.12) to get the final equation for L˜p
which shows the change in demand for labor of pth firm in the ith industry as a result of
a shock to real exchange rate along with other shocks to the industry.
L˜p = (A˜p − κA˜i)− κγεΓ˜− (1 + κ)µΩiE˜i (2.3.14)
where κ = (1−α)(1−α)+γ and 1 ≥ κ ≥ 0. This equation shows that pth firm exhibits job
creation if L˜p > 0 and job destruction if L˜p < 0. Furthermore, the solution shows that job
creation or job destruction in a particular firm depends on an idiosyncratic shock specific
to the firm, an aggregate shock to the industry which the firm belongs to, and a shock
to other aggregate variables, such as E˜i and Γ˜. Equation (2.3.14) exhibits the likelihood
that a rise in the real exchange rate increases job destruction while decreases in the real
exchange rate boost job creation.
Equation (2.3.14) describes the relationship of job creation and job destruction to the
real exchange rate and other idiosyncratic shocks for a single firm. To change this re-
lationship for the entire industry we need job creation and job destruction rates for the
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entire industry. Following Davis et al. (1996), we define job creation and job destruction
rates for the whole industry as the size-weighted average rates of job creation and job
destruction for all firms in that industry. Let S+ be the set of firms that expand employ-
ment in a given period of time and S− is the set of firms that contract employment in a
given period of time. Also, define φ+ as employment share of all the firms that expand
employment in a given period of time relative to employment in the whole industry, and
φ− as employment share of all the firms that contract employment in a given period of
time relative to employment in the industry.
Φ+ =
∑
pεS+
ϕp (2.3.15)
and
Φ− =
∑
pεS−
ϕp (2.3.16)
where Φ+ ≥ 0, Φ− ≥ 0 and Φ+ + Φ− = 1. Now using equation (2.3.14) and equation
(2.3.15) we get job creation for the entire industry, which is
JCi =
∑
pεS+
ϕp[(A˜p − κA˜i)− κγεΓ˜− (1 + κ)µΩiE˜i] (2.3.17)
Further simplification of this equation gives
JCi = −Φ+(κA˜i + κγεΓ˜ + (1 + κ)µΩiE˜i) +
∑
pεS+
ϕpA˜p (2.3.18)
This equation shows that all else remaining constant, a depreciation in the real ex-
change rate decreases job creation.
Similarly, job destruction for the entire industry is
JDi = −
∑
pεS+
ϕp[(A˜p − κA˜i)− κγεΓ˜− (1 + κ)µΩiE˜i] (2.3.19)
Further simplification of equation (2.3.19) gives
JDi = Φ+(κA˜i + κγεΓ˜ + (1 + κ)µΩiE˜i)−
∑
pεS+
ϕpA˜p (2.3.20)
This equation shows that other things remaining the same, a depreciation in the real
exchange rate increases job destruction.
Overall equations (2.3.18) and (2.3.20) suggest that fluctuations in the real exchange
rate are associated with job flows. Holding other factors constant, appreciation of the real
exchange adds to job creation and diminishes job destruction. Further, these equations
suggest that the effect of exchange rate shocks on job creation and job destruction is more
pronounced in more open industries.
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2.3.2 Empirical Model
The theoretical model presented in the previous section gives a general framework for the
econometric specification of our model. This section deals with the way to get a specific
econometric specification of the model which allows us to test employment fluctuations in
response to changes in the real exchange rate. The reduced form of the general framework
with some modification gives the model we estimate to get empirical results regarding the
effects of loss or gain in competitiveness in EU and non-EU markets on UK employment.
Our empirical model is similar to that used by Moser et al. (2010), which is a modified
reduced form of the Klein et al. (2003) model. Moser et al. (2010) in their empirical
model treat 32 trading partners of the Germany as one group while calculating
the real exchange rate, whereas we treat 32 trading partners of the UK as one
group while calculating the real exchange rate. In addition, we have bifurcated
these 32 trading partners into European and non-European trading partners
of the UK and have calculated the real exchange rate for each group. This
bifurcation of the trading partners into European and non-European trading
partners gives us an opportunity to check the impact to fluctuations in the
real exchange rate of UK with European and non-European trading partners
individually as well as in a group on employment in the UK manufacturing
sector. Moser et al. (2010) use a real exchange rate based on trade weighted
relative wage cost and have calculated by considering 32 trading partners as a
one group their empirical model specification. Following Moser et al. (2010), in
our analysis, we also use a real exchange rate based on trade weighted relative
wage costs. However, we calculate a real exchange rate for three groups. This
grouping is based on the trading partners of the UK and defined as under:
• First, we consider all 32 trading partners of the UK as one group to
calculate the real exchange rate.
• Second, we consider only European trading partners of the UK as a group
to calculate the real exchange rate.
• Third, we consider only non-European trading partners of the UK as a
group to calculate the real exchange rate.
Specifically, we can write the empirical models as follows.
Workerflowit = β0 + β1Jobcreationit−1 + β2Jobdestructionit−1 + β3Avgwageit
+ β4GDPgrowtht + β5Salesgrowthit + β6Competitivenessit
+ β7Sizeit + µt + it (2.3.21)
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where i = industry and t = time
Workerflow ∈ {Job Creation, Job Destruction, Net Flows, Gross Flows}
Since UK trade with European Union countries is free, whereas trade with
non-European, especially with poor countries, is subject to various tariff and
non-tariff barriers, therefore, the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on the
trade of the UK with EU member countries and non-member countries is likely
to differ. Moreover, real exchange rates can vary only with respect to Euro-
pean countries or only with respect to non-European countries and remain
fixed with other countries. Therefore, the impact of loss/gain in competitive-
ness in European and non-European markets on the UK labor market may
differ. Thus to model these situations, first, we divide the 32 trading partners
into two groups, European trading partners and non-European trading part-
ners, and instead of using competitiveness of the UK goods in the markets of
32 trading partners of the UK, in the above model, we use competitiveness of
UK goods in the European market only as an independent variable to estimate
the impact of the real exchange rate on employment in the UK manufacturing
sector. The resulting model will estimate how employment in the UK man-
ufacturing sector responds to the variations in real exchange rate of the UK
with only European trading partners of the UK. In simple words, the new
model will allow us to estimate the impact of real exchange rate changes on
employment in the UK under a situation in which the UK only trades with
the EU countries. Second, instead of using competitiveness of the UK goods
in the markets of 32 trading partners of the UK in the above model we use
competitiveness of UK goods in only non-European market as independent
variable to estimate the impact of the real exchange rate on employment in
the UK manufacturing sector. The resulting model will estimate how employ-
ment in UK manufacturing sector responds to the variations in real exchange
rate of the UK with only non-European trading partners of the UK. In this
case the new model will allow us to estimate the impact of the real exchange
rate on the employment in the UK under a situation in which UK only trades
with the non-EU countries. Third, instead of using competitiveness of the UK
goods in the markets of 32 trading partners of the UK in the above model
we use competitiveness of UK goods in European markets and non-European
markets as independent variables to estimate the impact of the real exchange
rate on employment in the UK manufacturing sector. Thus, in this case, the
new model will allow us to estimate the impact of the real exchange rate on
employment in the UK under a situation in which the UK trades with the EU
21
and non-EU countries at a time, but we assume that the fluctuations in the
exchange rates of UK with EU countries do not affect the trade with non-EU
countries or the other way round. In this case the empirical model takes the
form as written below in equation (2.3.22).
Workerflowit = β0 + β1Jobcreationit−1 + β2Jobdestructionit−1
+ β3Avgwageit + β4GDPgrowtht + β5Salesgrowthit
+ β6Competitiveness(EU)it + β7Competitiveness(non− EU)it
+ β8Sizeit + µt + it (2.3.22)
In fact, world trading markets are interlinked with each other and the effects of a shock
in one market may be transmitted to other markets. The linkages between the different
markets may change the pattern of job flows in trading economies in response to a shock
to the real exchange rate. In the same vein, a shock to UK trade with EU countries may
change the volume of UK trade with non-EU countries or the other way round. Thus, we
add an interaction term of EU and non-EU competitiveness in model (2.3.22) to capture
the interaction between the EU and non-EU markets and their combined effect on changes
in employment in UK manufacturing. The model (2.3.22) changes to equation (2.3.23)
given below.
Workerflowit = β0 + β1Jobcreationit−1 + β2Jobdestructionit−1
+ β3Avgwageit + β4GDPgrowtht + β5Salesgrowthit
+ β6Competitiveness(EU)it + β7Competitiveness(non− EU)it
+ β8Competitiveness(EU)it × Competitiveness(non− EU)it
+ β9Sizeit + µt + it (2.3.23)
2.3.3 Construction of Variables
We use a procedure similar to that of Davis et al. (1996) to calculate job flows: job
creation, job destruction, gross job flows and net job flows. Let the level of employment
in a firm in period t is eft and ∆eft is the change in employment between the period t
and t− 1. S+ and S− are the groups of firms with ∆eft > 0 and ∆eft < 0 respectively, in
industry S. To get job creation, we add up all the changes in employment in S+ group.
For job destruction, we sum all the changes in employment in S− group. The size of
the firm xft is measured as the average employment between the period t and t − 1, i.e.
xft = 0.5(eft + eft−1). Accordingly, industry size is obtained by summing up average firm
employment across the industry, i.e. Xst =
∑
xft
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With regard to job flow rates, job creation, and job destruction flow rates are calculated
as the size-weighted average of the change in employment, using the formula given below.
JCst =
∑
fS+
gft
xft
Xst
(2.3.24)
JCst =
∑
fS−
gft
xft
Xst
(2.3.25)
where gft =
∆(eft)
xft is the growth rate of employment in firm f at time t. The sum of
the job creation (JC) and job destruction (JD) gives total job reallocation or gross job
flows (GFR) in the industry S and the difference of JC and JD gives net changes in the
employment or net job flows (NFR) in the industry S.
Following Moser et al. (2010), we employ a real exchange rate index based on the wage
cost of the firm as the explanatory variable in the model to capture how fluctuations in real
exchange rates affect firms’ employment decisions. The real exchange rate is measured as
the UK’s average hourly wage cost in manufacturing relative to the trade-weighted average
hourly wage cost across the UK’s trading partners as below:
Real Exchange Rate = (Wage Cost)t =
∑
j⊂C
(Hourly Wage Cost in UK)t
(Hourly Wage Cost)jt
× (Exports)jt∑
iC(Exports)it
In our analysis, a shock to the real exchange rate means a large increase/decrease
in the hourly wage average cost in the UK manufacturing sector relative to
the trade-weighted average wage cost across the UK’s trading partners. Fluc-
tuations in the real exchange rate affect employment through three channels
namely the export channel, import channel and imported inputs channel. Note
that, a rise in the real exchange rate means a rise in the cost of the produc-
tion and reduction in the profitability of a firm if the prices of the products
which it produces remain constant. The rise in real exchange rate may have
no impact on the employment if a firm is ready to reduce its profit and does
not increase the prices of its product when it faces the rise in relative wage
cost. The firm may not increase the prices of its products if it expects that
the rise in the real exchange rate is not permanent. But if a firm shifts all or
a portion of the rise in the cost of production to the prices of the product it
produces, then, the rise in the real exchange rate may lead to a reduction in
employment. This reduction in employment in response to a rise in the real
exchange rate can occur through any or all three channels given above.
In the export exposure channel, a rise in real exchange rate increases the
prices of exports and reduces the demand for goods being sold in interna-
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tional markets. Now firms have two choices: first, they can go for piling up
their stocks and inventories and keep on producing their products at the level
at which they were producing before the rise in real exchange rate. Second,
if they do not increase their stocks and inventories and opt to reduce their
output when they face a reduction in demand for their products in interna-
tional markets. In the first case there will be no impact of a rise in the real
exchange rate on employment but in the second case a rise in the real ex-
change rate reduces the employment. So the export exposure channel have
negative impact of fluctuations in real exchange rate on employment. In the
import exposure channel, a rise in the cost of production due to a rise in real
exchange rate increases the prices of domestic products and makes imported
products relatively cheaper. This again leads to a decrease in the demand for
goods produced locally and increases the demand for imported goods. Partic-
ularly, the demand for goods whose cheaper imported substitutes are available
will decrease leading to a decrease in output and employment of the domestic
firms. So, the import exposure channel have negative impact of fluctuations
in real exchange rate on employment.
In the imported input channel, a rise in real exchange rate makes the
imported inputs cheaper. The firms can control the cost of production by
using the imported inputs. In this case impact of a rise in real exchange rate
on employment can be positive depending on the proportion of the imported
inputs being used in the production process.
So the net effect of fluctuations in the real exchange rate on employment
depends on the magnitudes of these three effects. However, in this chapter,
we focus only on the export exposure channel of the impact of the fluctuations
in the real exchange rate on employment because we do not have data on
industry level imports and the use of imported inputs.
Although the fluctuations in the real exchange rate affect employment
through three channels given above, we focus only on the export channel while
estimating the impact of real exchange rate on employment in the UK man-
ufacturing sector because we do not have the data on industry-level imports
and the data on use of industry-level imported inputs.
The wage cost(real exchange rate) and job creation move in opposite directions. How-
ever, wage cost and job destruction move in the same direction. Therefore, we expect that
an appreciation of the real exchange rate decreases the job creation rate and increases the
job destruction rate. In addition, the real exchange rate as measured in the above formula
indicates that for a given shock to the real exchange rate, employment fluctuates more in
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the firms that have a higher export share. Thus, we expect that labor employed in the
more open firms is more exposed to external shocks, such as swings in real exchange rates.
Changes in the real exchange rates alter the relative prices and consequently, the compet-
itiveness of firms in international markets changes. So, to calculate the competitiveness
of the industry in the global market, we have interacted openness of the industry with
changes in the real exchange rate from year t to t− 1.
Competitivenessit = 4(Wage Cost)t ×Opennessit
where, openness is defined as the average share of exports in total revenues in year t
and t− 1, and it is calculated by using the formula given below
Opennessit =
1
2
t−1∑
τ=t−2
Exportsit
(Total Revenues)it
We expect a positive coefficient of competitiveness for job creation and a negative
coefficient for job destruction. Regarding the coefficients of competitiveness for gross and
net job flows, we make no prior judgment. In the case of GDP growth rate and sales
growth rate, we expect a positive coefficient for job creation and a negative coefficients for
job destruction.
The other variables used in the analysis are defined as follows:
Hourly wage costs: Hourly compensation costs for production workers in U.S. dollars
in country j in year t.
Exports: Exports from the UK to country j in year t. We use total UK exports to
calculate real exchange rate. To calculate openness of the industry, we use firm level
exports.
Real GDP growth: Nominal GDP growth in the UK in year t, deflated by consumer
the price index.
Sales growth: Growth of total revenues from year t− 1 to t.
Avg. wage: Total wage sum in reporting year t divided by total employment in year t.
2.3.4 Data Sources
The data used in this Chapter are taken from various sources. To calculate job creation,
job destruction, gross job reallocation and net change in employment, firm-level data on
employment are obtained from the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) on-line data
base. Firm level exports, sales, capital and wages and salaries are also extracted from the
same source. Researchers point out some problems with FAME data set, for
example Harris and Li (2007) compared the Annual Respondents Database
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(ARD) and FAME data sets and report, the FAME database is unrepresenta-
tive of small- to medium-sized enterprises and therefore cannot produce results
that can be generalized to the UK level. In pointing out that FAME is biased
towards large enterprises Harris and Li (2007) define a firm as a small firm
if it employs less than 13 employees, a firm as a medium firm if it employs
between 13 and 66 employees and a firm as a large firm if it employs more than
66 employees. However, if we use the European Union definition of firms clas-
sification then FAME data gives a good representation of the small, medium
and large firms. According to the European Classification of firms, a firm is
termed as a small firm if it employs less than 50 people, a firm is termed as
a medium firm if it employs 50 to 249 people and a firm is termed as a large
firm if it employs 250 or more people. Moreover, many researchers like Faggio
et al. (2010), Greenhalgh and Rogers (2006), Bridges and Guariglia (2008),
Liu et al. (2000), Girma et al. (2008), Draca et al. (2008) and Greenaway et al.
(2007) have used the data extracted from FAME database for their firm-level
studies for the UK. Our sample size consists of firms of twenty two industries
of the UK manufacturing sector. These 22 industries give a good representa-
tion of small, medium and large firms. Table 1 and Figure 1 show distribution
of the firms into small, medium and large in each industry. Table 1 shows that
the share of small and large firms are almost similar in most of the industries.
Only in the cases of industries 16, 34 and 35 are the shares of large firms much
higher than the share of small firms. However, the total number of firms in
these industries is low, particularly in industry 16 the total number of firms
is just 161. The share of medium sized firms in each industry is higher than
the share of small and large firms in all the industries except in industry 16
in which the share of large firms is the higher than the share of medium and
small firms.
The firm-specific information available at FAME gives us an opportunity to extend
our analysis for exporting and non-exporting industries. To accomplish this purpose, we
define an exporting industry as a group of firms in an industry who sell their product
in international markets. In contrast, we define non-exporting industry as a group of
firms in an industry who sell their products only in domestic markets. More precisely, the
FAME data set allows us to capture the behavioral response of firms who are involved in
international trade, and the firms who sell only in the domestic markets, to an exogenous
shock.
Another important variable which affects the decisions of firms regarding employment
is the hourly wage cost. This is taken from the United States Bureau of Labor Statis-
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Table 1: Distribution of Firms in 22 Industries of the UK Manufacturing
Sector
No. of Firms Shares
Industry Total Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
15 12553 2682 5686 4185 21.37 45.30 33.34
16 161 37 37 87 22.98 22.98 54.04
17 3774 740 2099 935 19.61 55.62 24.77
18 2157 694 922 541 32.17 42.74 25.08
19 728 108 426 194 14.84 58.52 26.65
20 2986 676 1722 588 22.64 57.67 19.69
21 3727 692 2137 898 18.57 57.34 24.09
22 13454 3983 6534 2937 29.60 48.57 21.83
23 661 203 287 171 30.71 43.42 25.87
24 11296 3194 5115 2987 28.28 45.28 26.44
25 7630 1457 4309 1864 19.10 56.47 24.43
26 4298 978 2057 1263 22.75 47.86 29.39
27 4087 1128 1993 966 27.60 48.76 23.64
28 18416 4187 10743 3486 22.74 58.34 18.93
29 11525 3364 5334 2827 29.19 46.28 24.53
30 2264 680 1017 567 30.04 44.92 25.04
31 7739 1942 3879 1918 25.09 50.12 24.78
32 4217 954 2217 1046 22.62 52.57 24.80
33 5898 1775 2820 1303 30.09 47.81 22.09
34 3385 371 1626 1388 10.96 48.04 41.00
35 3059 633 1331 1095 20.69 43.51 35.80
36 14403 3509 8044 2850 24.36 55.85 19.79
According to European Classification of firms, a firm is termed as a small firm if it employs less than 50
people. a firm is termed as a medium firm if it employs 50 to 249 people and a firm is termed as a large
firm if it employs 250 or more people.
UK SIC 2003 classification is used for industry classification coding. See Table A.7 in the Appendix A for
industry code explanation.
Figure 1: Share of Firms in 22 industries of UK Manufacturing Sector
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tics (BLS). BLS provides hourly wage costs for 32 countries from four different regions:
Americas, Europe, Asia and Oceania. We have divided these 32 countries into two major
27
groups: European and non-European to measure how changes in wage costs in the UK
relative to other countries affect employment in the UK manufacturing (see Table 2 for
UK trading partners).
Table 2: The UK Major Trading Partners
No European Trading partners No non-European Trading Partners
1 Austria 1 United States
2 Belgium 2 Brazil
3 Czech Republic 3 Mexico
4 Denmark 4 Australia
5 Finland 5 China, P.R: Hong Kong
6 France 6 Israel
7 Germany 7 Japan
8 Hungary 8 Korea Republic of
9 Ireland 9 New Zealand
10 Italy 10 Philippine
11 Luxembourg 11 Singapore
12 Netherlands 12 Sri Lanka
13 Norway 13 Canada
14 Poland
16 Portugal
17 Spain
18 Sweden
19 Switzerland
Also note that the data on hourly wage costs are available only for these 32 countries.
Further note that more than 80 percent of UK exports flow to these countries (see Table
3). More than 96 percent of UK total exports to European markets goes to the countries
we have included in our sample. Similarly, more than 59 percent of total UK exports to
non-European countries goes to the countries we have selected as non-European trading
partners of the UK.
We have exploited hourly wage costs to calculate real exchange rates for the UK with
other European and non-European countries and the competitiveness of the exports of
the UK in European and non-European countries’ markets. Details of the construction of
the real exchange rate and competitiveness are given in the variable construction section.
Other macroeconomic variables used in this study are the GDP growth rate and CPI.
The data on GDP growth rate and CPI are extracted from World Development Indicator
(WDI) 2009. Similarly, data on UK exports to her various trading partners are taken from
the United Nations on-line data base; UN COMTRADE. This analysis covers the time
period from 1999 to 2010.
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Table 3: UK Export Share to EU and non-EU Countries
Year EU non-EU Selected 32 Selected EU Selected non-EU
Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries
1999 63.66 36.34 86.72 97.65 67.59
2000 62.06 37.94 86.61 97.49 68.80
2001 59.91 40.09 84.30 97.52 64.55
2002 61.36 38.64 85.13 97.33 65.77
2003 59.28 40.72 83.17 96.97 63.08
2004 57.93 42.07 81.54 96.82 60.52
2005 57.63 42.37 80.85 97.02 58.85
2006 60.81 39.19 81.83 96.83 58.56
2007 60.58 39.42 81.90 96.71 59.14
2008 59.78 40.22 80.84 96.54 57.51
2009 58.23 41.77 80.89 96.50 59.14
Note: See Table 2 for EU and non-EU trading partners of the UK.
All figures are in percentage.
2.3.5 At First Glance
Although our data cover only 12 years from 1999 to 2010, a relatively short time period,
our variables of interest including the real exchange rate, GDP growth rate, employment,
exports and sales exhibit considerable variations. Below we explain how the real exchange
rate of the UK have behaved throughout the sample period and then we present the
summary statistics of the other variables included in the model.
According to Cobham (2002) in the presence of separate currencies with
variable exchange rates for different countries, the exchange rate is seen as
an important adjustment mechanism and an important policy tool in trans-
mitting/absorbing the effects of an external shock under the flexible exchange
rate regimes. However, other researchers like Buiter (2000) point out that
the exchange rate itself is a source of external asymmetric shocks therefore
he prefers fixed exchange rate regimes and favors the fixed exchange rate and
giving up the adjustment mechanism that works through flexible exchange
rates.
The UK is a good example of the flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes
because to be the part of European Monetary System (EMS) the UK entered
into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) program in October
1990 and adopted the fixed exchange rate system. However, the UK left the
ERM program within two years in September 1992 and came back to flexible
exchange rate regime because the pound sterling came under the pressure of
speculators.
As the exchange rate of a country appreciates or depreciate and adjusts
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in short-run under the flexible exchange rate mechanism in response to the
nature of an external shocks such as portfolio shock therefore it automatically
move towards some long-run equilibrium. The overvalued valued currencies
depreciate and undervalued currencies appreciate and move along their long-
run equilibrium values. The large fluctuations in the values of a currency in
terms of other currencies in which substantial deviations from the average
value occurs are termed as the shock to the exchange rate.
Fluctuations in nominal exchange rates: value of currency of the country
in terms of currency of another country, brings about changes in the real
exchange rate: cost of foreign goods in terms of domestic goods. According to
Cobham (2002) for UK, in short-run the causality runs from nominal exchange
rate to real exchange rate and has marked the period of 1975 to 2000 as
a period of strong depreciations in the nominal exchange rate of the UK.
Moreover, he marked the trends of appreciations in the real exchange rate
of the UK over the period from 1979 to 1981 and over the period from 1996
to 1998. During this period the fluctuations in the real exchange rate were
similar to the changes in the nominal exchange rate, however, the changes in
real exchange rates were preceded by the fluctuations in nominal exchange
rates.
Since our objective is to measure the impact of the fluctuations in the real
exchange rates on the employment in the UK manufacturing sector, therefore,
we use the real exchange rate based on trade-weighted labor cost in UK man-
ufacturing sector relative to labor costs in the manufacturing sectors of the
trading partners of the UK. Figure 2 shows the wage costs in manufacturing
sector based real exchange rate of the UK over the period of the 1999 to 2010.
The trends in real exchange rate suggests the large overvaluation during the
period from 1999 to 2001 and the large undervaluation during the period from
2008 to 2010. Wren-Lewis and Britain (2003) and Cobham (2006) reported
that pound sterling was 16 percent overvalued against euro and 10 percent
overvalued against the dollar in 2002. Furthermore, Cobham (2006) points
out that these overvaluations of the sterling had an adverse impact on the
tradable sector. Overall, Figure 2 and Figure 4 suggest that overvaluations of
the sterling from 2006 to 2007 had adversely affected the UK exports. Simi-
larly, the trends in real exchange rate also suggests the small undervaluation
during the period from 2002 to 2003 and the small overvaluation during the
period from 2006 to 2007. Overall, Figure 2 suggest that real exchange rate
of the UK had been oscillating around its average value of the whole sample
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period. The movements in the real exchange rate of the UK during 1999 to
2010 can be divided into three segments: first, the period of depreciation from
1999 to 2003, second, the period of appreciation from 2003 to 2007 and third,
again the period of depreciation from 2007 to 2010.
Figure 2: Real Exchange Rate based on the Wage Costs in Manufacturing
Sector of the UK from 1999 to 2010
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However, Figure 3 shows that trade-weighted real exchange rate of the UK
was relatively less volatile and had oscillated within the band of five percent
around the mean value of the real exchange rates for the period starting from
1999 to 2008. The trend in trade weighted real exchange rate indicates the
large undervaluation from 2008 and onward. According to Cobham (2002) the
real exchange rate based on wage costs in manufacturing sector reflects the
variations in the mark ups that affect the competitiveness of the UK goods
traded in the global markets, therefore, the trends in real exchange rates shown
in Figures 2 and 3 may indicate that the fluctuations in the competitiveness
of the UK goods in international markets, which in turn affects the exports,
output and employment.
Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 show variations in real exports, real exchange rate
with 32 trading partners, real exchange rate with non-EU trading partners
and real exchange rate with EU trading partners.
Figures 4, 5, 7 and 18 in Appendix A show real exchange rate of the UK
with 32 trading partners, with non-EU trading partners, with EU trading
partners and with top 5 UK trading partners. Figures 4, 5 and 7 suggest
that total exports and real exchange rate with 32 trading partners and real
exchange rate with EU trading partners move in opposite directions. However,
Figure 6 seems to suggest that total exports and the real exchange rate with
non-EU trading partners move in same direction. This may be driven by the
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Figure 3: Trade-weighted Real Exchange Rate of the UK from 1999 to 2010
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Figure 4: Total Exports of the UK from 1999 to 2010
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fact that labor compensation cost in UK manufacturing sector is relatively low
as compared to the EU and non-EU trading partners. Our measure of real
exchange rate is based on compensation cost which in fact has risen over the
time but remained less as compared to EU and non-EU trading partners of
the UK. Figures 8,9 and 10 shows that compensation costs of the UK and its
5 major trading partners. The trend in these Figures shows that the UK is
relatively a low cost country. Figure 10 shows that before 2003, hourly labor
compensation cost in the UK was low as compared to compensation costs in
non-EU trading partners but higher as compared with the compensation costs
in EU trading partners. From 2003 to 2007 labor compensation cost in UK
was similar to its trading partners but after 2007 it has become higher in both
EU and non-EU trading partners of the UK. Comparing Figures 5, 6, 7 in the
main text and Figure 16 in Appendix A suggests that the real exchange rate and average
32
Figure 5: UK’s Real Exchange Rate with selected 32 Trading Partners from
1999 to 2010
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Figure 6: UK’s Real Exchange Rate with selected non-EU Trading Partners
from 1999 to 2010
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export shares in total sales move in opposite directions, and that the real exchange rate
appears a prominent variable in explaining current export shares in total sales. The trend
in the real exchange rate and export shares in total sales suggests that real exchange rate
fluctuations precede changes in export shares in total sale. So, in the light of these figures
we can say that UK manufacturing industries may sign future export contracts on the
basis of the current real exchange rate.
Figure 17 in Appendix A displays average employment in the UK manufacturing sector.
In the light of Figure 17 in the Appendix A, we can see that average employment in
this sector steadily decreased over time. Specifically, the continuous downward trend
in average employment in the last decade seems to suggest that average employment is
uncorrelated with the real exchange rate. However, when we split the manufacturing sector
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Figure 7: UK’s Real Exchange Rate with selected EU Trading Partners from
1999 to 2010
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into exporting and non-exporting industries, the trends in average employment shows its
linkages with the real exchange rate more clearly. For instance, the appreciation in the
real exchange rate in the late nineties is escorting the decline in employment in exporting
industries and the rise in employment in non-exporting industries in 2000.
Table 4: Summary Statistics (All Industries)
Year Total GDP Sales Export Job Job Net Gross
Employment Growth Growth Share Creation Destruction Flows Flows
1999 375320 3.47 27.54
2000 388528 3.92 17.84 27.66 6.37 15.61 -9.24 21.99
2001 403820 2.46 18.46 19.67 5.03 9.41 -4.39 14.44
2002 390478 2.10 0.37 20.50 4.59 9.37 -4.78 13.95
2003 370680 2.82 12.19 19.67 3.20 8.62 -5.43 11.82
2004 352289 2.76 1.29 22.26 4.09 6.42 -2.33 10.52
2005 339726 2.17 6.85 17.58 4.75 6.97 -2.22 11.72
2006 333018 2.85 0.62 19.77 4.96 6.09 -1.13 11.05
2007 326934 2.56 4.42 18.24 4.91 5.66 -0.74 10.57
2008 325298 0.55 13.42 17.74 5.82 5.00 0.82 10.81
2009 270298 -4.92 -141.54 31.30 2.34 7.19 -4.85 9.53
Note: See Table 2 for EU and non-EU trading partners of the UK.
All figures except total employment are in percentage.
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Figure 8: Average Hourly Compensation Cost in Manufacturing Sectors of
the UK and UK’s top 5 Trading Partners from 1999 to 2010
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Figure 9: Hourly Compensation Cost in Manufacturing Sectors of the UK and
UK’s Trading Partners from 1999 to 2010
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Figure 10: Hourly Compensation Cost in Manufacturing Sectors of the UK
and UK’s top 5 Trading Partners from 1999 to 2010
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Table 5: Summary Statistics (Exporting Industries)
Year Total GDP Sales Export Job Job Net Gross
Employment Growth Growth Share Creation Destruction Flows Flows
1999 190213 3.47 48.21
2000 217847 3.92 14.32 49.34 7.30 7.47 -0.16 14.77
2001 199208 2.46 -15.68 45.95 4.54 8.57 -4.02 13.11
2002 206181 2.10 8.87 47.01 7.48 11.08 -3.59 18.56
2003 196554 2.82 -133.17 48.48 3.63 6.66 -3.03 10.29
2004 188833 2.76 7.74 49.40 3.36 6.91 -3.55 10.27
2005 184639 2.17 -54.86 48.25 5.05 5.12 -0.07 10.17
2006 174848 2.85 1.57 50.94 5.18 5.33 -0.15 10.51
2007 171241 2.56 0.16 50.77 5.60 3.78 1.82 9.38
2008 165619 0.55 4.88 52.55 5.68 4.26 1.42 9.95
2009 161019 -4.92 -6.65 56.78 2.97 7.41 -4.44 10.39
Note: See Table 2 for EU and non-EU trading partners of the UK.
All figures except total employment are in percentage.
Note that we define an exporting industry as the group of firms in an industry that sell all or a portion
of their output in foreign markets. Moreover, if a firm exports in some years and does not export in other
years, in this case we include this particular firm in exporting firms’ group in the years in which it has sold
all or a portion of its output in foreign markets, and in all other years we include this particular firm in
non-exporting firms’ group because this firm’s exports are zero in these years.
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Table 6: Summary Statistics (Non-Exporting Industries)
Year Total GDP Sales Job Job Net Gross
Employment Growth Growth Creation Destruction Flows Flows
1999 185107 3.47
2000 170681 3.92 13.66 4.80 26.39 -21.59 31.19
2001 204611 2.46 33.56 6.49 10.04 -3.55 16.52
2002 184298 2.10 -1.14 3.31 7.53 -4.22 10.85
2003 174126 2.82 11.92 3.19 11.12 -7.93 14.31
2004 163456 2.76 -10.09 5.29 6.88 -1.58 12.17
2005 155087 2.17 13.88 4.46 9.27 -4.81 13.72
2006 158170 2.85 -23.85 4.86 7.45 -2.58 12.31
2007 155693 2.56 8.85 4.50 9.10 -4.61 13.60
2008 159679 0.55 14.44 8.69 6.44 2.25 15.13
2009 109278 -4.92 -305.86 1.92 7.77 -5.85 9.69
Note: See Table 2 for EU and non-EU trading partners of the UK.
All the figures except total employment are in percentage.
Note that we define non-exporting industry as the group of a firms in an industry that do not sell their
out put in the foreign markets.
Table 7: Average Job Creation, Job Destruction , Net Flows, Gross Flows,
Sales, Exports and Wages in UK Manufacturing Industries from 1999-2010
Industry
Code JC JD NF GF Sale Export Wages
15 50983.08 95592.34 -44609.25 146575.4 3697189 171874.6 122165.1
16 5597.333 3591.583 2005.75 9188.917 291182.3 60399.43 14601.97
17 5803.333 11071.58 -5268.25 16874.92 96932.39 20055.54 12565.97
18 4503.417 8552 -4048.583 13055.42 70634.84 7543.109 7467.337
19 892.1667 2388.5 -1496.333 3280.667 40240.04 7230.404 3196.646
20 2846.833 8060.167 -5213.333 10907 85744.76 4543.737 8847.788
21 3799.417 9297.667 -5498.25 13097.08 506284.3 36815.36 22395.56
22 22281.5 34270 -11988.5 56551.5 1260667 178784.6 100786.7
23 3445.333 7741.083 -4295.75 11186.42 2321497 504470.7 58681.81
24 18202.83 50266.42 -32063.58 68469.25 3272974 411923.3 119461.8
25 8148.583 20784.83 -12636.25 28933.42 480903.2 74528.7 36091.47
26 8039.583 26072.25 -18032.67 34111.83 1543351 62480.46 34576.44
27 6096.75 11961.67 -5864.917 18058.42 390737.8 142946.2 30326.74
28 36356.33 54847.42 -18491.08 91203.75 995959.7 297853.5 126096.8
29 26240.75 58231.42 -31990.67 84472.16 1107337 426489.7 127410.9
30 7200.083 6551.25 648.8333 13751.33 783334.3 62050.59 26499.78
31 15751.67 35525.25 -19773.58 51276.92 605052.3 144426.8 54367.87
32 14031.17 13341.83 689.3333 27373 711675.7 238626.1 46822.89
33 16995.83 21788.42 -4792.583 38784.25 566316.6 201236.1 61050.16
34 7424.75 22025 -14600.25 29449.75 492274.6 92554.8 42116.74
35 14638.58 11589.75 3048.833 26228.33 406481.1 205955.2 68437.18
36 17701.67 28204.67 -10503 45906.33 685707.6 106033.4 68424.65
UK SIC 2003 classification is used for industry classification coding.
Wages, Sales and Exports are at 2005 prices.
see Table A.7 in the appendix for industry code explanation
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Table 8: UK Real Exchange Rate with Selected Countries
Year Selected 32 Selected EU Selected non-EU
Countries Countries Countries
1999 0.996 1.036 0.894
2000 1.040 1.120 0.855
2001 1.027 1.103 0.842
2002 1.014 1.070 0.874
2003 0.960 0.976 0.924
2004 0.989 0.984 1.000
2005 1.000 1.000 1.000
2006 1.015 1.011 1.028
2007 1.035 1.013 1.091
2008 0.921 0.884 1.013
2009 0.808 0.784 0.864
2010 0.809 0.805 0.819
Note: See Table 2 for selected EU and non-EU trading partners of the UK.
Real exchange rate figures are calculated using 2005 as base year.
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It seems that in the early 2000s, fluctuations in the real exchange rate are followed by
the shifting of resources from exporting industries to non-exporting industries. Thus, the
fall of employment in trading industries appears to be absorbed by non-trading industries.
However, after 2002 employment in both the exporting and non-exporting industries falls
which gives the impression that the UK manufacturing sector is contracting. Moreover,
summary statistics given in Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 also show that UK manufacturing sector
is contracting. Employment growth in all the industries except industries 16, 30, 32, and
35 net employment is negative. Table 7 indicates that 18 out of 22 industries of the UK
manufacturing sectors show a decline in average employment. Tables 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8
indicate that the impact of the real exchange rate on aggregate employment is small. So,
the summary statistics given in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, and the trends in Figures 4, 5, 6 and
7 given above and Figures 16 and 17 in Appendix A reveal that the employment and real
exchange rate are interconnected and labor adjustment cost driven by the exchange rate is
worthy of analysis. Industry-wise exports are shown in Figure 19 in Appendix A. Figure
19 in Appendix A indicates that the industrial exports of the UK manufacturing sector
vary across the industries and over the time. Particularly the exports of the industries 15,
16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 30 and 32 show a considerable variations in their sales in the
foreign markets.
2.3.6 Estimation of the Model
The models proposed in equations (2.3.21), (2.3.22) and (2.3.23) are the dynamic panel
models in which the current realization of the job flows are influenced by the previous
period job flows. These models are first order autoregressive (AR1) panel data models
because only the first lag of the dependent variable appears as an explanatory variable in
the models. The general form of first order autoregressive (AR1) panel data models can
be written as follows:
yit =
ρ∑
i=1
αiyi,t−1 + β0 + β1xit + β2zit + µi + τt + εit (2.3.26)
where t = 1 + ρ, ....., T years, i = 1, ...., N industries, yit is the job flow rate in industry
i at time t, xit is a vector of pre-determined control variables, zit is a vector of other
exogenous variables, µi is an unobserved time-invariant industry-specific fixed effects, τt
is time specific fixed effects and εit is an error term. αi, ı=1,.......,ρ and βj , j=0,1,2 are
the regression coefficients with |∑αi| ≤ 1. Blundell and Bond (1998) focused on initial
conditions to estimate the parameters of dynamic models such as this. In these initial
conditions which implies that moment restrictions are sufficient to estimate αi for T ≥ 3
Blundell and Bond (1998) assume that µi and εit are independently distributed across
the i and have the familiar error components structure in which E[µi] = 0, E[εit] = 0,
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E[µiεit] = 0, for t = 1 + ρ, ......, T years, i = 1, ......, N industries. They also assumed that
error εit are serially uncorrelated and that the initial conditions yit are predetermined.
That is E[εitεis] = 0 for i = 1, ......, N and s 6= t and E[yi1εit] = 0 for t = 2, ......, T years,
i = 1, ......, N industries.
Estimating such a dynamic regression model of industrial job flow rates controlling for
different possible determinants on a panel of heterogeneous industries may raise econo-
metric problems which need to be care of while estimating these models. These problems
include:
• Omitted variable or time invariant industry specific characteristics (fixed effects) µi
may be correlated with the explanatory variables and cause biased estimation.
• The idiosyncratic disturbance term εit may have individual specific pattern of het-
eroscedasticity.
• Due to shorter time and larger industry dimension of the panel data, a shock to
industry specific effects may not dissipate with time and hence cause significant
correlation of yit−1 with the error term.
• Besides yit−1, some other regressors may be endogenous and thus may be correlated
with the error term in the regression.
All these problems make OLS estimates biased and inconsistent. Particularly the en-
dogeneity of yi,t−1 to the industry specific fixed effect µi makes yi,t−1 correlated with error
term and ultimately makes OLS estimates upward biased and inconsistent (Presbitero,
2008). Therefore, a possible solution to get consistent estimates is Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) which takes care of these issues when estimating the dynamic panel
model. Specifically, Arellano and Bover (1995) / Blundell and Bond (1998) propose Sys-
tem GMM to estimate the dynamic panel model such as given in equation in 2.3.26.
Basically, System GMM estimate the dynamic panel model using a system of two simul-
taneous equations, one in levels and other in first differences. Moreover, System GMM
uses instruments while estimating the regression model, where the instrument used in level
equations are lagged first differences and instruments used in first difference equation are
lagged levels of the series. Through this System GMM controls for potential endogene-
ity problem and controls for possible correlation between the unobserved, time invariant
cross-section specific effects and any of the explanatory variable and gives consistent es-
timates. Solomon (2010) describes three advantages of using System GMM estimator to
estimate the dynamic panel model.
• First, System GMM controls for the potential endogeneity arising from the explana-
tory variables in the model.
40
• Second, System GMM control for the possible correlation between the unobserved,
time invariant cross-section specific effects and any of the explanatory variable.
• Finally, System GMM is good in dealing with short and persistent data sets and
it does not suffer from the weak instrument problem which could arise from such a
data set.
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 All Industries
This section discusses the results for all industries of the UK manufacturing sector. From
all industries of the UK manufacturing sector we mean that when we estimate the empirical
model using the data of 22 industries of the UK manufacturing sectors included in our
sample. Table 9 reports the estimation results when the dependent variable is net job
flows. Column 1 contains the results when we consider 32 trading partners of the UK as
one group while calculating the real exchange rate. This column shows how employment
responds to variations in the real exchange rate of the UK with major trading partners
of the UK. Column 2 shows the results when we consider only selected European trading
of the UK as one group while calculating the real exchange rate. Column 3 shows the
results when we consider only selected non-European trading of the UK as a one group
while calculating the real exchange rate. Column 4 shows the results when we consider
real exchange rate of the UK with both European and non-European trading partners of
the UK simultaneously. Column 5 displays the results when we consider real exchange
rate of the UK with both European and non-European trading partners along with their
interaction. All the remaining tables presented in this section are structured similarly
except that they contain as the dependent variables job creation, job destruction and
gross job flows, respectively. We have estimated these models using the Blundell and
Bond (1998) dynamic panel estimation technique, generally known as System GMM and
our main variable of interest, competitiveness, is assumed to be predetermined.
Now we discuss our findings one by one in the light of the results presented in Tables
9, 10, 11 and 12. Our first result highlights the response of net job flows to the variations
in competitiveness. Columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 9 shows that the coefficient of compet-
itiveness is negative and statistically significant. Thus, columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 9
indicate that a rise in competitiveness1 significantly reduces the net job flows in the UK
manufacturing sector.
1Our variable competitiveness is combination of the real exchange rate based on trade weighted relative
wages and openness of the industry, therefore, when we say rise in competitiveness variable it means UK
products are becoming less competitive in international markets due to the rise in relative wage cost of
the UK products.
41
Table 9: Net Job Flows in Manufacturing Sector of the UK (All Industries)
Dependent Variable: Net Job Flow Rate
1 2 3 4 5
L.Job Creation (-0.363)** (-0.403)*** (-0.512)*** (-0.372)** (-0.413)**
(0.172) (0.151) (0.165) (0.147) (0.174)
L. Job Destruction (-0.558)*** (-0.424)** (-0.337)* (-0.351)** -0.244
(-0.165) (0.171) (0.184) (0.14) (0.168)
Average Wage (-0.833) -0.516 -0.260 -0.183 -0.055
(0.601) (0.548) (0.596) (0.619) (0.702)
GDP Growth 0.004** 0.003* 0.003* 0.004** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Size (-0.027)* (-0.029)*** (-0.035)** (-0.030)** (-0.036)**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.0146) (0.019)
Competitiveness (-0.520)**
(32 Partners) (0.249)
Competitiveness (-0.539)** -0.107 0.530
(EU Partners) (0.252) (0.333) (0.48)
Competitiveness (-0.352)*** (-0.282)* (-0.391)**
(non-EU Partners) (0.118) (0.168) (0.171)
Competitiveness 0.001*
(Interaction) (0.001)
Constant 0.056* 0.040* 0.038* 0.028 0.022
(0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.028) (0.021)
Arellano AR(2) Probability 0.120 0.172 0.500 0.265 0.640
Hansen Test Probability 0.720 0.963 0.931 0.535 0.998
Total Observation 198 198 198 198 198
No. Of Groups 22 22 22 22 22
Observation per group 9 9 9 9 9
Robust Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
Standard Errors are clustered by industry.
∗ ∗ ∗ = Significant at 1 percent. ∗∗ = Significant at 5 percent. ∗= Significance at 10 percent.
Specifically, net job flow rates are reduced by 0.520, 0.539 and 0.352 units, with a one
unit rise in the competitiveness of the UK with respect to 32 trading partners, with respect
to EU trading partners and with respect to non-EU trading partners respectively. Since
the competitiveness variable is a combination of the real exchange rate and openness,
therefore, these results imply that a rise in the real exchange rate significantly reduces
net employment in the UK manufacturing sector and this effect is more intensive in the
industries that export more. Moreover, an increase in the real exchange rate significantly
decreases net employment in UK manufacturing sector whether we consider the real ex-
change rate of the UK with respect to selected 32 trading partners, the real exchange rate
of the UK with respect to selected EU trading partners or the real exchange rate with
respect to selected non-EU trading partners. So, the real exchange rate affects net job
flows in the UK manufacturing sector negatively and significantly whether we consider 32
trading partners as a group to calculate the real exchange rate, or we split these 32 trading
partners into EU and non-EU trading partners and consider them as an individual group
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to calculate the real exchange rate, and consider UK trade with only one group at a time.
The UK has trade ties with the EU and non-EU countries and UK exports are going
to EU and non-EU countries at the same time though the volume of exports going to
EU trading partners is considerably higher than the volume of exports going to non-EU
trading partners. Moreover, the wage cost of the UK relative to EU countries and relative
to non-EU countries also varies. Therefore, the impact of a change in the real exchange
rate of the UK with respect to EU countries may differ from the impact of a change in the
real exchange of the UK with respect to non-EU countries. To test this we have divided the
32 trading partners into EU and non-EU trading partners and calculated the real exchange
rates and competitiveness for each group and have included the competitiveness of the UK
in EU markets and the competitiveness of the UK in non-EU markets simultaneously in
the model. The results of this model are reported in column 4 of Table 9. The coefficients
of Competitiveness (EU Partners) and Competitiveness (non-EU Partners) indicate that
Competitiveness (EU Partners) and Competitiveness (non-EU Partners) both affect the
net job flows in the UK manufacturing sector negatively. However, Competitiveness (non-
EU Partners) significantly reduces net job flows in the UK and Competitiveness (EU
Partners) plays an insignificant role in determining the net employment in the UK. This
implies that when we consider the real exchange rate of the UK with EU countries and the
real exchange rate of the UK with non-EU countries then a rise in the real exchange rate
of the UK with non-EU countries significantly reduces the employment in the UK. This
also implies that a rise in wage costs of the UK relative to non-EU countries is detrimental
to employment in the UK. However, a rise in wage costs of the UK relative to the EU
countries is insignificant in explaining employment in the UK. This may due to the fact
that UK is relatively more low cost than non-European trading partners and relatively
less low cost as compared with European trading partners (see Figures 8 and 9 for the
cost comparison).
Similarly, column 5 of the Table 9 shows the results when we add the interaction of
the Competitiveness (EU Partners) and Competitiveness (non-EU Partners) in the model.
The idea behind including this interaction terms was to test whether the fluctuations in
competitiveness of UK goods in EU markets affects the competitiveness of UK goods in
the non-EU markets or the other way round and ultimately affect the job flows in the UK
or not. Results reported in column 5 of the Table 9 once again indicate that a rise in
competitiveness of the UK in non-EU markets significantly determines net employment in
the UK whereas a rise in competitiveness of the UK in EU markets does not affect net
employment in the UK. However, the positive and significant coefficient of the interaction
terms indicates that the fluctuations in competitiveness of the UK goods in EU markets
affects the competitiveness of UK goods in the non-EU markets or the other way round
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and significantly increases job flows in the UK. This also indicates that the rise in the
competitiveness in the non-EU markets leads to increase in the jobs that firms that export
their products to the EU countries, and vice versa.
The elasticity of net employment in UK manufacturing sector to competitiveness with
respect to 32 trading partners is about seven percent(0.06). Similarly, the elasticity of
net employment in UK manufacturing sector to competitiveness with respect to European
trading partners is seven percent(0.09). However, the elasticity of net employment in UK
manufacturing sector to competitiveness with respect to non-European trading partners
is relatively less and it is four percent(0.02). These elasticities shows that other things
remaining the same, one percent change in the competitiveness leads to less than one
percent changes in the net employment in the UK manufacturing sector.
Since we define competitiveness as a product of the real exchange rate (trade weighted
wage cost of the UK relative to its trading partner) and openness (average share of exports
in total sales in last two years), therefore, our negative coefficients of the competitiveness
imply that a rise in the wage cost of the UK relative to its trading partners reduces
employment in the UK manufacturing sector. This effect becomes intensive for firms
with larger export shares. Note that this finding does not change whether we consider
all 32 sample trading partners of the UK or when we divide these 32 trading partners
into European and non-European trading partners of the UK and use European or non-
European only or both at a time as a separate group (see Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Table 9)
or when we consider or European and non-European trading partners both simultaneously
and along with their interaction (see Columns 4 and 5 in Table 9).
However, the coefficient of competitiveness (EU trading partners) in Column 2 of the
Table 9 is bigger than the coefficient of competitiveness (non-EU trading partners) in
Column 3 of the Table 9. This finding suggests that as compared to a shock to UK
competitiveness in non-EU markets, a shock to UK competitiveness in EU markets affects
employment in the manufacturing sector of the UK more significantly. The difference in
the effect of a change in competitiveness of the UK with regard to European and non-
European countries on net employment exists because the UK exports more relatively to
European countries (see, Table 3). Moreover, as displayed in Column 4, when we take
into account European and non-European trading partners of the UK simultaneously,
then, a rise in UK competitiveness relative to non-European countries significantly reduces
net employment. This result suggests that employment in the UK is more sensitive to
fluctuations in exchange rates of the UK with non-European countries despite the fact
that the share of UK exports going to non-European countries is lower than the share of
UK exports going to the European countries.
Furthermore, Table 9 shows that firm-specific variables like average wages and the firm
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size reduces the net jobs flows. However, a rise in average wages significantly decreases the
net job flows in the UK manufacturing sector. The coefficient of the average wage ranges
from -1.009 to -0.562 depending on the model specification. This implies that firms cut
down their staff when they face a higher wage cost. Moreover, the negative coefficients
of size in all the models we have estimated show that net job flows decreases with an
increase in the size of a firm. Although, all the coefficients of size variable are statistically
insignificant, they indicate that the jobs in the bigger firms are relatively more stable than
the small firms.
Another important determinant of the net job flows in the UK is the GDP growth
rate. Column 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Table 9 show that the coefficients of GDP growth
are positive and statistically significant. The coefficient of the GDP growth rate almost
remains 0.002 what ever the specification of the model we estimate. This implies that as
the GDP of the UK rises net jobs increase in the UK. This also indicates that during the
periods of prosperity employment increases and during the slump time employment in the
UK decreases.
Now we discuss our findings highlighting the response of job creation to the variations
in competitiveness. Columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 10 show that the coefficient on compet-
itiveness is negative and statistically significant. Thus, columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 10
indicate that a rise in competitiveness significantly reduces job creation in the UK man-
ufacturing sector. Specifically, job creation rates are reduced by 0.432, 0.412 and 0.290
units with a one unit rise in the competitiveness of the UK with respect to 32 trading
partners, with respect to EU trading partners and with respect to non-EU trading part-
ners respectively. Since the competitiveness variable is a combination of the real exchange
rate and openness, therefore, these results imply that a rise in the real exchange rate sig-
nificantly reduces new job opportunities in the UK manufacturing sector and this effect
is more intensive in those industries that export more. Moreover, an increase in the real
exchange rate significantly hinders job creation in the UK manufacturing sector whether
we consider the real exchange rate of the UK with respect to selected 32 trading partners,
the real exchange rate of the UK with respect to selected EU trading partners or the real
exchange rate of the UK with respect to selected non-EU trading partners of the UK. So,
the real exchange rate affects job creation process in the UK manufacturing sector nega-
tively and significantly whether we consider 32 trading partners as a group to calculate
the real exchange rate, or we split these 32 trading partners into EU and non-EU trading
partners and consider them as an individual group to calculate real exchange rate, and
consider UK trade with only one group at a time.
The results reported in the column 4 of the Table 10 show that the coefficients of the
Competitiveness (EU Partners) and Competitiveness (non-EU Partners) indicates that
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Competitiveness (EU Partners) and Competitiveness (non-EU Partners) both affect the
job creation in the UK manufacturing sector negatively.
Table 10: Job Creation in Manufacturing Sector of the UK (All Industries)
Dependent Variable: Job Creation Rate
1 2 3 4 5
L.Job Creation (-0.189)* -0.122 (-0.231)*** (-0.221)*** (-0.225)***
(0.105) (0.1) (0.094) (0.081) (0.085)
L. Job Destruction -0.108 (-0.218)* -0.082 -0.089 -0.102
(0.09) (0.118) (0.081) (0.083) (0.1)
Average Wage (-0.715)** (-1.009)*** (-0.562)* (-0.598)* (-0.733)**
(0.288) (0.317) (0.029) (0.307) (0.366)
GDP Growth 0.002* 0.002* 0.002** 0.002* 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Size -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.009
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Competitiveness (-0.432)***
(32 Partners) (0.145)
Competitiveness (-0.412)*** -0.129 -0.037
(EU Partners) (0.156) (0.221) (0.351)
Competitiveness (-0.290)*** (-0.249)*** (-0.229)**
(non-EU Partners) (0.065) (0.1) (0.108)
Competitiveness 0.0002
(Interaction) (0.001)
Constant 0.074** 0.086** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.080***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (.016)
Arellano AR(2) Probability 0.160 0.368 0.119 0.117 0.120
Hansen Test Probability 0.960 0.864 0.997 0.998 0.991
Total Observation 198 198 198 198 198
No. Of Groups 22 22 22 22 22
Observation per group 9 9 9 9 9
Robust Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
Standard Errors are clustered by industry.
∗ ∗ ∗ = Significant at 1 percent. ∗∗ = Significant at 5 percent. ∗= Significance at 10 percent.
However, Competitiveness (non-EU Partners) significantly reduces job creation rates
in the UK and Competitiveness (EU Partners) plays an insignificant role in determining
new employment opportunities in the UK. This implies that when we consider the real
exchange rate of the UK with EU countries and the real exchange rate of the UK with
non-EU countries then a rise in the real exchange rate of the UK with non-EU countries
significantly reduces new job opportunities in the UK. This also implies that a rise in wage
costs of the UK relative to non-EU countries is detrimental to employment generation in
the UK. However, a rise in wage costs of the UK relative to the EU countries is insignificant
in explaining new job creations in the UK. This may due to the fact that UK is relatively
more low cost than non-European trading partners and relatively less low cost as compared
with European trading partners (see Figures 8 and 9 for the cost comparison).
Similarly, results reported in column 5 of Table 10 once again indicate that a rise in
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competitiveness of the UK in non-EU markets significantly determine job creation in the
UK whereas the a rise in competitiveness of the UK in EU markets does not affect job
creation in the UK. However, the positive and significant coefficient of the interaction
term indicates that the fluctuations in competitiveness of UK goods in EU markets affect
the competitiveness of UK goods in the non-EU markets or the other way round and
significantly increase job opportunities in the UK. This also indicates that the rise in
competitiveness in the non-EU markets leads to increase in jobs in the firms that export
their products to the EU countries, and vice versa.
The negative coefficients on competitiveness in the Table 10 imply that a rise in the
wage cost of the UK relative to its trading partners decreases new employment opportu-
nities in the UK manufacturing sector. This effect becomes intensive for firms with larger
export shares. Once again note that this finding does not change whether we consider all
32 sample trading partners of the UK or when we divide these 32 trading partners into Eu-
ropean and non-European trading partners of the UK and use European or non-European
only or both at a time as a separate group (see Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Table 10) or
when we consider or European and non-European trading partners both simultaneously
and along with their interaction (see Columns 4 and 5 in Table 10).
However, the coefficient on competitiveness (EU trading partners) in Column 2 of the
Table 10 is bigger than the coefficient on competitiveness (non-EU trading partners) in
Column 3 of the Table 10. This finding suggests that as compared to a shock to UK
competitiveness in non-EU markets, a shock to UK competitiveness in EU markets affects
new jobs opportunities in manufacturing sector of the UK more significantly. Moreover,
as displayed in Column 4, when we take into account European and non-European trad-
ing partners of the UK simultaneously, then, a rise in UK competitiveness relative to
non-European countries significantly reduces job creation. This result suggests that job
creation in the UK is more sensitive to fluctuations in exchange rates of the UK with
non-European countries.
Furthermore, Table 10 shows that firm specific variables like average wages and firms
size, and job creation move in opposite direction. However, a rise in average wages sig-
nificantly decreases job creation in the UK manufacturing sector. The coefficient on the
average wage ranges from -1.009 to -0.562 depending on the model specification. This
implies that firms cut down recruitment of new staff when they face higher wage costs.
Moreover, the negative coefficients on size in all the models we have estimated show that
job creation decreases with an increase in the size of a firm. Although, all the coefficients
of a variable named size are statistically insignificant, they indicate the stability of the
jobs in the bigger firms.
Another important determinant of job creation in the UK is the GDP growth rate.
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Column 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Table 10 show that the coefficients on GDP growth are
positive and statistically significant. The coefficient of GDP growth almost remains 0.002
whatever the specification of the model we estimate. This implies that as the GDP of
the UK rises job creation also increases in the UK. This also indicates that during the
times of economic prosperity when GDP increases, the employment opportunities in the
UK also increases and during slumps when GDP declines, the employment opportunities
in the UK decrease as well.
Table 11: Job Destruction in Manufacturing Sector of the UK (All Industries)
Dependent Variable: Job Destruction Rate
1 2 3 4 5
L.Job Creation 0.068 0.061 0.093 -0.046 -0.049
(0.174) (0.171) (0.178) (0.155) (0.155)
L. Job Destruction 0.283** 0.289** 0.254* 0.332** 0.320**
(0.126) (0.125) (0.129) (.143) (0.146)
Average Wage -0.664 -0.650 -0.744 -0.566 -0.541
(0.609) (0.608) (0.606) (0.5) (0.491)
GDP Growth (-0.002)* (-0.002)* (-0.002)* (-0.002*) (-0.002)*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Size 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.018 0.019
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.02)
Competitiveness 0.087
(32 Partners) (0.156)
Competitiveness 0.075 0.038 -0.307
(EU Partners) (0.18) (0.217) (0.365)
Competitiveness 0.082 0.017 0.057
(non-EU Partners) (0.078) (0.121) (0.133)
Competitiveness -0.001
(Interaction) (0.001)
Constant 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.017) (0.016)
Arellano AR(2) Probability 0.162 0.151 0.204 0.143 0.162
Hansen Test Probability 0.663 0.473 0.443 0.984 0.991
Total Observation 198 198 198 198 198
No. Of Groups 22 22 22 22 22
Observation per group 9 9 9 9 9
Robust Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
Standard Errors are clustered by industry.
∗ ∗ ∗ = Significant at 1 percent. ∗∗ = Significant at 5 percent. ∗= Significance at 10 percent.
Table 11 shows the results regarding the response of job destruction to variations in the
competitiveness and other key variables affecting job destruction. Columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and
5 of Table 11 show that the coefficients on competitiveness are positive and statistically
insignificant. This implies that fluctuations in competitiveness do not play any role in
explaining job destruction in the UK manufacturing sector. In other words, in response
to fluctuations in the real exchange rate firms in the UK manufacturing sector do not fire
their workers. This also indicates that firms in the UK manufacturing sector retain their
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trained workers when they face a rise in wage costs relative to wage costs in the trading
partners of the UK.
Columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Table 11 indicate that job destruction in UK manufacturing
sector is mainly determined by the GDP per capita and the previous period job destruc-
tions. An increase in the GDP significantly reduces the job destructions. The coefficients
of GDP remain almost −0.002 whatever the model specification we adopt to estimate the
response of job destruction. This implies that during a period of prosperity the rate of
job destruction is significantly decreased. The coefficients of GDP remain almost −0.002
whatever the model specification we adopt to estimate the response of job destruction.
Moreover, the previous period job destruction also significantly explains current period
job destruction. The coefficients of lagged job destruction range from −0.254 to 0.334 in
different models we have estimated to estimate the responses of job destruction to different
variables. Furthermore, results reported in Table 11 indicate that average wages and firm
size do not play any role in explaining job destruction in the UK manufacturing sector.
Table 12 shows the results regarding the gross flows of jobs in the UK manufacturing
sector. Columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Table 12 indicate that the coefficients on com-
petitiveness are negative and insignificant in the entire set of models we have estimated.
This implies that fluctuations in competitiveness do not explain variations in gross flows
of employment in the UK manufacturing sector. In other words, we can say that fluctua-
tions in the real exchange rates of the UK do not affect the gross flow of jobs in the UK
manufacturing sector. Table 12 shows that gross flows of employment in the UK manufac-
turing sector are mainly driven by average wage costs, previous period job creations and
previous period job destructions. The coefficients of the previous period job creation and
previous period job destructions are positive and significant which implies that previous
period job flows are really important in determining current period gross job flows in UK
manufacturing sector. The coefficients of the previous period job creation ranges from
0.228 to 0.435 in the models we have estimated. Similarly, the coefficients of the previous
period job creation ranges from 0.277 to 0.337 in the models we have estimated. Moreover,
Columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Table 12 show that coefficients of the average wage are negative
and statistically significant in the entire set of models we have estimated. This implies
that a rise in average wages reduces gross flows of the jobs in the UK manufacturing sector
significantly. This decrease in the gross job flows in response to a one unit increase in the
average wage ranges from −1.173 to −1.582 depending on the model’s specification.
Overall, results reported in Tables 10 and 11 explain the adjustment process in net
employment. Our findings suggest that the adjustment process in net employment to a
real exchange rate led fluctuations in competitiveness works through job creation.
The results in Tables 10 and 11 confirm this observation. Table 10 shows that compet-
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Table 12: Gross Job Flows in Manufacturing Sector of the UK (All Industries)
Dependent Variable: Gross Job Flow Rate
1 2 3 4 5
L.Job Creation 0.417* 0.435* 0.370 0.228 0.229
(0.245) (0.245) (0.236) (0.22) (0.255)
L. Job Destruction 0.284* 0.277 0.310* .337** .334**
(0.164) (0.167) (0.158) (0.151) (0.154)
Average Wage (-1.329)** (-1.363)** (-1.173)* (-1.580)* (-1.582)*
(0.624) (0.639) (0.651) (0.817) (0.869)
GDP Growth 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Sales Growth 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.01) (0.01)
Size 0.016 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.014
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029)
Competitiveness -0.137
(32 Partners) (0.187)
Competitiveness -0.103 0.073 0.076
(EU Partners) (0.213) (0.282) (0.391)
Competitiveness -0.107 -0.129 -0.129
(non-EU Partners) (0.1) (0.111) (0.111)
Competitiveness 0.000
(Interaction) (0.001)
Constant 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.094*** 0.110*** 0.110***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.03) (0.03)
Arellano AR(2) Probability 0.683 0.683 0.644 0.651 0.653
Hansen Test Probability 0.884 0.884 0.888 0.716 0.655
Total Observation 198 198 198 198 198
No. Of Groups 22 22 22 22 22
Observation per group 9 9 9 9 9
Robust Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
Standard Errors are clustered by industry.
∗ ∗ ∗ = Significant at 1 percent. ∗∗ = Significant at 5 percent. ∗= Significance at 10 percent.
itiveness affects job creation significantly and Table 11 shows that competitiveness affects
job destruction insignificantly. Keeping in mind the definition of competitiveness, in the
light of results presented in these two tables we may infer that a shock to the real exchange
rate disturbs only job creation. Considering the way we have calculated the real exchange
rate, another interpretation of the result is that the rise in UK wage costs relative to its
trading partners hinders the creation of new jobs but does not affect existing jobs in the
UK manufacturing sector. This result also implies that a rise in the wage cost of the UK
relative to its trading partners reduces new job opportunities in the UK manufacturing
sector but does not affect the existing jobs in the UK manufacturing sector. This effect be-
comes intensive for firms with larger export shares. This finding does not change whether
we consider all 32 sample trading partners of the UK or when we divide these 32 trading
partners into European and non-European trading partners of the UK and use European
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or non-European only or both at a time as a separate group (see Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4
in Tables 10 and 11) when we consider or European and non-European trading partners
both simultaneously and along with their interaction (see Columns 4 and 5 in Tables 10
and 11).
Based on the results given in Tables 10 and 11 we can say that in response to a
shock to competitiveness, net employment in UK manufacturing sector adjusts through
job creation. Moser et al. (2010) reports similar findings for Germany, a comparatively
more restricted labor market compared with the UK. This finding seems to be in contrast
with the findings of Klein et al. (2003) for the USA labor market which appears to adjust
through job destruction in response to a shock to the real exchange rate. The difference
in the adjustment process in response to fluctuations in the real exchange rate in UK and
USA labor markets might be due to the following three reasons. First, there is a difference
in definition of the real exchange rate,Klein et al. (2003) use real exchange rate based on
prices, whereas we use real exchange rate based on trade weighted relative wages. Second,
we use different definition of the openness, Klein et al. (2003) use ratio sum of imports and
exports to total out as a measure of openness, whereas we use average share of exports
in total sales in previous two years as a measure of openness. Third, we use a different
data set to analyze to the impact of real exchange rate on employment. We have used UK
manufacturing sector data whereas Klein et al. (2003) have used US manufacturing sector
data to estimate the impact of exchange rate on employment.
Our finding that the reaction of job creation and job destruction to a shock in competi-
tiveness is not the same for the UK is in line with the existing literature for other European
countries like Germany and France. Using establishment level data, Moser et al. (2010)
find that the reaction of job creation and job destruction to real exchange rate changes
is asymmetric for Germany. Similarly, Abowd et al. (1999) report that exogenous shocks
other than the real exchange rate affect job creation more than job destruction. However,
our estimates for job creation and job destruction are higher than the coefficients esti-
mated by Moser et al. (2010). So our results suggest that UK labor market adjustment
is larger than in the German labor market. In fact, our findings are comparable with
the findings of Burgess and Knetter (1998) for the United States, Canada and the United
Kingdom that indicate that employment adjusts more quickly in response to a shock to
the real exchange rate while German and Japanese employment are insensitive to shocks
to the real exchange rate.
Once again our finding that job creation and job destruction behave differently in
response to a shock in competitiveness does not change with the change of the specification
of the model. Fluctuations in competitiveness affect job creation significantly and job
destruction insignificantly whether we consider competitiveness with regard to all (32 in
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our sample) trading partners of the UK or take into account competitiveness with regard
to EU or non-EU trading partners only. Columns 1, 2 and 3 in Tables 10 and 11 support
this observation. Furthermore, changes in competitiveness foster only job creation even
when we check the effect of competitiveness of the UK with regard to non-EU trading
partners of the UK controlling for the effect of competitiveness of the UK with respect to
EU trading partners (see Columns 4 and 5 in Tables 10 and 11).
The asymmetric reaction of job creation and job destruction in response to a shock in
competitiveness may indicate that firms in the UK manufacturing sector do not want to
lose their trained workers, at least in the short run. However, these firms do not offer new
jobs if they lose their competitiveness in world markets. This behavior of firms may be
behind the active response of job creation and non-responsiveness of job destruction to a
shock to competitiveness.
Our third result emphasizes the response of employment to temporary shocks other
than competitiveness shocks such as GDP and sales growth. The results presented in
Tables 9, 10 and 11 show that temporary shocks to GDP growth significantly affect job
flows in UK manufacturing. A negative shock to GDP growth significantly reduces job
creation and net job flows and significantly increases job destruction. This seems to suggest
that employment in the UK responds to shocks and adjusts according to the nature of the
shock. Workers laid off in the bad times are rehired in good times.
In contrast to the results of Moser et al. (2010) that GDP growth and sales growth do
not affect job flows, we found that GDP growth increases job flows. This finding indicates
that the UK employment market appears to respond to market forces while the German
labor market does not exhibit such responses. Moreover, our results do not change when
we change the model specification, considering all 32 partners, European, non-European
or both together and without their interaction (see Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Tables 9, 10
and 11).
Our fourth result highlights the effects of variations in average wage costs and job
flows. Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12 indicate that a rise in average wage costs (represented with
average wage in the results tables) significantly decreases net job flows, job creation and
gross job flows but does not explain job destruction. This result indicates that in response
to a rise in average wage cost firms do not lay off their existing workers, however, they
may be reluctant to hire new workers.
Another potential implication of this finding is that an increase in average wages ben-
efits only those workers who remain in their jobs or who have succeeded in getting a job.
However, an increase in average wages is detrimental to unemployed labor because unem-
ployed workers have to bear the cost of higher wages in terms of lower jobs opportunities
available and longer spells of unemployment. This finding is again comparable to that of
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Moser et al. (2010) for Germany, a rise in average costs significantly reduces job creation
but does not affect job destruction. Our findings show that a rise in average costs signifi-
cantly reduces gross job flows and job creation but does not affect job destruction, these
do not change with the change in specification. Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Tables 10, 11
and 12 confirm this observation.
Finally, we find that the larger the size of the firm, the lesser will be net job flows
and job creation (see Table 9). However, the coefficients are very small. This implies that
bigger firms discourage job creation and try to absorb the temporary rise in demand. On
the other hand, smaller firms have less capacity to bear the shock so they lay off their
workers in bad times and rehire them in good times. This behavior of smaller firms raises
their contribution toward net job flows. In other words, in the UK manufacturing sector
smaller firms contribute more to net job flows. Hijzen et al. (2010) report similar results
for smaller firms for the UK using data over the period from 1997 to 2008. From Columns
1, 2, 3 and 4 of Table 9 we can say that our finding that bigger firms contribute less towards
net job flows is robust and does not change with the change in model specification.
The results we have discussed above are robust and do not alter with the changes
in model specification. They remain consistent when we consider all 32 major trading
partners of the UK, when we take into account only European trading partners or when
we use data on the non-European trading partners of the UK in our specification. The
changes in the model specification slightly alter the value of the parameters but signs and
statistical significance of the parameters do not change.
2.4.2 Exporting Industries
The results discussed so far show that a rise in UK wage costs relative to its trading
partners significantly reduces net employment overall in the UK manufacturing sector.
Moreover, the adjustment process in employment works through job creation. In this
section, we report the results of only exporting industries of the UK manufacturing sector.
we define an exporting industry as the group of firms in an industry which sell
all or a portion of their output in foreign markets. Moreover, if a firm exports
in some years and does not export in other years, in this case we consider
this particular firm exporting firms group only in the years in which it has
sold all or a portion of its output in foreign markets. The year in which this
particular firm’s exports are zero, in that year we consider this firm in non-
exporting firms group. Table 13 describes the results for net job flows in exporting
industries which are quite similar to the results for net job flows in UK manufacturing as
a whole.
Now we discuss our findings one by one in the light of the results presented in Tables
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Table 13: Net Job Flows in Manufacturing Sector of the UK (Exporting In-
dustries)
Dependent Variable: Net Job Flow Rate
1 2 3 4 5
L.Job Creation (-0.163)* (-0.171)* 0.111 0.238 0.230
(0.096) (0.096) (0.137) (0.153) (0.159)
L. Job Destruction -0.548 -0.564 (-0.594)** (-0.706)** (-0.740)**
(0.393) (0.393) (0.241) (0.303) (0.366)
Average Wage -0.007 -0.019 0.086 -0.012 -0.016
(0.074) (0.075) (0.121) (0.132) (0.123)
GDP Growth 0.005*** .005*** .007*** .007*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Sales Growth -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005
(0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Size 0.008 0.009 0.097 0.095 0.094*
(0.071) (0.071) (0.059) (0.052) (0.053)
Competitiveness (-0.273)*
(32 Partners) (0.141)
Competitiveness (-0.288)* -0.201 -0.277
(EU Partners) (0.153) (0.246) (0.537)
Competitiveness (-0.134)* -0.019 -0.005
(non-EU Partners) (0.077) (0.13) (0.179)
Competitiveness -0.973
(Interaction) (4.918)
Constant 0.016 0.019 -0.032 -0.012 -0.009
(0.031) (0.032) (0.041) (0.046) (0.042)
Arellano AR(2) Probability 0.997 0.998 0.931 0.938 0.923
Hansen Test Probability 0.943 0.973 0.803 0.709 0.777
Total Observation 198 198 198 198 198
No. Of Groups 22 22 22 22 22
Observation per group 9 9 9 9 9
Robust Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
Standard Errors are clustered by industry.
∗ ∗ ∗ = Significant at 1 percent. ∗∗ = Significant at 5 percent. ∗= Significance at 10 percent.
13, A.1, A.2, and reftab:Table A3 in Appendix A. The result given in Table 13 highlights
the response of net job flows in exporting industries of the UK manufacturing sector to the
variations in competitiveness. Columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 13 show that the coefficient on
competitiveness is negative and statistically significant. Thus, columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table
13 indicate that a rise in competitiveness significantly reduces net job flows in exporting
industries of the UK manufacturing sector. Specifically, net job flow rates are reduced by
0.273, 0.288 and 0.134 units, with a one unit rise in the competitiveness of the UK with
respect to 32 trading partners, with respect to EU trading partners and with respect to
non-EU trading partners respectively. Since the competitiveness variable is a combination
of the real exchange rate and openness, therefore, these results imply that a rise in the
real exchange rate significantly reduces net employment in exporting industries of the
UK manufacturing sector and this effect becomes more intensive in the industries that
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export more. Moreover, an increase in the real exchange rate significantly decreases net
employment in exporting industries of the UK manufacturing sector whether we consider
the real exchange rate of the UK with respect to selected 32 trading partners, real exchange
rate of the UK with respect to selected EU trading partners or real exchange rate of the
UK with respect to selected non-EU trading partners of the UK. So, real exchange rate
affects net job flows in exporting industries of the UK manufacturing sector negatively
and significantly whether we consider 32 trading partners as a group to calculate the real
exchange rate, or we split these 32 trading partners into EU and non-EU trading partners
and consider them as an individual group to calculate real exchange rate, and consider
UK trade with only one group at a time.
The UK has trade ties with the EU and non-EU countries and UK exports are going
to EU and non-EU countries at the same time though the volume of exports going to
EU trading partners is considerably higher than the volume of exports going to non-
EU trading partners. Moreover, the wage cost of the UK relative to EU countries and
relative to non-EU countries also varies. Therefore, the impact of a change in the real
exchange rate of the UK with respect to EU countries differs from the impact of a change
in the real exchange of the UK with respect to non-EU countries. The results given in
column 4 of the Table 13 provides the evidence for this observation. The coefficients
of Competitiveness (EU Partners) and Competitiveness (non-EU Partners) indicate that
Competitiveness (EU Partners) and Competitiveness (non-EU Partners) both affect the
net job flows in the UK manufacturing sector negatively. However, both the coefficients
are insignificant statistically which indicates that Competitiveness (non-EU Partners) and
Competitiveness (EU Partners) play an insignificant role in determining net employment
in the exporting industries of the UK. This implies that fluctuations in the real exchange
rate of the UK with EU countries and with non-EU countries do not affect employment in
exporting industries of the UK. Furthermore, this finding indicates that a rise in wage costs
of the UK relative to EU and non-EU countries decreases net employment in the exporting
industries of the UK. However, this decrease in the net employment is insignificant. This
may be due to the fact that UK is relatively more low cost than non-European trading
partners and relatively less low cost as compared with European trading partners (see
Figures 8 and 9 for the cost comparison).
Similarly, column 5 of the Table 13 shows the results when we add the interaction
of the Competitiveness (EU Partners) and Competitiveness (non-EU Partners) in the
model which indicate that neither competitiveness of the UK in non-EU markets nor the
competitiveness of the UK in EU markets affect the net employment in the exporting
industries of the UK. However, the negative and significant coefficient of the interaction
terms in column 5 of the Table 13 indicates that the fluctuations in competitiveness of
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the UK goods in EU markets do not affect the competitiveness of the UK goods in the
non-EU markets or the other way round and also have no role in explaining the net job
flows in exporting industries of the UK.
Since we define competitiveness as the product of the real exchange rate (trade weighted
wage cost of the UK relative to its trading partner) and openness (average share of exports
in total sales in last two years), therefore, our negative coefficients on competitiveness
imply that a rise in the wage cost of the UK relative to its trading partners reduces
employment in exporting industries of the UK manufacturing sector. This effect becomes
intensive for firms with larger export shares. Note that this finding does not change
whether we consider all 32 sample trading partners of the UK or when we divide these
32 trading partners into European and non-European trading partners of the UK and
use European or non-European only or both at a time as a separate group or when we
consider or European and non-European trading partners both simultaneously and along
with their interaction (see Columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 in Table 13).
However, the coefficients are significant only in the first three models. Moreover, the
coefficient on competitiveness (EU trading partners) in Column 2 of the Table 13 is bigger
than the coefficient on competitiveness (non-EU trading partners) in Column 3 of the
Table 13. This finding suggests that as compared to a shock to UK competitiveness in
non-EU markets, a shock to UK competitiveness in EU markets affects employment in
exporting industries of the UK manufacturing sector more significantly. The difference in
the effect of a change in competitiveness of the UK with regard to European and non-
European countries on net employment exists because the UK exports more relatively to
European countries (see, Table 3).
Furthermore, Table 13 shows that firm specific variables like average wages and firm
size do not affect net jobs flows in exporting industries of the UK manufacturing sector.
However, a rise in average wages decreases the net job flows in the UK manufacturing
sector. The coefficient on the average wage ranges from -0.007 to -0.086 depending on the
model specification. This implies that firms cut down their staff when they face a higher
wage cost. Another important determinant of the net job flows in exporting industries of
the UK is the GDP growth rate. Column 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Table 13 show that the
coefficients of GDP growth are positive and statistically significant. The coefficients of the
GDP growth rates range from 0.005 to 0.007 depending on the model specification. This
implies that as the GDP of the UK rises the net jobs increase in exporting industries of
the UK. This also indicates that macroeconomic prosperity increases the employment in
the exporting industries of the UK and vice versa.
The results presented in Table 13 show that a rise in competitiveness significantly
decreases net employment in the exporting industries of UK manufacturing. This implies
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that a rise in the real exchange rate trims down jobs in exporting industries of the UK
manufacturing sector. This impact is more intensive for more open firms. In other words
employment is more sensitive to fluctuations in the real exchange rate for firms who trade
more. This observation is robust and does not change with the change in trading partners
of the UK. Columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 13 show that a negative relationship between net
job flows and competitiveness holds whether we consider all 32 trading partners of the UK
or when we focus on only European or non-European trading partners of the UK.
Another finding regarding the effect of a shock to competitiveness on net job flows,
which Table 13 displays, is that a shock to the competitiveness of the UK in EU countries
market is more detrimental to net job flows in exporting industries of the UK manufac-
turing sector than to a shock in competitiveness of the UK in non-EU country markets.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 13 show that a rise in competitiveness in EU countries’ markets
reduces net employment three times more as compared to the reduction in employment
in response to a rise in competitiveness in non-EU countries. In other words, net employ-
ment in exporting industries of the UK manufacturing sector is more sensitive to a shock
in competitiveness in EU markets than to a shock in competitiveness in non-EU markets.
Higher sensitivity of net job flows in exporting industries to a shock in competitiveness in
EU markets as compared to a shock in competitiveness in non-EU markets is due the fact
that about 60 percent of the exports of the UK goes to EU countries (see Table 3).
Now we discuss our findings highlighting the response of job creation in exporting
industries of the UK manufacturing sector to variations in competitiveness. Columns
1, 3 and 4 of Table A.1 in Appendix A show that the coefficient on competitiveness is
negative and statistically significant. Thus, Columns 1, 3 and 4 of Table A.1 in Appendix
A indicate that a rise in competitiveness significantly reduces job creation in exporting
industries of the UK manufacturing sector. Specifically, job creation rates are reduced by
0.174, 0.105 and 0.097 units with a one unit rise in the competitiveness of the UK with
respect to 32 trading partners and with respect to non-EU trading partners respectively.
Since the competitiveness variable is a combination of the real exchange rate and openness,
therefore, these results imply that a rise in the real exchange rate significantly reduces the
new job opportunities in the UK manufacturing sector and this effect is more intensive
in the industries those exports more. Moreover, an increase in the real exchange rate
significantly hinders job creation in the UK manufacturing sector whether we consider the
real exchange rate of the UK with respect to selected 32 trading partners or real exchange
rate of the UK with respect to selected non-EU trading partners of the UK. However,
the coefficient on competitiveness (EU partners) is negative but statistically insignificant
which implies that fluctuations in the real exchange rate do not explain variations in new
job creation in the exporting industries of the UK manufacturing sector. So, the real
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exchange rate affects job creation process in the UK manufacturing sector negatively and
significantly whether we consider 32 trading partners as a group to calculate the real
exchange rate, or we split these 32 trading partners into EU and non-EU trading partners
and consider them as an individual group to calculate the real exchange rate, and consider
UK trade with only one group at a time.
The results reported in the column 4 of the Table A.1 in Appendix A show that the
coefficients on Competitiveness (EU Partners) and Competitiveness (non-EU Partners) in-
dicates that Competitiveness (EU Partners) and Competitiveness (non-EU Partners) both
affect job creation in the UK manufacturing sector negatively. Similarly, results reported
in column 5 of the Table A.1 in Appendix A show that the coefficient of the interaction
term is positive and insignificant which indicates that the fluctuations in competitiveness
of the UK goods in EU markets do not affect competitiveness of the UK goods in the
non-EU markets or the other way round.
Furthermore, Column 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Table A.1 in Appendix A shows that firm-
specific variables like average wages and firm size, and job creation move in the opposite
direction. However, a rise in average wages significantly decreases job creation in the
exporting industries of the UK manufacturing sector. The coefficient of the average wage
ranges from -0.165 to -0.069 depending on the model specification. This implies that firms
cut down the new recruitment of new staff when they face a higher wage cost. Moreover,
the negative coefficients of size in all the models we have estimated show that job creation
decreases with an increase in the size of a firm. Although, all the coefficients of a variable
named size are statistically insignificant, they indicate the stability of jobs in the bigger
firms.
Another important determinant of the job creation in the UK is the GDP growth rate.
Column 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Table A.1 in Appendix A show that the coefficients of
GDP growth are positive and statistically significant. The coefficient of the GDP growth
ranges from 0.002 to 0.003 depending on the specification of the model we estimate. This
implies that as the GDP of the UK rises, the job creation also increases in the exporting
industries of the UK. This also indicates that during the economic prosperity when GDP
increases, the employment opportunities in exporting industries of the UK also increases.
Table A.2 in Appendix A shows the results regarding the response of job destruction
in exporting industries of the UK manufacturing sector to variations in competitiveness
and other key variables affecting job destruction. Columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Table A.2
in Appendix A show that the coefficients on competitiveness are positive and statistically
insignificant. This implies that fluctuations in competitiveness do not play any role in
explaining job destruction in exporting industries of the UK manufacturing sector. In other
words, in response to fluctuations in the real exchange rate firms in exporting industries
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of the UK manufacturing sector do not fire their workers. This also indicates firms in the
UK manufacturing sector retain their trained workers when they face a rise in wage costs
relative to wage costs in the trading partners of the UK.
Columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Table A.2 in Appendix A indicate that job destruction
rates in the UK manufacturing sector are mainly determined by GDP growth rates, average
wages and previous period job destructions. An increase in GDP growth rates significantly
reduces the job destructions. The coefficients on GDP range from −0.004 to −0.005
depending on the model specification we adopt. This implies that during a period of
prosperity job destruction rates are significantly decreased. The coefficients of average
wages range from −0.169 to −0.191 depending on the model specification we adopt. This
implies that firms in the exporting industries of the UK manufacturing sector do not fire
their worker when they face a rise in average wages. Moreover, the previous period job
destruction also significantly explains the current period job destruction. The coefficients
of lagged job destruction ranges from −0.391 to 0.476 in different models we have estimated
to estimate the responses of job destruction to different variables. Furthermore, results
reported in Table A.2 in Appendix A indicate that firm size does not play any role in
explaining job destruction rates in exporting industries of the UK manufacturing sector.
Table A.3 in Appendix A shows the results regarding gross flows of jobs in exporting
industries of the UK manufacturing sector. Columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Table A.3
in Appendix A indicate that coefficients on competitiveness are negative and insignificant
in the entire set of models we have estimated. This implies that fluctuations in competi-
tiveness do not explain variations in gross flows of employment in the UK manufacturing
sector. In other words, we can say that fluctuations in the real exchange rates of the UK
do not affect gross flows of jobs in UK manufacturing sector. Table A.3 in Appendix A
shows that gross flows of employment in the UK manufacturing sector are mainly driven
by average wage costs and GDP growth rates. The coefficients of average wages and GDP
growth rates are negative and significant which implies that average wages and GDP
growth rates are really important factors in determining the gross job flows in export-
ing industries of UK manufacturing sector. The coefficients on average wages range from
−0.366 to −0.411 in the models we have estimated. This implies that a rise in average
wages reduces gross flows of the jobs in exporting industries of the UK manufacturing
sector significantly. This decrease in the gross job flows in response to a one unit increase
in the average wage ranges from −0.366 to −0.411 depending on the model’s specification.
Similarly, the coefficients of the GDP growth rates remain −0.003 in the models we have
estimated. This implies that a rise in GDP growth rates reduces the gross flows of the
jobs in the UK manufacturing sector significantly. This decrease in the gross job flows
remains the −0.003 in response to a one unit increase in the GDP growth rate in all the
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models we have estimated.
Overall, results reported in Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A explain the adjustment
process in net employment. Our findings suggest that the adjustment process in net
employment to real exchange rate led fluctuations in competitiveness works through job
creation because changes in competitiveness affect only job creation significantly but do not
foster job destruction (see Columns 1, 3 and 4 in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix A).
This finding indicates that shocks to the real exchange rate do not affect job destruction
but significantly hinder job creation in the UK exporting industries. Keeping in view
the definition of the real exchange rate, we can also say that a rise in UK wage costs
relative to its trading partners decreases job creation significantly and does not change
job destruction in exporting industries.
Columns 1 and 3 of Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix A indicate that in response to
a shock in competitiveness the adjustment process in employment in exporting industries
works through job creation whether we consider competitiveness of the UK in all 32 trading
partners countries’ markets or when we take into account non-EU trading partners of the
UK only. However, the adjustment process in employment in response to fluctuations in
competitiveness is not clear when we reduce the sample to EU trading partners of the
UK only or when we control for the effect of competitiveness in non-EU markets or in
EU markets. This is clear from the coefficients on competitiveness from Columns 2 and
4 in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix A. This may be due to the fact that we have
calculated competitiveness using the wage cost of the UK relative to its trading partners.
The wage cost in EU trading partners of the UK and the UK is more or less same and
does not change very much over time. Therefore, a slight change in relative wage cost of
the UK is not enough to change job creation or job destruction.
We also find that net job flows are insensitive to firm-specific average wage costs. How-
ever, overall macroeconomic conditions in the country significantly disturb net job flows.
For instance, Table 13 shows that a positive shock to GDP promotes jobs significantly
in exporting industries. This implies that workers laid off in bad times are rehired in
good times. We can also interpret this finding as employment in trading firms responds to
the macroeconomic environment in the country. Once again, our finding that the overall
macroeconomic environment in a country plays a vital role in determining the employment
level does not change with the change in specification (see Columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 in
Table 13).
Another observation similar to our main findings is that job creation and job destruc-
tion in exporting industries do not respond symmetrically to a shock in competitiveness.
Job creation decreases significantly in response to a rise in competitiveness while job de-
struction is insensitive to changes in the competitiveness (see Tables A.1 and A.2 in the
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Appendix A). This implies that firms do not lay off their trained workers in response to
a negative shock to their demand in the short run, however, they recruit new staff in re-
sponse to a positive shock to their demand. Like our finding for all industries, our finding
that job creation and job destruction behave differently in response to a shock in compet-
itiveness for exporting industries does not change as well with the change in specification
of the model (see results in Columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Table A.2 and Columns 1 and 3,
of Table A.1 in the Appendix A).
Furthermore, for exporting industries we find that for firm-specific variables, sales
growth and average wages play a significant role in explaining variations in jobs but sales
growth has limited power to explain deviations in employment. Tables A.1 and A.2 in the
Appendix A indicate that average wages hinders job creation and job destruction signifi-
cantly but sales growth explains neither job creation nor job destruction. Fluctuations in
average wages lead to changes in job creation and in job destruction is consistent and do
not change with the change in specification of the model (see results in Columns 1, 2, 3,
4 and 5 of Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix A).
With regard to total job flows in exporting industries in response to a shock in firm
specific and macroeconomic variables, Table A.3 in the Appendix A indicates that firm-
specific variables and the overall macroeconomic environment in the country significantly
explain the overall reallocation of the jobs. A rise in average wages and GDP growth
reduces the gross job flows in exporting industries. However, sales growth increases the
gross job flows in exporting industries of the UK manufacturing sector. Furthermore,
Columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Table A.3 in the Appendix A indicate that firm specific
and macroeconomic variables play a significant role in determining the gross job flows in
exporting industries and this finding does not change with the change of specification.
2.4.3 Non-Exporting Industries
So for we have discussed our results for all industries and only exporting industries of the
UK manufacturing sector. Now we turn to explain our findings regarding non-exporting
industries in the UK manufacturing sector. We define a non-exporting industry as
the group of firms in an industry those do not sell their products in the foreign
markets. Table 14 shows the results for the net job flows in firms those sell their products
only in domestic markets. We call this group of firms non-exporting industries. The table
displays that changes in real exchange rate do not affect net job flows in non-exporting
firms. This observation remains valid whether we consider all 32 trading partners of the
UK or we estimate the effects of real exchange rate on net job flows taking in to account
only European or non-European trading partners of the UK simultaneously. The results
in Columns 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Table 14 support this observation as the coefficients of the
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real exchange rates in all the models are insignificant .
Table 14: Net Job Flows in Manufacturing Sector of the UK (Non-Exporting
Industries)
Dependent Variable: Net Job Flow Rate
1 2 3 4 5
L.Job Creation (-0.374)** (-0.388)*** (-0.329)** (-0.390)*** (-0.711)***
(0.15) (0.121) (0.16) (0.119) (0.186)
L. Job Destruction -0.030 0.163 -0.260 0.169 -0.573
(0.38) (0.225) (0.356) (0.221) (0.482)
Average Wage -1.618 -0.263 -1.453 -0.530 -5.119
(1.48) (2.185) (1.335) (2.073) (4.928)
GDP Growth 0.005* 0.007* 0.0001 0.007* 0.023**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.011)
Size (-0.108)** (-0.182)** (-0.115)* (-0.180)** (-0.109)*
(0.052) (0.08) (0.066) (0.082) (0.055)
Real Exchange Rate -0.246
(32 Partners) (0.219)
Real Exchange Rate -0.372 -0.371 7.719
(EU Partners) (0.268) (0.268) (6.027)
Real Exchange Rate 0.149 0.166 42.993
(non-EU Partners) (0.277) (0.328) (30.095)
Real Exchange Rate -38.513
(Interaction) (27.888)
Constant 0.371 0.383 0.025 0.350 -8.154
(0.349) (0.345) (0.088) (0.353) (6.552)
Arellano AR(2) Probability 0.934 0.323 0.762 0.313 0.659
Hansen Test Probability 0.937 0.364 0.985 0.334 0.420
Total Observation 198 198 198 198 198
No. Of Groups 22 22 22 22 22
Observation per group 9 9 9 9 9
Robust Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
Standard Errors are clustered by industry.
∗ ∗ ∗ = Significant at 1 percent. ∗∗ = Significant at 5 percent. ∗= Significance at 10 percent.
In Table 14 the coefficient of the real exchange rate of UK with European trading
partners are negative and the coefficient of the real exchange rate of UK with non-European
trading partners are positive in case of non-exporting industries. This indicates that due
to a rise in the real exchange rate of UK with non-European trading partners keeping the
real exchange rate with European trading partners constant increases the net jobs flow rate
in non-exporting industries and also indicate the transfer of the resources from exporting
firms to non-exporting firms. Whereas the negative coefficient of the real exchange rate
with European trading partners terms points out that an increase in real exchange rate
reduces net employment in non-exporting firms. The reduction in employment in non-
exporting firms may be taking place due to a rise in imports that have become cheaper
as a result of a rise in the real exchange rate. However, these effects of the real exchange
rate on net employment rates in non exporting firms are insignificant.
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We also find that in non-exporting firms the net job flows are mainly determined by
GDP growth. Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 of Table 14 show that the coefficients on GDP
growth rates are positive and statistically significant. This implies that an increase in
GDP growth leads to a rise in employment in non-exporting firms. The marginal effect
of the GDP growth rate on net employment rate for exporting industries are
0.005, 0.007, 0.007 and 0.023 for models 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 in Table 14. A one
percent change in GDP growth rate leads to less than one percent change
in the employment2. This implies that in a time of prosperity employment
rises and in bad times employment falls. This result also indicates that the
overall macroeconomic environment in the country affects job flows in non-
exporting firms of manufacturing sector of the UK. This result remains valid
for the entire set of models we have estimated except when we consider non-
European trading partners of the UK. This may be due to the fact that most
UK trade takes place with other European countries.
Columns 1, 2, 3, and 5 of Table 14 show that the size of a firm in an industry
has a negative effect on net employment rates in the non-exporting industries.
The marginal effects of the size of a firm in an industry on net employment
rates in non-exporting industries are -0.108, -0.182, -0.115, -0.180 and -0.109
for models 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively, in Table 14. This implies that as the
size of a firm in an industry increases the fluctuations in the net employment
decreases. However, our results indicate that one percent change in size of a
firm in an industry leads to a less than one percent change in the employment3.
Results shown in Table 14 implies that for non-exporting firms, the bigger the
firm, the lesser will be the net change in employment in response to a shock.
Net job flows decrease with the increase in the size of the firm. This indicates
that smaller firms are more vulnerable to a shock. In other words, we can
say that bigger firms have more capacity to bear shocks and the adjustment
in employment in bigger firms is relatively low. This result is very stable and
does not change with the change of specification.
We also find that a shock to the real exchange rate neither creates nor destroys jobs
in non-exporting industries. The coefficients of the real exchange rates in the entire set
of the models we have estimated for job creation and job destruction in non-exporting
industries are insignificant (see Tables A.4 and A.5 in Appendix A). This implies that job
creation and job destruction in non-exporting industries of the UK manufacturing sector
2The elasticities of net employment rates to GDP growth rates for these coefficients are -0.19, -0.26,
-0.19, -0.004 and -0.87
3The elasticities of net employment rates to GDP growth rates for these coefficients are 0.34, 0.57, 0.36,
0.57 and 0.34
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are insensitive to variations in the real exchange rate. Once again our finding that changes
in real exchange rate do not bring changes in job creation or job destruction for non-trading
industries is consistent and does not vary with change to the model specification.
Table A.4 in Appendix A show previous period job creation rates, GDP growth and
average wages play a significant role in determining the job creations rates. The negative
and statistically coefficients of the previous period job creation rates and the average wages
indicate that other things remaining the same, a rise in previous period job creation rates,
and a rise in average wages decrease job creation rates significantly. Whereas positive and
statistically coefficients of the GDP growth rates indicate that a rise in GDP growth rates
increases the job creation rates in non-exporting industries significantly. The marginal
effect of the previous period job creation rates, average wages and GDP growth rates
are -0.110, -1.429 and .009 respectively when in the model 1. The marginal effects of
these variables are similar in other four model given in the Table A.4 in Appendix A. The
positive coefficients of GDP growth rate implies that other thing remaining the same, as
the GDP growth rate rise the firms increase hiring the new staff which leads to increase
in the opportunities to get employed for the existing unemployed workers and for the new
workers joining the labor force. The negative coefficients of average wages implies that
other thing remaining the same, as wages rise firms reduce hiring new staff which leads
to a reduction in the opportunities to get employed for the existing unemployed workers
and for new workers joining the labor force.
However, a one percent change in the previous period job creation rates, average wages
and GDP growth rates leads to less than one percent changes in job creation rates because
the elasticities in job creation rates with respect to previous period job creation rates,
average wages and GDP growth rates are less than one for all the models we have estimated
except for average wages in model 4 and for GDP growth in model 54. Whereas, Table
A.5 in Appendix A indicates that the job destruction rate is mainly determined by the
previous period job destruction rates and no other variable has a significant effect on
job destruction rates except GDP growth rates which is significant in model 5. Results
presented in Tables A.4 and A.5 in Appendix A show that GDP growth significantly
determines job creation and job destruction in non-exporting industries. However, GDP
growth affects job creation significantly in all five models, and job destruction in one out
of five models we have estimated. Therefore, we can say that our finding is consistent and
does not change with the change of model specification. In addition, we may say that the
4The elasticities of job creation rate with respect to previous period job creation rates are -0.12, -0.13,
-0.10, -0.13 and -0.18 for models 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively. The elasticities of job creation rate with
respect to average wages are -0.61, -0.90, -0.58, -1.08 and -0.98 for models 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively.
The elasticities of job creation rate with respect to GDP growth rates are 0.39, 0.56, 0.13, 0.52 and 1.82
for models 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively.
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adjustment process in net employment to a shock in average wages mainly works through
job creation because fluctuations in average wages affect job creation significantly and job
destruction insignificantly in most of the models we have estimated (see Tables A.4 and
A.5 in Appendix A).
With regard to firm-specific variables, we find that a rise in average wages does not
affect job destruction but significantly reduces job creation in non-exporting firms of the
UK manufacturing sector. This implies that non-exporting firms do not lay off their exist-
ing staff when they face higher wages. However, they avoid new recruitment when wages
rise. As a result, the effect of a rise in wages on net employment becomes insignificant
(see Table 14). Table A.6 in Appendix A shows that gross flows of the jobs are mainly
determined by previous period job creations and job destruction rates. Tables A.4 and
A.5 in Appendix A also support this observation. These two tables show that job creation
and job destruction rates are significantly determined by their lags.
Overall, our results show that a change in wage costs of the UK manufacturing sec-
tor relative to the wage costs in UK’s trading partners does not affect net employment
in non-exporting industries of the UK. Moreover, variations in the real exchange rates
neither create nor destroy jobs in non-exporting industries of the UK. Average wages and
GDP growth play a major role in explaining the dynamics of the employment in non-
exporting industries. Moreover, these results remain consistent whether we consider the
real exchange rate of the UK with 32 trading partners of the UK or we take into account
real exchange rate of the UK with only European or real exchange rate of the UK with
non-European trading partners of the UK only.
2.5 Conclusions
Shocks to the real exchange rate change incentives to produce tradable versus non-tradable
goods and generate labor market adjustment costs and may end up with net losses/gains
in employment. Along with the size of adjustment costs, how the adjustment process in
employment works is really important in labor market analysis. In this paper we have
analyzed three main questions. First, how employment in UK manufacturing responds
to a real exchange rate-led shock in competitiveness. Second, whether the adjustment in
employment works through job creation or job destruction. And third, whether the effect of
real exchange rate-led changes in UK competitiveness with European and non-European
countries is similar. Furthermore, the data we used provide us with an opportunity to
extend our analysis to exporting and non exporting firms of the UK manufacturing sector.
Using GMM we have estimated the dynamics of employment adjustments due to a
shock in competitiveness for the UK manufacturing sector. Our first conclusion is that
there is a significant reduction in the employment due to a rise in UK wage costs relative
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to its trading partners. This effect is more pronounced in industries that export relatively
more. However, the effect is small economically.
Second, the adjustment in net employment to a shock in competitiveness is significantly
driven by job creation and not significantly affected by job destruction. However, in
job creation previous period job destruction plays a more important role. Our results
are comparable to the results of Moser et al. (2010) for Germany, Abowd et al. (1999),
Gourinchas (1999) for France who found that job creation is more sensitive to shocks to
the real exchange rate as compared to job destruction. However, Moser et al. (2010) found
lower coefficients as compared to those we reported here.
Moreover, our results suggest that the UK labor market responds to shocks and in-
duces the employment smoothing accordingly. For example, temporary shocks to GDP
significantly explain job creation, job destruction and net flows. This implies that workers
fired in bad times will be rehired in good times. So, employment will be high in good
times but low in bad times.
Similar to the Hijzen et al. (2010) findings regarding the contribution of smaller firms
to employment fluctuations, we also find that smaller firms contribute more towards job
creation and slightly less towards job destruction than larger firms. This implies that
employment in small firms is more sensitive to fluctuations in competitiveness than large
firms. Furthermore, the size of labor adjustment in the UK manufacturing sector in
response to real exchange rate led fluctuations in competitiveness of the UK with European
and non-European countries differs. This observation is similar to the results of Burgess
and Knetter (1998) that the size of labor adjustment in response to a shock in real exchange
rate varies from country to country.
Moreover, we found that fluctuations in real exchange rate may not affect net employ-
ment in non-exporting firms. However, the increases in real exchange rate significantly
reduce net employment in exporting firms. So we can say that employment in exporting
and in non-exporting firms behave differently in response to a change in the real exchange
rate. In fact, changes in the real exchange rate put more pressure on net employment
through job creation than job destruction in both exporting and non-exporting firms of
the manufacturing sector of the UK.
Finally, the average wage cost affects jobs creation significantly but does not foster job
destruction. This suggest that insiders benefit from higher wages while outsiders bear the
cost of the job reallocation process.
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Chapter 3
Financial Turmoil, External Finance and UK Exports
3.1 Introduction
The funds that a firm acquires from the external resources such as banks
and other financial institutions to finance their productive activities are called
external finance. Availability and easier access to the funds from external resources
play an important role in growth and development of a country. The growing literature
in trade and finance establishes the fact that access to finance is a key ingredient in firms’
growth. According to the Business Environment and Enterprise Survey BEEPS (2010),
about 66% of the respondent firms in 29 countries of Europe and Central Asia (ECA) and
63% of EU-10 countries respondent firms report that access to external finance is one of the
major obstacles in doing business. Furthermore, this report indicates that the percentage
of firms indicating unfavorable interest rates as the main reason for not applying for a
loan ranges from about 2 to 42% of the firms surveyed. Overall, the survey suggests
that unavailability of external funds at affordable costs is a major obstacle in starting,
maintaining or extending business to foreign markets. In other words, credit constraints
may prevent firms from extending their business across borders.
Several empirical studies have examined the relationship between trade and finance
from different dimensions. Some of them look into the impact of financial development
on international trade and show that financial development promotes international trade.
For example, Beck (2003) finds that countries with better developed financial system have
higher export shares and trade balances in the industries that use more external finance.
Similarly, Hur et al. (2006), using cross-country industry level data, report that financial
development increases export shares and trade balances. On the other hand, some studies
have examined the linkages between access to external finance and cross border economic
activities. For instance, Berman and He´ricourt (2010) using a large cross-country firm-
level data set of nine developing and emerging economies show that financial constraints
create a disconnection between a firm’s productivity and its export status. Manova et al.
(2011) using Chinese firms’ data show that credit constraints restrict international trade
flows. Specifically, their findings indicate that limited credit availability hinders firms’
trade flows.
Another dimension explored in the trade and finance literature is how credit constraints
affect firms’ decisions to enter in international markets. Minetti and Zhu (2011) find that
the probability of exporting in Italian credit-rationed firms is 39% lower and that credit
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rationing reduces foreign sales by more than 38%. Similarly, using UK firm-level data,
Guariglia and Mateut (2010) study the links between firms’ global engagement status
and their financial health and show that the global engagement of firms improves their
financial health, suggesting that firms involvement in cross-border activity shields them
from financial constraints.
In general, researchers have established the fact that financial constraints reduce in-
ternational trade. However, empirical evidence on how firms exports respond to financial
constraints during the financial crisis is limited. According to my knowledge there is only
one paper by Chor and Manova (2011) which explores how international imports to the
USA reacted during the financial crisis. They show that countries with higher interbank
rates export less to the USA. They also show that this negative relationship has been
further intensified during the recent financial crisis when the interbank rate shot up. Fur-
thermore, they find that industries that require more external finance, with lower access
to trade credit and lower collateralizable assets, export less, and this effect becomes even
stronger during financial crisis. According to WTO (2010), the volume of the global trade
contracted by 12.2% during 2007-2009 global economic crisis. It was the largest decline in
world trade since World War 2.
Moreover, the intensity of the decline in trade flows caused by the financial constraints
seems to increase during the financial crisis (Chor and Manova, 2011). According to WEO
(2010) annualized quarter-over-quarter drop in the global real GDP averaged under 6%
from the last quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009, whereas the drop in global real
imports was five times as large and averaged over 30% during the same time period. The
same source reports that volume of the global trade which was growing at 2.9% in 2008
showed a decrease of 11% in 2009. During this period the imports and exports of the
advanced economies declined more rapidly than the imports and exports of the emerging
and developing economies. The imports and exports of the advanced economies declined by
12.7% and 12.4% respectively in 2009, whereas the imports and exports of the emerging
and developing economies declined by 8.2% and 7.8% respectively in 2009. Similarly,
Mora and Powers (2009) report that nominal global merchandise exports dropped by 32%
between the second quarter of 2008 and second quarter of 2009.
Mora and Powers (2009) consider the decline in trade financing as a major contributor
towards the decline in the world trade during the second half of 2008 and early 2009. Sum-
marizing the findings of the 6 surveys of international banks, suppliers, and government
agencies, Mora and Powers (2009) point out that trade financing is number two cause of
the decline in the global trade after falling the international demand. In these surveys,
among international suppliers, 30 % consider reduced supply of trade financing as a key
factor in lowering foreign sales, and 57 % of the banks reported that lower credit availabil-
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ity contributed to trade decline between the second half of 2008 and early 2009. Banks
reduced the supply of trade financing in last quarter of 2008 the trade financing and the
value of letters of credit fell by 11% in this quarter. Furthermore, the global impact of the
crisis on trade financing peaked in the first half of the 2009.
Similarly, quoting the surveys of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Bankers
Association for Finance and Trade (BAFT) now merged with International Financial Ser-
vices Association (BAFT-IFSA), Chauffour and Malouche (2011) report that about 40
percent of trade finance was bank intermediated whose prices increased considerably dur-
ing the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Mora and Powers (2009) report that the price of letter
of credit increased by 70 base points and the price of export credit insurance increased
by 100 base points during the crisis. The trade cost on average increased by about 11%
between the second quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009 (Jacks et al., 2009). This
rise in the costs of the trade in general and the increase in the cost of trade finances in
particular played their role in the collapse of global trade. Thus, it appears that reduction
in the availability of the trade finance, and the rise in the cost of the trade finance resulted
in the fall of the global trade. So, it is worthwhile to analyze whether trade finance was
indeed a major factor driving the fall in UK trade during the recent financial crisis.
Thus, in this chapter we analyze how UK exports responded to external financing
during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. It is useful to analyze UK exports during the
financial crisis because the UK is the seventh largest producer of manufacturing goods
and the fifth largest exporter of manufacturing goods in the world (Garcia-Vega et al.,
2012). Furthermore, on average 30 percent of the total sales of UK manufacturing firms are
directed abroad. The UK is the second largest host to multinational enterprises (Guariglia
and Mateut, 2010). Moreover, UK is one of the economies that was severely affected by the
financial crisis 2007-2009. During the crisis, the UK’s growth rate fall to -0.4 percent (Das,
2010), unemployment rate increased to 7.8 percent and the lending interest rates shot up
to 6.5 percent per annum (Brancaccio and Fontana, 2010). Furthermore, in this crisis
the Northern Rock bank, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Halifax Bank of Scotland
(HBOS) got into trouble, RBS bank announced the loss of 24.1 billion pounds, the biggest
loss of the corporate history, and the share price index decreased to 83.59. The UK’s credit
market was dried up and credit provided to the private sector decreased to $3.353 billion.
Moreover, during the crisis period 25 percent of UK manufacturers reported lack of credit
as a major hurdle in fulfilling their export orders and 15 percent of manufacturers reported
lack of credit as a factor likely to constraint their investment in next twelve months (BOE,
2011). Furthermore, UK exports declined drastically during the crisis period; the details
of decline in exports are given in Table 16. In order to rescue the UK’s banks, Bank
of England slashed the interest rate to 0.5 percent and the UK government announced a
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bailout package of £400 billion worth. The UK government measures to encourage lending
and to revive confidence in financial markets have increased UK taxpayer liability to 1.5
trillion pounds (Oxlade, 2012). These facts about the UK economy during the financial
crisis 2007-2009 raise the importance of the analysis which estimates the impact of the
financial crisis on UK sectoral exports. We use monthly UK exports data to estimate the
effects of the global financial crisis 2007-2009. Our sample period consists of January 2002
to September 2011.
We contribute to the existing literature in three aspects. First, the existing literature
estimates the impact of the current global financial crisis on US exports, whereas we focus
on UK exports. Second, in the previous literature researchers analyzed the impact of the
financial crisis on exports from the supply side only. Rather, we estimate the impact of
the financial crisis on exports considering both the demand and supply sides. Finally, we
use monthly data whereas most of the previous studies have used annual data.
We show that financial dependence is significant in determining the volume of UK
exports. Specifically, we find that the impact of financial dependence is negative and
statistically significant. We also show that the negative relationship between financial de-
pendence and the ability of firms to export became relatively stronger during the 2007-2009
financial crisis. These results hold when we use different proxies for financial dependence
in our analysis.
Further, our findings suggest that GDP and the capital-labor ratio of the UK and
the GDP and claims on the private sector of the importer country have positive and
significant impact on UK sectoral exports. Moreover, we found that the capital-labor
ratio and interest rates of importer countries are negative and statistically significant. We
also observe that the UK lending rate affects UK exports negatively.
In general, our findings remain unchanged when we use the overnight interbank rate
instead of the lending rate as a measure of cost of capital. They remain unchanged even
when we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to estimate the model. Furthermore,
the negative impact of financial dependence on exports holds when we extend our analysis
to the sectoral level; we find that those sectors that rely more on external finance, have
lower access to trade credit and have lower collateralizable assets export less relatively.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the studies that
have focused on the effects of financial dependence on exports. A brief review of financial
crisis 2007-2009 is also presented in this section. Section 3.3 describes the data we use in
our empirical analysis and discusses the construction of the variables. Section 3.4 presents
the empirical model which we estimate in order to examine the impact of financial crisis
on UK sectoral exports. Section 3.5 presents and discusses the empirical findings. Finally,
Section 3.6 presents conclusions.
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3.2 Literature Review
The linkages between trade and finance have been extensively analyzed both theoretically
and empirically. Researchers mainly focus on estimating the impact of overall financial
conditions in a country on international trade, in explaining the channels through which fi-
nancial constraints influence the cross-border flows of goods and services, and on exploring
whether firms’ participation in exporting activity affects their financial health. In general,
the trade and finance literature establishes the fact that financial constraints affect inter-
national trade. However, this effect varies across firms, industries, sectors and countries
depending on their dependence on external finance and overall financial conditions in the
country.
Several studies document that in the presence of credit constraints, countries with
more developed financial markets have a comparative advantage in financially vulnerable
sectors. Beck (2002), using 30 years data for 65 countries, explores the link between
financial development and trade in manufactures. He shows that countries with better-
developed financial sectors have a comparative advantage in manufacturing industries.
Moreover, he also shows that financial development has a significant impact on both the
level of exports and trade balance of manufactured goods. Similarly, Kletzer and Bardhan
(1987) show that a well-developed financial sector can theoretically lead to a comparative
advantage in industries that rely more on external financing. Hur et al. (2006) report a
positive relationship between financial development and industry-level exports. In short,
the development of the financial system in a country boosts exports by providing easy
access to financial resources to the exporters.
With regard to the association between firms’ financial health and their exporting
activities Greenaway et al. (2007), using data of UK manufacturing firms, show that
exporter firms exhibit better financial health than non-exporter firms. In fact, not only
does firms’ financial health affect exports but firm involvement in international trade also
affects firms’ financial status. Regarding the impact of firms’ participation in cross-border
sales on the financial health of firms, Greenaway et al. (2007) and Guariglia and Mateut
(2010) analyze the link between global engagement status and financial health of the
UK firms and find that global engagement status shields firms from financial constraints.
Hence, the existing literature seems to establish a two-way causality between financial
health and firms’ exporting status.
Evidence from existing studies suggests that trade finance is a key element in de-
termining the volume of international trade. According to Auboin (2009) 80 to 90% of
world trade depends on some form of trade financing. This implies that countries with
better financial markets have a comparative advantage in accessing foreign markets and
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extending their business beyond their national borders because developed financial mar-
kets provide trade credits on easier terms and conditions than relatively less developed
financial markets.
In fact, trade financing generates funds to cover substantial upfront sunk costs that
firms intending to start exporting activity or to extend their business in global market
have to pay but cannot be financed with internal cash flows. This implies that policies
that ensure the availability of funds at easier terms and conditions will stimulate trade.
By and large, the trade and finance literature identifies three main reasons of exports’
reliance on external finance. First, firms have to bear additional upfront fixed sunk costs
as well as some variable costs specific to international trade which cannot be met from
internal cash flows. Sunk costs include expenditures made to search for profitable export
markets and to set up marketing and distribution networks abroad. They also include
outlays incurred in adapting the product to meet international standards and regulatory
compliance and variable costs consisting of expenditure on shipping and customs duties.
In most cases firms have to bear these expense before the export revenues are realized.
In order to finance these expenditures, exporters opt for external resources. Second, on
average international transactions take 30 to 90 days longer than domestic transactions
which further intensifies an exporter’s need for external capital (Chor and Manova, 2011).
Finally, cross border business activities involve more risk relative to domestic business
activities. To avoid this risk exporters have to insure their transactions for which they
have to pay insurance premium leading to an increase in the cost of exporting and further
intensifying the need for external capital. As a result of the risks associated with trade,
the benefits/profit of trade may fall.
Although sunk entry cost is crucial for exporters, it varies with the size of firms. Das
et al. (2007) show that on average sunk entry cost for Colombian small producers is higher
and ranges from 430,000 to 412,000 US dollars while for large producers on average it is
lower and ranges from 334,000 to 402,000 US dollars. However, they report similar sunk
entry costs across sectors. In sum, in the presence of a sunk entry cost, exporting becomes
a challenge for firms. Furthermore, firms have to bear these costs before they actually
start exporting their product. This implies that only firms with sufficient liquidity can
expand their business beyond national borders.
The above mentioned factors indicate the significance of financial markets for cross-
border trade. Any disruption in financial markets which constrained the liquidity available
may affect firms’ decisions to sell their products in global markets and affects the overall
volume of trade. Recently, using Italian firm level data, Minetti and Zhu (2011) show that
credit constraints impede exporting activities of firms. This negative impact of credit con-
straints on exports becomes stronger during the financial crisis when the supply of funds
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becomes worse. Likewise, Auboin (2009) reports that 10-15% of the fall in international
trade in the second half of 2008 was due to a fall in the supply of trade finance. Further-
more, the size of global market for trade finance in 2008 is estimated at the $10-12 trillion,
which is almost 80% of the total value of world trade in 2008. In a nutshell, international
trade and finance are closely linked and among others factors global trade also reflects
variations in financial markets.
Thus, researchers working on trade and finance use different firm-specific variables to
denote firms’ dependence on external resources and to evaluate the impact of external
financing on international trade. For instance, to reflect firms’ requirement for outside
capital Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Chor and Manova (2011) use the fraction of total
capital not financed by internal cash flows. This measure of firms’ financial dependence
along with reflecting the volume of formal trade financing also indicates firms’ long term
need for external capital. Using this definition of firms’ dependence on external finance
to estimate the impact of external finance on exports Chor and Manova (2011) show that
countries with high costs of capital export less in sectors that depend more on external
resources.
Buyer-supplier trade credit is another important indicator which shows firms’ depen-
dency on external finance and reflects short term working capital needs of firms and affects
cross border trade. Petersen and Rajan (1997), Fisman and Love (2003) and Chor and
Manova (2011) use buyer-supplier trade credit as a potential substitute for formal trade
financing. Their findings indicate that firms with greater access to buyer-supplier trade
credit export more relative to firms with lower access to buyer-supplier trade credit. Fur-
thermore, Brennan et al. (1988) and Long et al. (1993) argue that buyer-supplier trade
credit is used to ensure the quality of the product and as an incentive to discriminate
among cash and credit customers. Since buyer-supplier trade credit does not come from
formal banking channels, firms with a greater access to buyer-supplier trade credit may
show some resilience to the detrimental effects of a financial crisis which squeezes liquidity
and makes it harder for firms to get credit from formal banking channels.
Along with the availability of external funds, the ability of firms to acquire these
funds also matters. Therefore, firms’ endowment of tangible assets which determines their
ability to acquire funds from formal banking channels becomes important. In principle,
firms characterized with more tangible assets can offer greater collateral to acquire external
funds. Researchers use tangible assets as an inverse proxy for the financial vulnerability
of firms. For example, Chor and Manova (2011) use tangible assets as an inverse proxy for
the financial vulnerability of sectors to estimate the impact of the financial crisis on US
imports. Their findings show that the exports of the sectors with higher endowments of
tangible assets are less sensitive to adverse credit conditions during the 2007-2009 financial
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crisis.
So far we have discussed studies which focus on the overall impact of financial devel-
opment on international trade. Now we emphasize how international trade behaves in
response to unexpected events happening in financial markets which reduce the availabil-
ity of funds. In fact, the importance of financial resources in promoting and extending
cross border trade flows magnifies when financial markets face a liquidity crunch and trade
financing dries up. Indeed, financial crisis depletes trade financing and creates a gap be-
tween demand for and supply of trade finance. Chauffour and Malouche (2011) report
that the gap between demand and supply of trade finance in US financial markets was
estimated at around $25 billion during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Furthermore, they
report that this gap increased to around $300 billion in secondary markets with the spread
of financial crisis from USA to EU and then to the developing countries. This suggests
that the trade finance market dried up globally during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
Consequently, firms became financially constrained and their output, employment and
sales declined in both domestic and foreign markets. In particular, foreign sales contracted
drastically during the financial crisis. Levchenko et al. (2011) report that from the second
quarter of 2008 to second quarter 2009 US imports declined by 21.4 percent and exports
dropped by 18.9 percent. Similarly, Auboin (2009) reports that 10-15% of the fall in
cross border trade in the second half of 2008 was caused by the fall in the supply of trade
finance. In the same vein Amiti and Weinstein (2011) estimate that the 1997 banking crisis
caused a 10.5 percent decline in Japanese exports. Bricongne et al. (2012) report similar
results for French sector level exports. In short, financial crisis has severe consequences
for international trade.
However, the financial turmoil’s effect on cross border trade varies from firm to firm,
industry to industry, sector to sector and from country to country depending on the size
and dependency of firm, industry or sector on external financial resources and on the level
of financial markets developments in the country. For instance, Chor and Manova (2011)
report that credit constraints hinder international trade and this hindrance intensified
during the 2007-2009 financial crisis when acute shortage of trade financing prevailed in
the financial markets. Moreover, they find that exports decreased relatively more in sectors
which rely more on external finance, have limited access to buyer-supplier trade credit and
have fewer collateralizable assets.
On the whole, the existing literature establishes a strong link between external finance
and international trade flows. Specifically, researchers consider that credit constraints
hinder cross border flows of goods and services. However, the literature on how interna-
tional trade flows respond to unexpected events like liquidity crisis in financial markets
is limited. Existing work mainly focuses on USA and European countries. Particularly,
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very few studies exist with reference to the impact of the 2007-2009 financial crisis on in-
ternational trade. Specifically, with reference to the response of international trade flows
of the UK during the 2007-2009 liquidity crunch the existing literature is scarce. Thus, to
look into effects of financial crisis on UK trade flows has worth and will contribute to the
trade-finance literature considerably.
3.3 A Brief Review of Financial Crisis 2007-2009
Financial crisis, or credit crunch, is not a new phenomenon. Financial markets in the
world have gone through sudden liquidity crunches in the past as well. According to Bordo
(2008) financial crises are as old as financial markets. However, the 2007-2009 financial
crisis differs from previous crises in its nature, intensity and in the level of damage to
economies facing the crisis.
The 2007-2009 financial crisis was a global crisis which started in the USA and spread
like a wild fire to other parts of the globe through asset markets, international banking and
through monetary standards. For instance, Das (2010) states that given the economic,
financial and trade inter-linkages of the world economy, the US financial crisis shifted to
other economies very quickly. Furthermore, during the crisis, valuation of the banks fell
and stock markets crashed across the countries. For example US and UK indices dropped
by more than three-quarters of their original value during this period (Wisniewski and
Lambe, 2011). As a result, many banks across the globe suspended their normal activities
and failed to honor their obligations. Specifically, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, BNP
Paribas, Sachsen LB and Northern Rock bank were among the victims of the crisis.
In terms of intensity and damage, the 2007-2009 financial crisis was so damaging
that COP (2009) and De Larosie`re (2009) described it as the worst crisis since the Wall
Street Crash and the Great Depression of late 1920s and 1930s. Likewise, Turner (2009)
considered it as the greatest crisis in the history of finance capitalism. Consequently,
economies facing the crisis were damaged intensively. For instance, the WorldBank (2011)
shows that growth rate of the world economy declined to -2.05 percent in 2009 from 3.94
percent in 2007. Similarly, high income economies, OECD, EURO Area, Japan and United
States declined to -3.53, -3.69, -4.18, -6.29 and -2.67 percent in 2009 which were growing
at 2.65, 2.54, 2.82, 2.36 and 1.94 percent, respectively, in 2007. However, low and middle
income economies showed a positive growth rate in 2009 and were growing at the rate of
2.78 percent in 2009. This suggests that financial crisis led to severe economic contraction
in advanced economies where financial markets are well developed.
Indeed, liquidity constraints arising from the financial crisis 2007-2009 have contributed
to falls in aggregate supply and demand. Output and employment decreased drastically
during the crisis period. For example, Das (2010) reports that the growth rate of the
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second largest economy in Europe, i.e., the UK fell to -0.4 percent in third quarter of
2009. Similarly, Brancaccio and Fontana (2010) reports that the unemployment rate in
US rose from 4.7 percent in the fourth quarter of 2007 to 9.2 percent in the second quarter
of 2009. Likewise, unemployment in the UK moved from 5.1 percent to 7.8 percent, France
from 7.5 percent to 9.1 percent, Spain from 8.6 percent to 17.9 percent, and Ireland from
4.6 percent to 12 percent during the same time period. These examples of a decline in
growth rate and in employment indicate that the 2007-2009 financial crisis has affected
real sector intensively.
With regard to the reasons behind the financial crisis of 2007-2009, Brancaccio and
Fontana (2010) point to two issues. First, they argued that misguided underpricing of
the risk which made financial investors overconfident in measuring and managing the risk
lead to financial crisis. Second, they consider the ‘Greenspan Put’, i.e., loose monetary
policy of early 2000 as a major cause of the recent financial crisis. In a similar vein Bordo
(2008) suggests that major changes in regulations, lax regulatory oversight, a relaxation
of normal prudent lending and period of abnormally low interest rates contributed to the
crisis. Along with the default of subprime mortgage, the above mentioned factors created
uncertainty in financial markets about the soundness of loans for buyouts leading to drying
up the interbank lending market. The prevailing uncertainty and lack of funds available
in financial markets turned into a severe liquidity crisis in a very short period of time and
spread across the globe through trade and financial markets linkages.
Consequently, the governments and the central banks of some economies, plagued
with liquidity crisis, stepped in with fiscal and monetary stimulus to combat the crisis.
For example, in the case of monetary measures to combat crisis and to encourage lending,
the Bank of England slashed bank rate form 5% in 2008 to 0.5% in 2009 and the US
central bank kept bank rates close to zero in 2008. With reference to fiscal stimulus
Das (2010) reports that initially the US government provided a small stimulus worth
$152 billion in 2008 and later in 2009 president Obama signed a package worth $787
billion to save the banks. Furthermore, to rescue US financial institutions and to reduce
market rates the Federal Bank committed itself to purchase $1.7 trillion worth of treasury
bonds, mortgage-backed securities and agency debts. Similar measures were taken to save
the financial institutions of the UK. The BBC reports that in October 2008, the UK
government announced a $88 billion rescue package for the banking system. Moreover,
the UK government offered up to $350 billion in short-term lending support5.
In the context of the chronology of the events which took place during the 2007-2009
financial crisis, Wisniewski and Lambe (2011) and Brunnermeier (2009) state that early
signs of the crisis became visible in February 2007 when delinquency rates among subprime
5See, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7521250.stm.
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borrowers increased. Later, in June 2007, the leading investment bank Bear Stearns came
under pressure when two of its hedge funds failed to meet their margin calls. The crisis
intensified and spread to other economies with the passage of time. As Edmonds et al.
(2010) report the disruption in the banking operation intensified in August 2007 when
BNP Paribas suspended normal activities on three of its hedge funds and the ECB was
forced to provide liquidity, and the German Bank Sachsen LB became a victim of the
crisis. Failure of the banks to continue their normal activities generated chaos and a fear
of liquidity problem in the financial markets.
The fear of liquidity problems worsened with the collapse of Bear Stearns in March
2008. However, the financial crisis reached on its peak in September 2008 when Lehman
Brothers collapsed (Oxlade, 2012)6, followed by the announcements of bailout packages
for the banks by governments of the affected economies and mergers of banks in October
2008. Consequently, the public debts mounted up and macroeconomic conditions wors-
ened. Despite granting the generous bail out packages to banks by the government to
cope with the liquidity crisis, confidence in financial markets only slowly returned in April
2009.
Up till now we discussed the overall development of the crisis. Now we look into the
insights of the crisis with reference to the UK. The UK is one of the economies which has
been severely affected by the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The tidal wave of the crisis
starting with the repayment of the subprime mortgage in August 2007 entangled the UK
as well. At the same time, British house prices started to fall and triggered the financial
crisis in the UK. However, British house prices stabilized in April 20097. The overnight
interbank rate started to shoot up and reached to 6.5 percent per annum
in September 2008 which was 5.31 percent per annum in January 2007 and
share price index number decreased to 83.596 in October 2008 from 131.015
in June 2007, as a result the credit market dried. The claims on private sec-
tor which shows credit provided to private sectors decreased to $3.353 billion
in June 2008 from $14.082 billion in June 2007. This created distress in the
stock markets and share prices declined. The share price index dropped from
132.5 in May 2007 to 82.2 in November 2008 and declined further to 74.2 in
February 2009. As a result investment, output and exports declined. The
real exports of the UK declined to £4155.988 million in September 2008 from
£10025.571 million in July 2007 when the crisis started8. According HM Trea-
6Oxlade, A. (2012), Economy watch: Is the British economy already back into recession?
http://9dj1o x.0.u.is/money/news/article-1616085/Economy-watch-What-Britain.html.
7See footnote 2 for reference.
8These figures are taken from International Financial Statistics(IFS) 2011 data base.
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sury’s Management Report (2012)9, following a news report leaked by BBC
that Northern Rock bank had approached the Bank of England for liquidity
support, on 14 September 2007 about £4.6 billion were withdrawn from the
Northern Rock bank. Furthermore, the report states that in January 2008
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) announced the biggest loss in the corporate
history, a loss of £24.1 billion. BOE (2011) reports that in 2007 less than 3%
of the UK manufacturers cited the lack of credit as a factor likely to constraint
their export orders over next three months, this number increased to 15% in
2009. In addition, in 2007, less than 2% of the UK manufacturers cited the lack
of credit as a factor likely to constraint their output over next three months,
this number increased to 25% in 2009. Consequently, UK exports declined.
However, the decline in exports varied from sector to sector.
For example, from October 2008 to November 2008 within the period of
one month Food and live animal exports dropped by 9.2 percent, Beverage and
tobacco exports decreased by 19.4 percent, Crude materials, inedible except
fuel exports decreased by 44.5 percent, Chemical and related products exports
dropped by 22.1 percent, Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material
decreased by 14.9 percent and Machinery and transport equipment exports
decreased by 11.9 percent. Similar trends were observed in the exports of
other commodities during this period (see Table 16 for details). These figures
show that the financial crisis 2007-2009 has affected the real economy of the
UK particularly the financial crisis 2007-2009 had severe consequences for the
UK exports.
In the chronology of events which took place in the UK during the financial crisis,
Northern Rock got into trouble and applied for liquidity support from the Bank of Eng-
land in September 2007 and finally was nationalized in February 2008 after two unsuc-
cessful bids. Similarly, in early October 2008 Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) ran into
a trouble and through a bailout package was merged into Lloyds bank in January 2009.
On 8th October 2008 UK government announced 400 billion pound worth rescue plan for
the banks and nationalized HBOS and RBS, two largest banks of the UK and took the
partial ownership of the Lloyd TSB bank. According to Oxlade (2012) UK government
measures to encourage lending and to revive confidence in financial markets has increased
UK taxpayers’ liability to 1.5 trillion pounds.
In sum, the 2007-2009 financial crisis was global in nature and severely affected macroe-
conomic conditions across the globe. Indeed, acute liquidity constraints in financial mar-
9 Review of HM Treasury’s management response to the financial crisis, March 2012 Report available
at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/review fincrisis response 290312.pdf
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kets during the crisis have led to the contraction of the real sector in all the affected
economies. Thus, given the above mentioned facts it is important o investigate the impact
of 2007-2009 financial crisis on UK exports.
3.4 Empirical Model and Methodology
3.4.1 Empirical Model
Given the state of the literature we use the models given in equations 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 to
analyze the impact of 2007-2009 financial crisis on the UK exports. These models are
modified versions of the model used by Chor and Manova (2011) to estimate the impact
of financial crisis on US imports. In their model, Chor and Manova (2011) consider only
demand side of the exports which is affected by changes in cost of the capital. Chor and
Manova (2011) interacted exporter country’s cost of capital with the financial
vulnerability of different sectors of the importing country. This implies that
Chor and Manova (2011) are changing the exporter country’s cost of capital
and observing its impact on exports through changes in the financial vulnera-
bilities of the sectors operating in the importing countries in response to the
changes in exporter country’s cost of capital. This may be incorrect because
fluctuations in the exporter country’s cost of the capital will affect the finan-
cial vulnerabilities of firms or the sectors operating in an exporting country
rather than affecting the financial vulnerabilities of the firms or the sector
operating in the importing country. Moreover, from the model proposed by
Chor and Manova (2011), we cannot differentiate whether fluctuations in the
cost of capital affect exports by affecting the demand for exports or by affect-
ing the supply of exports because Chor and Manova (2011) have interacted
exporter country’s cost of the capital with the financial vulnerability of the
sectors operating in the importing countries to measure the impact of the
financial vulnerability of the sector on exports.
Thus, to overcome the above mentioned problems in Chor and Manova
(2011) model we have modified it. In the modified model we interact exporter
country’s cost of the capital with financial vulnerability of firms or sectors
operating in the exporting countries to estimate the impact of the financial
vulnerability of a firm or a sector on its exports. This will give the impact of the
financial conditions in the exporting country on the supply of the exports. In
addition, we interact the cost of capital in the importer country with financial
vulnerability of firms or sectors operating in the importing country. This
will give the impact of the financial conditions prevailing in the importing
country on the demand for exports. So, from the modified model we can
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easily bifurcate the impact of the variations in the cost of the capital on the
supply of exports and on the demand for exports.
The modified version of the model is given below in equations 3.4.1 and 3.4.2.
Exportsuk,kit = β1IBrateuk,t × EXTFINuk,k + β2DCrisis × IBrateuk,t × EXTFINuk,k
+ β3IBrateit × EXTFINi,k + Σnj=1αjZj +Dkt +Dit +Dik + ikt (3.4.1)
Exportsuk,kit = β0Exportsuk,kit−1 + β1IBrateuk,t × EXTFINuk,k
+ β2DCrisis × IBrateuk,t × EXTFINuk,k + β3IBrateit × EXTFINi,k
+ Σnj=1αjZj +Dkt +Dit +Dik + ikt (3.4.2)
where k = sector, t = time and i = importer country
Exportsuk,kit=UK exports in sector K going to importing country i.
IBrateuk,t=cost of capital in UK at time t. In principle, insurance costs and interest rates
charged on the exports credit lines would be the ideal measures to represent the cost of the
trade financing for the UK. However, unfortunately, a direct measure of insurance costs
and the rates charged on the exports credit lines are not available for the UK and for the
trading partners of the UK from the data sources we have used to get the data for this
chapter. Therefore, following Chor and Manova (2011) we use interbank lending rate as
a measure of cost of the capital or as a proxy for the trade financing in the UK and in
trading partners of the UK.
IBratei,t=cost of capital the cost of trade financing in importing country at time t. We
use the interbank lending rate as a measure of cost of the capital as a proxy for the trade
financing in trading partners of the UK.
EXTFINuk,k=dependence of sector k of the UK on external resources. We have used
four proxies; External Finance, Trade Credit, Tangible Assets and Leverage, to measure
the dependence of a sector k of the UK on external resources and their definitions are
given in the variable construction section.
EXTFINi,k=dependence of sector k of the importing country on external resources. We
have used credit to the private sector as a proxy to measure the dependence of sector k of
the importing country on external resources.
Z=is a vector of control variables and includes GDP of the UK, interest rates of the UK,
Capital labor ratio of the UK, importer country’s GDP, Capital labor ratio, interest rates,
and Time required to enforce a contract (TREC). All these variables directly or indirectly
affect UK exports and have been used as control variables in the literature. Note that in
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our analysis exports, GDP of the UK, Capital-labor ratio of the UK, importer country’s
GDP, Capital-labor ratio are in log form.
Dit= Country-time fixed effects. They will capture the impact of the shocks to aggregate
production and bilateral exchange rates fluctuations in each importing country on their
imports over time.
Dkt= Sector-time fixed effects. They will capture the impact of the shocks to aggregate
production, bilateral exchange rates fluctuations on different sectors which vary across the
sectors depending on the size, vulnerability and trade volumes of a sector.
Dik= Country-sector fixed effects. They will capture the time-invariant sources of the
comparative advantage that affect the average pattern of the country imports across the
sectors.
DCrisis=dummy variable, equal to 1 if the period is crisis period, otherwise
zero. In our analysis, following (Wisniewski and Lambe, 2011) we use the
time period from May 2007 to February 2009 as the crisis period.
ikt= error term
In both models we use double interaction (IBrateuk,t × EXTFINuk,k) and
triple interaction (DCrisis × IBrateuk,t × EXTFINuk,k) terms. Here, the double
interaction term IBrateuk,t × EXTFINuk,k measures the sensitivity of financial
vulnerability of the sector k in the UK to fluctuations in the cost of capital.
IBratei,t ×EXTFINi,k measures the sensitivity of the financial vulnerability of
the sector k in the importing country to changes in the cost of capital. When
the cost of capital rises it becomes harder for a firm to acquire external fi-
nance leading to a reduction in output and exports especially in firms with
greater requirements for external finance. So, we expect the coefficient of
the IBrateuk,t × EXTFINuk,k term, i.e., β1 < 0. Similarly, the double interac-
tion term IBratei,t × EXTFINi,k measures the sensitivity of financial vulner-
ability of the sector k in importing country i to fluctuations in the interest
rates. The double interaction term IBratei,t × EXTFINi,k also measures fluc-
tuations in demand for imports of country i from the UK. So, the coefficient
of IBratei,t × EXTFINi,k term, i.e. β3 shows the sensitivity of UK exports to
changes in interest rates in importing country. As the cost of borrowing for
consumption purposes increases demand for imported goods decreases. Thus,
as a consequence, when the cost of borrowing increases it will decrease UK
exports as well. So, we expect the coefficient of the IBratei,t×EXTFINi,k term,
i.e., β3 < 0.
The triple interaction term DCrisis × IBrateuk,t × EXTFINuk,k measures the
sensitivity of financial vulnerability of the sector k in the UK to fluctuations
81
in the cost of capital during the crisis period. In fact, credit conditions in a
country become worse as the interest rate shoots up during the financial crisis
and in turn the cost of capital becomes very high. Subsequently, firms cannot
afford to raise external funds at high interest rates and cut down their output
and employment during periods of liquidity crunch. Consequently, domestic
and foreign sales decline. In particular, financially constrained firms’ exports
decline relatively more as compared to less constrained firms. Therefore, we
expect coefficient of the DCrisis × IBrateuk,t × EXTFINuk,k term, i.e., β2 < 0 as
well. In other words, we expect that the negative effect of a rise in interest
rate on exports intensifies during the credit crunch.
3.4.2 Construction of Variables
The funds that a firm acquires from the external resources such as banks
and other financial institutions to finance their productive activities are called
external finance. For firms’ dependence on external resources, we use the following four
proxies.
3.4.3 External Finance (EXTFIN)
External Finance (EXTFIN) is defined as the fraction of total capital expenditure not
financed by internal cash flows from operation (Rajan and Zingales, 1998):
EXTFIN =
Total Capital Expenditure not Financed by Internal Cash Flows from Operation
Investment
It indicates firms’ long term need for external finance. A rise in interest rates makes
it costly for firms to get finance from formal banking channels and ultimately leads to a
decrease in cross-border activities of financially constrained firms. Therefore, we expect
the coefficients of IBrateuk,t × EXTFINuk,k and DCrisis × IBrateuk,t × EXTFINuk,k
terms, i.e., both β1 and β2 to be less than zero when using EXTFIN as a proxy for financial
dependence of the sector to estimate equation 3.4.1.
3.4.4 Trade Credit (TCRED)
Trade Credit (TCRED) is defined as the ratio of trade credit to the book value of total
assets of firms.
TCRED =
Trade Credit
Book Value of Total Assets of Firm
This variable indicates firms’ short term working capital requirements (Chor and
Manova, 2011). Firms use trade credit as an alternative to borrowing from formal bank-
ing channels. Moreover, firms with a greater access to trade credit are less sensitive to a
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rise in interest rates because they can finance their cross-border activities by using buyer-
supplier trade credit. Therefore, we expect the coefficients of IBrateuk,t × TCREDuk,k
and DCrisis×IBrateuk,t×TCREDuk,k terms, i.e., β1 and β2 to be greater than zero when
instead of EXTFIN we use TCRED as a proxy for financial dependence of the sector to
estimate equation 3.4.1. Furthermore, β2 can be less than zero as well if the crisis exhausts
the credit availability along with the other forms of financing to the firms to support their
exports.
3.4.5 Tangible Assets (TANG)
Tangible Assets (TANG) is defined as the ratio of tangible assets to book value of total
assets.
TANG =
Total Tangible Assets
Book Value of Total Assets of Firm
This proxy captures firms’ ability to pledge collateral in acquiring external borrowing
(Braun (2003) ; Claessens and Laeven (2003) ; Chor and Manova (2011)). Firms with
greater tangible assets can get funds from banks more easily because they can offer more
assets as collateral. Therefore, we expect the coefficients of IBrateuk,t × TANGuk,k and
DCrisis× IBrateuk,t×TANGuk,k terms, i.e., both β1 and β2 to be greater than zero when
instead of EXTFIN we use TANG as a proxy for financial dependence of the sector to
estimate equation 3.4.1.
3.4.6 Leverage (LEVERAGE)
Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to book value of total assets.
LEVERAGE =
Total Debt
Book Value of Total Assets of Firm
Leverage shows the riskiness of firms. Risks of default increase with an increase in
the leverage of firms. Banks try to avoid lending funds to firms with high leverage or
may lend to them at an interest rate which is higher than the interest rate which banks
charge firms with lower values of leverage. So, firms with high leverage may not be able to
get funds from banks easily and reduce their cross-border activities. Thus, we expect the
coefficients of IBrateuk,t×LEV ERAGEuk,k and DCrisis×IBrateuk,t×LEV ERAGEuk,k
terms, i.e., both β1 and β2 to be less than zero when we use LEVERAGE as a proxy
for financial dependence of the sector to estimate equation 3.4.1. On the other hand, the
leveraged firms are normally big in their sizes, and can manage to get loans from the banks
to finance their production activities fulfill their export orders even under the financial
crisis situations. Thus, in this case the coefficients of IBrateuk,t × LEV ERAGEuk,k and
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DCrisis×IBrateuk,t×LEV ERAGEuk,k terms, i.e., both β1 and β2 to be greater than zero
when we use LEVERAGE as a proxy for financial dependence of the sector to estimate
equation 3.4.1. If the crisis become so worse that the leveraged firms could not exploit
the banks to get the funds then the coefficient of DCrisis× IBrateuk,t×LEV ERAGEuk,k
terms will be less than zero.
Note that we calculate these proxies at the firm level and then to match with sector
level data we take a median of all the firms operating in a sector.
3.4.7 Data Sources
The data we use for this study are taken from various sources and our sample period
consists of January 2002 to September 2011. Monthly data of UK exports are taken from
Overseas Trade Statistics, HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC). Overseas Trade Statistics,
HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) provide detailed data on monthly exports and imports
of the UK. Furthermore, HMRC provides the break down on import and export data for the
UK according to regions, trading partners and Standard International Trade Classification
(SITC) commodity codes. Note that our sample covers UK exports going to 25 major
trading partners only. Table 9 shows these trading partners. Also note that these trading
partners account for more than 80% of UK exports. Thus, the selection of the sample
seems reasonable.
Table 15: The UK Major Trading Partner
No Trading partner No Trading Partner
1 BELGIUM 14 NETHERLANDS
2 CANADA 15 NORWAY
3 CHINA 16 POLAND
4 CZECH REPUBLIC 17 QATAR
5 DENMARK 18 RUSSIA
6 FRANCE 19 SINGAPORE
7 GERMANY 20 SPAIN
8 HONG KONG 21 SWEDEN
9 HUNGARY 22 SWITZERLAND
10 INDIA 23 TAIWAN
11 IRISH REPUBLIC 24 TURKEY
12 ITALY 25 USA
13 JAPAN
In order to measure the financial dependence of the sectors, firm level data are taken
from Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME). FAME provides detailed information on
companies for a period of ten years. Moreover, the majority of the firms, for which FAME
provides data, are not listed on the stock exchange. In general, non-listed companies are
small, financially constrained, possess lower assets and have poor credit ratings as com-
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pared to large, financially sound, and well-established listed companies with better credit
ratings. In addition, smaller firms are likely to face more problems in obtaining financial
resources from banking and non banking channels relative to the large firms. Thus, our
proxies for the financial dependence of firms should provide a good representation of fi-
nancially constrained firms. Table B.5 provides the characteristics of the sectors and the
number of firms included in each sector included in our sample. Monthly lending interest
rate, overnight interbank rate, consumer price index and claims on private sector of part-
ner countries and of the UK, are extracted from International Financial Statistics (IFS).
Data of the UK’s GDP,labor force and gross fixed capital formation and the GDP, labor
force, gross fixed capital formation and the time required to enforce a contract (TREC)
of partner country are extracted from the World Development Indicators (WDI).
3.4.8 At First Glance
Table B.4 given in Appendix B reports the means, standard deviations, maximum and
minimum values of the key variables used in the analysis, before, after and during the
financial crisis 2007-2009. This table shows that on average the lending rates and overnight
interbank rates have increased on average during the financial crisis which indicate that
the credit markets of the UK were tighten and the credit availability to firms to finance
their production activities to fulfill their export orders have lowered during the crisis.
Table B.4 given in Appendix B also indicates that on average the cost of capital increased
during the financial crisis and has played its role in decreasing UK exports. This decline
in the UK exports is shown in Table 16. Table 16 shows that if we compare total exports
at the start of the crisis and the exports when recovery started the total exports of the UK
have declined by 13.8 percent. Furthermore, Table 16 shows that total exports declined
by 14.2 percent within the period of one month, from October 2008 to November 2008,
when the crisis was at its peak.
Our objective is to explore how the financial crisis of 2007-2009 has affected
the UK exports. To achieve this goal we a require measure of credit conditions
in the UK and in trading partners of the UK as our key explanatory variables.
The interest rates charged on export credit lines or insurance would be the
ideal variables to be used as a direct measure of the cost of trade financing.
But unfortunately, the data of the rates charged on export credit lines or in-
surance is not readily available for the countries included in our sample from
the data sources that we have used for this chapter. Therefore, following Chor
and Manova (2011) we use interbank lending rates as a proxy to measure the
cost of trade financing. Chor and Manova (2011) state that in the absence of
systematic information on the cost of trade financing, the interbank lending
85
Table 16: Percentage Decline in the UK Exports at the Peak and During the
Financial Crisis
Sector Peak of Overall
the Crisis during the Crisis
Food and Live Animal -9.2 11.1
Beverages and Tobacco -19.4 -7.7
Crude Materials, Inedible except Fuel -44.5 -32.7
Minerals Fuels, Lubricants and Related material -11.5 -5.5
Animal and vegetable oils, Fats and Waxes -9.9 47.6
Chemical and Related Products, n.e.s -22.1 5.9
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material -14.9 -38.8
Machinery and Transport Equipments -11.9 -24.9
Miscellaneous manufactured article -9.0 -11.7
Commodities and Transactions not Classified elsewhere in the SITC -10.6 8.7
Total Exports -14.2 -13.8
Note: Calculated from Overseas Trade Statistics, HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) monthly data on UK
exports. Peak of the Crisis values are calculated using the exports from October 2008 to November 2008.
Overall during the Crisis values are calculated using the exports from March 2007 to February 2009.
rate can serve as a broader measure of the cost of external finance in the econ-
omy and also as a proxy for the cost of trade financing. Basically, interbank
rate is an interest rate that commercial banks charge from each other for a
short term loan which a commercial bank acquires from the other commer-
cial banks to adjust liquidity positions and to meet the reserve requirements.
Furthermore, the interbank lending rate serves as a benchmark for the overall
cost of the credit in the economy and other interest rates such as a mortgage
rates and commercial banks lending rates take a clue from it. However, Chor
and Manova (2011) state that the interbank rate is a noisy measure of the
actual cost of trade financing to exporting firms and underestimates the im-
pact of financial distress on trade flows. In order to support their argument
Chor and Manova (2011) present two reasons. First, the interbank rate is an
interest rate for the contracts that actually took place, and the financial trans-
action that did not occur would presumably cleared at a higher interest rates.
This implies that the actual marginal cost of capital for the marginal exporter
would likely to be higher. Second, at the height of the financial crisis, credit
tightening is due to the higher cost of credit and due to a limited availability
of external financing, both of which would hamper firms’ ability to export. In
the absence of systematic data on the loan quantities across countries and over
time we cannot evaluate the impact of credit rationing on trade flows. Thus,
results using the interbank rate as a proxy for cost of credit will provide only
a lower bound for the combined effects of both margins of credit tightening.
Thus, in the light of Chor and Manova (2011) arguments, use of interbank
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lending rate as a measure of credit conditions in a country underestimates
the impact of credit conditions on trade flows. With these limitations, we use
interbank lending rate as a measure of tightness of prevailing credit conditions
in the countries included in our sample. In addition, the fluctuations in total exports
of the UK for the whole sample period and during the financial crisis are shown in the
Figure 11. This figure depicts that the exports of the UK were falling even before the
start of financial crisis because cost of the capital were increasing even before the start of
financial crisis. The trends in cost of the capital represented by the lending interest rates
and overnight interbank rates are shown in Fig 13 indicate this phenomenon.
Figure 11: Total Exports of the UK
	  
	  
0.000	  50.000	  
100.000	  150.000	  
200.000	  250.000	  
2002	  Ja
n	  
2002	  Ju
l	  
2003	  Ja
n	  
2003	  Ju
l	  
2004	  Ja
n	  
2004	  Ju
l	  
2005	  Ja
n	  
2005	  Ju
l	  
2006	  Ja
n	  
2006	  Ju
l	  
2007	  Ja
n	  
2007	  Ju
l	  
2008	  Ja
n	  
2008	  Ju
l	  
2009	  Ja
n	  
2009	  Ju
l	  
2010	  Ja
n	  
2010	  Ju
l	  
2011	  Ja
n	  
2011	  Ju
ly	  
a:	  UK	  Total	  Exports	  in	  Million	  Pounds	  
from	  Jan	  2002	  to	  Sep	  2011	  
Total	  Exports	  
0.000	  
50.000	  
100.000	  
150.000	  
200.000	  
250.000	  
2007	  May	  2007	  Jul	   2007	  Sep	   2007	  Nov	  2008	  Jan	   2008	  Mar	  2008	  May	  2008	  Jul	   2008	  Sep	   2008	  Nov	  2009	  Jan	  
b:	  UK	  Total	  Exports	  in	  Milion	  Pounds	  
from	  May	  2007	  to	  Mar	  2009	  
Total	  Exports	  
The Fig 13 shows a sharp decline in the interest rate after 2009 which indicates the
measures taken by the Bank of England to encourage the investors in which the Bank has
slashed the interest rate from 5 percent in 2008 to 0.5 percent in 2009. This decline in the
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interest rate revived the confidence of the investors in the gloomy situation prevailing in
the UK and around the world. As a result the share price index started to improve from
the second quarter of 2009 which had been falling since the start of the crisis. Figure 20 in
Appendix B shows the fluctuations in share price index before, after and during the crisis.
However, UK exports revived after the second quarter of the 2009 as shown by the Figure
11. Sector level exports of the UK show a similar trend to the trend of total exports of the
UK. Figure 12 shows the trends in sectoral exports for the whole sample period as well as
during the crisis period.
Figure 12: Sectoral Exports of the UK
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The Figure 12 shows that Machinery and transport equipments (S-7), Chemical and
related products (S-5), Manufactured goods chiefly classified by material (S-6), Miscella-
neous manufactured articles (S-8) are the major exports of the UK. Similar to the Table
16, Figure 12 shows that exports in all the sectors have declined when the crisis was at its
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Figure 13: Monthly Lending and Overnight Interbank Rates of the UK
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peak. The exports of Minerals fuels, lubricants and related material (S-3) and Chemical
and related material (S-5) sectors have decreased drastically when the crisis was at its
peak. However, Table B.4 in Appendix B shows that on average UK exports going to
the selected trading partners have increased during the crisis. This implies that the UK
exports have declined drastically in the minor trading partners of the UK. However,if we
compare the UK exports going to all trading partners of the UK at the beginning of the
crisis with the exports when the recovery started, then Table 16 shows that overall UK
exports have declined by -13.8 percent. Furthermore, Table 16 shows that the exports of
Manufactured goods chiefly classified by material (S-6), Crude materials, inedible except
fuel (S-2) and Machinery and transport equipments (S-7) were severely hit by the financial
crisis, when we compare the export at the beginning of the crisis with the exports when
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the recovery started.
Table B.4 also indicates that the key variables identified in the literature to measure
the cost of capital, i.e. the lending rates and overnight interbank rate have increased on
average and became more volatile during the financial crisis 2007-2009. During the crisis,
on average rise in the lending interest rate and in the overnight interbank rate reflects
that the credit conditions in UK had become worse during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
This rise in the cost of capital during the crisis had led to an increase in the vulnerability
of financially constrained firms. As a result UK exports declined.
In sum, Table 16, Table B.4 in Appendix B, Figure 13, Figure 20 in Appendix B,
Figure 11 and Figure 12 indicate that the financial conditions in the UK had become tight
during the financial crisis and led to the increase in financial vulnerability of firms, which
in turn, have adversely affected the cross-border activity of the UK firms.
3.4.9 Estimation of the Model
The model shown in equation 3.4.1 is a simple panel regression model and we use Ordinary
Least Square (OLS) technique to estimate the model given in equation 3.4.1. In this
model we control for sector-time, country-time and country-sector fixed effects through
the dummy variables used in the model. However, equation 3.4.2 is a dynamic model as
it contains the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable.
Inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable and the time
invariant unobserved sector and country specific effects make the model given in equation
3.4.2 endogenous. Moreover, there is problem of reverse causality between the GDP of the
UK and the exports of the UK in the in equation 3.4.2 as well. Therefore, OLS estimates
become inconsistent. Actually, in presence of the endogenous variables in the model, the
OLS estimates just give the magnitude of the association and do not give the directions
of the causation which is required for the policy analysis. Therefore, we use Instrumental
Variable (IV) method to get the consistent estimates which is a widely used methodology
is presence of the endogenous variable in the model to get the consistent estimates. This
method not only gives the magnitude of the association but the direction of causality as
well. Basically, the IV method uses the instrumental variable in place of the variable
which is causing the endogeneity problem in the model. A good instrument has three
properties. First, the instrumental variable is uncorrelated with the error terms. Second,
the instrumental variable is correlated with the variable being instrumented. Third, an
instrumental variable is strongly correlated with the variable being instrumented. The first
and the second properties of the instrumental variable are called necessary conditions for
a variable to be an instrument of a variable. With these properties of the instruments, the
IV method gives consistent estimates of the model which can be used for policy analysis.
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Moreover, along with catering the simultaneous causality bias the IV method addresses
the omitted variable bias and errors in the variable bias as well.
Econometricians suppose.
Yi = βXi + εi (3.4.3)
In this equation Yi is dependent variable and Xi is an independent variable.  is error
term. Now if we apply OLS to estimate the β, then β will be consistent and can be used
for policy analysis only if
Cov(X) = 0 (3.4.4)
However, if
Cov(X) 6= 0 (3.4.5)
Then OLS to estimate the β will be inconsistent and cannot be used for policy analysis.
However, the Instrumental Variable(IV) method gives consistent estimates of β which can
be used for the policy analysis. Actually, the IV method breaks the Xi in to two parts,
one which is correlated with the error term and the other part which is not correlated with
the error term. IV method do this using the instrumental variables. Suppose there exists
a variable Zi which is correlated with the Xi but not correlated with the error term. The
variable Zi will be a valid instrument if it satisfies the conditions below.
Cov(Z) = 0 (3.4.6)
Cov(XZ) 6= 0 (3.4.7)
Now if the Zi satisfies the above conditions then in first stage regress Xi on Zi using
the OLS and calculate the predicted values of Xi. These predicted values of the Xi will
not be correlated with the error term. Then in the second stage use these predicted values
of Xi instead of the Xi in the original model given in equation 3.4.3 to get the consistent
estimates of the β.
We can write the above mentioned process as under.
Stage 1:
Xi = θZi + υi (3.4.8)
Now calculate the predicted values of Xi, X̂i where X̂i=θ̂Zi. As the Zi is not corre-
lated with the error term ε, the X̂i=θ̂Zi will not be correlated with error term ε as well.
Therefore, replace the Xi with the X̂i in equation 3.4.3 and estimate it using OLS.
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Stage 2:
Yi = βX̂i + εi (3.4.9)
This will give the value of the β which is consistent and can be used for the policy
analysis.
The model given in equation in 3.4.2 contains the lag of dependent variable Exportsuk,kit−1
as an explanatory variable. The term Exportsuk,kit−1 will be correlated with error term
εkit. Therefore, we use the Instrumental Variable technique to estimate the parameters
of the model because this methodology removes the problem of endogeneity by using the
instruments of the variables causing the endogeneity and gives consistent estimates when
we estimate a dynamic panel model.
3.5 Empirical Results
In this section we discuss the results we have got by estimating equations 3.4.1 and 3.4.2.
Overall, our results presented in Tables 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, B.1, B.2, B.3 and
B.5 show that UK exports are more sensitive to the cost of capital in sectors which are
financially constrained, have limited access to buyer-supplier trade credit, are endowed
with less tangible assets and have higher values of leverage. In addition, the sensitivity of
UK exports to the cost of capital increased during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
3.5.1 Aggregate Results
Tables 17, 18, 19 and 20 present the results from aggregate data obtained for equation
3.4.1. Column 2 in all tables in this section shows the results of models that estimate
the impact of external resources on exports after controlling for the country-time, sector-
time, country-sector and other factors that influence exports. Column 3 in all the tables
in this section presents the findings that estimate the impact of external resources and
the financial crisis of 2007-2009 on exports after controlling for country-time, sector-time,
country-sector and other factors influencing export shares. Column 4 in all the tables in
this section shows the results of models which estimate the impact of external resources,
financial crisis and the impact of importing country financial variables on export shares
after controlling for country-time, sector-time, country-sector and other factors influencing
the export. These tables differ with each other only with respect to the proxy used to
measure firm’s dependency on external resources.
Table 17 shows the results when we estimate equation 3.4.1 using external finance as a
proxy for firms’ dependence on external resources and lending interest rate as a measure
of the cost of capital.
As expected, β1 and β2, the coefficients of Lrate ∗ EXTFIN and D Crisis ∗ Lrate ∗
EXTFIN variables respectively are less than zero and statistically significant in columns
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Table 17: External Finance and Lending Rate
Crisis Period=May 07 to Feb 09 Dependent Variable: log (Sectoral Exports of the UK)
(1) (2) (3)
Lrate * EXTFIN -0.031*** -0.019* -0.024*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014)
D Crisis * Lrate * EXTFIN -0.013*** -0.009*
(0.004) (0.005)
Lrate * Pvt Claims 0.032**
(0.012)
UK Interest Rate -0.004 -0.004 -0.0005
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Partner Interest Rate -0.011 -0.011 -0.519**
(0.025) (0.024) (0.198)
UK GDP 27.944*** 27.230*** 18.236***
(2.482) (2.565) (2.793)
Partner GDP 0.382*** 0.383*** 0.588***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.032)
UK K/L Ratio 1.803** 1.797** 1.686*
(0.795) (0.795) (0.858)
Partner K/L Ratio -0.468*** -0.467*** -0.083***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
N 13216 13216 12206
r2 0.958 0.958 0.957
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors are clustered by Importers
Country-time, Sector-time and Country-Sector effects are controlled
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
2, 3 and 4 of Table 17. A one percent rise in the cost of the capital leads to 0.024 percent
decrease in UK exports in the sectors which depend more on the external resources. This
decrease in UK exports due to the rise in the cost of capital intensified further by 0.009
percent during the financial crisis 2007-2009 when financial conditions not only in the UK
but all over the world became tight. Since we have used lending interest rate as a proxy
for the cost of capital. Therefore, these results imply that as the lending rate goes up, the
UK tends to export relatively less in the sectors which depend more on external resources.
Moreover, this negative effect of the lending interest rate on UK exports became stronger
and highly significant during the 2007-2009 financial crisis when financial conditions in the
UK became tight and lending interest rates shot up. Table 17 also shows that a rise in the
cost of capital in the UK decreases UK sector level exports. These findings are consistent
with Chor and Manova (2011), who also report that countries with higher interbank rates
export relatively less to the USA in sectors with greater external finance requirements.
They also report that the negative effect significantly intensified during the 2007-2009
financial crisis. Similarly, our results are consistent with the findings of Manova et al.
(2011), who, using Chinese firm level data, show that financial constraints hinder firms’
trade flows. Moreover, Bricongne et al. (2012) report similar results for French sector level
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exports.
Table 17 shows that the coefficients of GDP and the capital-labor ratio of the UK are
statistically significant and indicate that these variables significantly affect UK sectoral
exports. Columns 2, 3 and 4 of the Table 17 show that the sectoral exports of the UK
increases significantly with the increase in GDP and the capital labor ratio of the UK. One
percent increase in UK GDP increases UK exports by 18.236 percent, and a one percent
increase in the UK capital-labor ratio increases UK exports by 1.686 percent. This implies
that GDP and the capital labor ratio of the UK significantly contribute to the exports
of the UK. The significant coefficients of the GDP of the UK and the GDP
of the importer country implies that exports can decline in the absence of a
financial crisis if the GDP of an exporter or importer country declines. A
fall in the GDP of the exporter country will reduce the supply of the exports
and the reductions in the importer country’s GDP will reduce demand for
the exports. Moreover, the exports of a country can decline if the domestic
demand for goods increases and production remains constant.
Column 4 of the Table 17 shows that the financial variables of importing country, claims
on private sectors as percentage of GDP and partner country interest rates significantly
affect UK exports. A one percent rise in the partner country’s claims on private sector
as a percentage of the GDP increases UK exports by 0.032 percent whereas one percent
rise in the importing country’s interest rate reduces UK exports by 0.519 percent. This
implies that the rise in the financial resources of the consumers living in trading partners
increases demand for goods imported from the UK whereas the rise in cost of the financial
resources in the importing country reduces the demand for goods imported from the UK.
Moreover, partner country GDP and the capital-labor ratio significantly determine UK
exports. Importing country GDP and UK exports are positively related whereas importing
country capital labor ratio and UK exports move in the opposite direction. This implies
that increases in the GDP of trading partners boost their imports from the UK whereas
an increase in capital relative to the labor of the trading partners discourages imports
from the UK. This result is quite meaningful because a rise in GDP of the importing
countries increases their income level which in turn boosts demand for imported goods,
while an increase in the capital labor ratio of trading partners indicate that their capacity
to produce and meet their demand for a product domestically is increased. Consequently,
their demand for imported goods decreases.
Overall, the results displayed in Table 17 indicate that the 2007-2009 financial crisis had
severe consequences for UK trade. Furthermore, the 2007-2009 financial crisis exerted its
pressure on UK exports by affecting the both demand and supply sides of exports. Results
in Table 17 also suggest that financial crisis hits the exports of financially constrained firms
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relatively more and the policies that reduce that cost of capital and generate liquidity can
reduce the detrimental effects of financial turmoil on international trade.
Table 18: Trade Credit and Lending Rate
Crisis Period=May 07 to Feb 09 Dependent Variable: log (Sectoral Exports of the UK)
(1) (2) (3)
Lrate * TCRED 1.046*** 0.851** 0.855**
(0.315) (0.307) (0.308)
D Crisis * Lrate * TCRED 0.170*** 0.118*
(0.055) (0.059)
Lrate * Pvt Claims 0.031**
(0.012)
UK Interest Rate -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.071***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Partner Interest Rate -0.010 -0.012 -0.496**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.196)
UK GDP 25.577*** 25.118*** 15.915***
(2.609) (2.641) (2.639)
Partner GDP 0.382*** 0.383*** 0.591***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.032)
UK K/L Ratio 1.793** 1.798** 1.688*
(0.798) (0.799) (0.862)
Partner K/L Ratio -0.468*** -0.467*** -0.082***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
N 13216 13216 12206
r2 0.958 0.958 0.957
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors are clustered by Importers
Country-time, Sector-time and Country-Sector effects are controlled
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 18 shows the results when we consider buyer-supplier credit as a proxy for trade
financing and lending interest rate as the proxy for the cost of capital. As we anticipated,
once again we obtain β1 and β2, the coefficients of the coefficients of Lrate ∗TCRED and
D Crisis ∗ Lrate ∗ TCRED variables respectively, are greater than zero. β1 > 0 implies
that as the cost of capital increases, sectors with greater access to buyer-supplier trade
credit export more as compared to sectors that have lower access to buyer-supplier trade
credit. β2 > 0 implies that during the financial crisis, when liquidity was squeezed and
the cost of trade financing from formal banking channel shot up, sectors that have greater
access to buyer-supplier trade credit exported more relatively.
In simple words, the results presented in Columns 2, 3 and 4 in Table 18 provide
evidence that access to buyer-supplier trade credit increases UK exports and this effect
intensified during the financial turmoil of 2007-2009. Specifically, the Column 4 shows
that one percent rise in the cost of the capital increases the exports of the UK in the
sectors that have access to buyer-supplier credit in terms of advance payments by 0.855
percent. This increase in the UK exports further intensified by the 0.118 percent during
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the financial crisis of 2007-2009, particularly in the sectors whose firms were able to get
buyer-supplier trade credits during the financial crisis. These results are consistent with
the findings of Chor and Manova (2011) and Levchenko et al. (2010) who report the role
of trade credit in explaining the variations in sector-level trade flows during the crisis.
In short, the results presented in Table 18 indicate that the ability and willingness of a
trading partners to continue in providing trade credit in terms of cash in advance or in
terms of spot payments during the financial disruption will reduce the detrimental effects
of the financial crisis for cross border trade flows.
Furthermore, similar to Table 17, Table 18 shows that variations in the UK’s GDP,
lending interest rates and capital labor ratio and the variations in importing country’s
GDP, lending interest rates, capital labor ratio and credit to private sector as a percentage
of the GDP significantly explain UK exports. Increase in the GDP and capital labor
ratio of the UK and the GDP of the trading partner increases the UK exports because
the coefficients of these variables in the Table 18 are positive and statistically significant.
However, the increase in lending interest rates of the UK and the lending interest rates and
capital labor ratio of the trading partner decreases the UK exports significantly because
the coefficients of these variables in the Table 18 are negative and statistically significant.
Overall results shown in Table 18 indicate that financial crisis 2007-2009 affected the
UK exports by reducing the credit availability to the firms from alternative sources, other
than formal financial institutions which affected both the demand and supply of the UK
exports.
Table 19 shows the results when we consider endowments of tangible assets of a sector
as an inverse proxy for financial vulnerability of the sector and the lending interest rate as a
proxy for the cost of capital. In fact, firms, industries or sectors characterized with greater
assets tangibility can offer greater collateral in order to get finance from formal banking
channels. So, in principle firms, industries or sectors endowed with greater tangible assets
are likely to be less sensitive to the frictions in financial markets or to the adverse credit
conditions. Thus, we expect β1 and β2 to be greater than zero.
Results shown in Table 19 indicates the coefficients of Lrate ∗ TANG are less than
zero when we estimate equation 3.4.1 using tangible assets of a sector as the proxy for
financial dependence of a sector on external resources. These coefficients range from -0.196
to -0.241 in the models we have estimated. These coefficients indicate that the sectoral
exports of the UK decline more in the sectors endowed with greater tangible assets when
they face a higher cost of capital. However, columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 19 show that the
coefficients of the terms D Crisis∗Lrate∗TANG are greater than zero when we estimate
equation 3.4.1 using tangible assets of a sector as the proxy for financial dependence of a
sector on external resources and the lending interest rate as a proxy for cost of the capital.
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Table 19: Tangible Assets and Lending Rate
Crisis Period=May 07 to Feb 09 Dependent Variable: log (Sectoral Exports of the UK)
(1) (2) (3)
Lrate * TANG -0.196** -0.241*** -0.208**
(0.070) (0.067) (0.077)
D Crisis * Lrate * TANG 0.041** 0.029*
(0.016) (0.015)
Lrate * Pvt Claims 0.031**
(0.011)
UK Interest Rate 0.057** 0.056** 0.056*
(0.026) (0.026) (0.030)
Partner Interest Rate -0.010 -0.011 -0.507**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.191)
UK GDP 24.088*** 23.103*** 14.298***
(2.121) (2.211) (2.368)
Partner GDP 0.382*** 0.383*** 0.589***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.031)
UK K/L Ratio 1.818** 1.822** 1.711*
(0.797) (0.797) (0.861)
Partner K/L Ratio -0.468*** -0.467*** -0.082***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
N 13216 13216 12206
r2 0.958 0.958 0.957
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors are clustered by Importers
Country-time, Sector-time and Country-Sector effects are controlled
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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These coefficients indicate that during the financial crisis 2007-2009 in which reserves of the
financial institutions were decreased dramatically, banks were reluctant to give loans to the
firms and interest rates were gone up, the UK sector level exports increased in the sectors
that were endowed with greater tangible assets because they can present more assets as a
collateral to the banks to get loan. This also implies that in the presence of high cost of
capital, UK export performance is better in the sectors characterized by greater tangible
assets. Moreover, the coefficient of the triple interaction term (D Crisis∗Lrate∗TANG),
β2 is greater than zero which implies that the positive impact of tangible assets on UK
export performance became markedly stronger during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
With regards to other control variables used in the models, Table 19 shows that GDP
and the capital labor ratio of the UK significantly determine UK sectoral exports. Columns
2, 3 and 4 of the Table 19 show that the sectoral exports of the UK increases significantly
with the increase in GDP and the capital labor ratio of the UK. One percent increase in
GDP of the UK increases the exports of the UK by 14.298 percent and one unit increase in
capital labor ratio of the UK increases the exports of the UK by 1.711 units. This implies
that GDP and the capital labor ratio of the UK significantly contribute to the exports of
the UK.
Column 4 of Table 19 shows that the financial variables of importing country, claims
on private sectors as a percentage of GDP and partner country interest rates significantly
affect UK exports. A one percent rise in the partner country’s claims on private sector as
a percentage of the GDP increases UK exports by 0.031 percent whereas a one percent
rise in the importing country’s interest rates decreases UK exports by 0.507 percent. This
implies that the rise in the financial resources of the consumers living in trading partners
increases demand for goods imported from the UK whereas the rise in the cost of financial
resources in the importing country reduces the demand for goods imported from the UK.
Moreover, partner country GDP and the capital-labor ratio significantly determine the UK
exports. Importing country GDP and UK exports are positively related whereas importing
country capital labor ratio and UK exports move in the opposite direction. This implies
that increases in the GDP of trading partners boost their imports from the UK whereas an
increase in capital relative to the labor of the trading partners discourages imports from
the UK. This result is quite meaningful because a rise in GDP of the importing countries
increases their income level which in turn boosts demand for imported goods, while an
increase in the capital labor ratio of trading partners indicate that their capacity to produce
and meet the their demand for a product domestically is enhanced. Consequently, their
demand for imported goods decreases.
Overall, results shown in Table 19 indicate that the 2007-2009 financial crisis had
severe consequences for UK exports particularly for the exports of the sectors with lesser
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endowments of the tangible assets. Furthermore, the 2007-2009 financial crisis exerted its
pressure on UK exports by affecting both the demand and supply sides of exports. Results
in Table 19 also suggest that financial crisis hits the exports of financially constrained
firms relatively more and policies that reduce that cost of capital and generate liquidity
can reduce the detrimental effects of financial turmoil on international trade.
Once again our results are consistent with the findings of Chor and Manova (2011) who
report that countries with higher interbank rates export more in the sectors intensive in
tangible assets. They also provide evidence of stronger comparative advantage of a sector
with greater tangible assets has in exporting its products during the financial crisis over
the sector with lower tangible assets. Similarly, Iacovone and Zavacka (2009) also report
that the decline in exports of the sector endowed with fewer tangible assets during the
financial crisis.
Table 20: Leverage and Lending Rate
Crisis Period=May 07 to Feb 09 Dependent Variable: log (Sectoral Exports of the UK)
(1) (2) (3)
Lrate * Leverage -0.240 -0.285* -0.254
(0.157) (0.160) (0.165)
D Crisis * Lrate * Leverage 0.040** 0.036**
(0.017) (0.017)
Lrate * Pvt Claims 0.029**
(0.013)
UK Interest Rate 0.085 0.085 0.070
(0.055) (0.055) (0.061)
Partner Interest Rate -0.010 -0.011 -0.467**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.220)
UK GDP 26.753*** 26.235*** 16.435***
(2.695) (2.733) (3.032)
Partner GDP 0.382*** 0.383*** 0.595***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.035)
UK K/L Ratio 1.812** 1.818** 1.702*
(0.799) (0.799) (0.865)
Partner K/L Ratio -0.468*** -0.467*** -0.079***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
N 13216 13216 12206
r2 0.958 0.958 0.957
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors are clustered by Importers
Country-time, Sector-time and Country-Sector effects are controlled
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Actually, a higher proportion of the tangible assets in firms’ total assets provides
higher protection to banks because banks can recover their loans by selling these assets
if a firm defaults. So, banks prefer to lend to firms with greater tangible assets. This
relationship between tangible assets and access to financial resources makes sectors with
intensive tangible assets less vulnerable to financial markets disruptions. Therefore, export
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performance of the sectors with greater tangible assets remains relatively stable during
financial crisis.
Table 20 shows results when we consider leverage as a proxy for financial dependence
of a sector on external resources. Basically, leverage indicates the riskiness of a firm.
A firm with larger values of leverage is more risky than a firm with a lower value of the
leverage. So, it is likely that firms characterized by higher leverage face problems in getting
funds from financial institutions. Particularly, during a liquidity crisis banks hesitate to
lend to highly leveraged firms. Therefore, such firms are likely to face disruption in their
exporting activity during the financial crisis. Hence, we expect coefficients of both single
and double interaction terms, i.e., the parameters of IBrateuk,t × LEV ERAGEuk,k and
DCrisis × IBrateuk,t × LEV ERAGEuk,k to be less than zero. In general, the leveraged
firms are big in their sizes and have more collateralizable assets which they can present as
a collateral to get funds from the financial resources from the financial institutions. If this
is the case, then leverage firms may get the funds easily from the banks even under the
crisis situations. Under this scenario the coefficients of both single and double interaction
terms, i.e., the parameters of IBrateuk,t × LEV ERAGEuk,k and DCrisis × IBrateuk,t ×
LEV ERAGEuk,k can be greater than zero. However, if the crisis becomes so severe that
banks are unable to give loans to leveraged firms, then coefficient of double interaction
terms, i.e., the parameters of DCrisis × IBrateuk,t × LEV ERAGEuk,k will be less than
zero.
Table 20 shows results when we consider leverage as a proxy for financial dependence
of a sector on external resources. Columns 2, 3 and 4 of the Table 20 show that the
coefficients of single interaction terms i.e., the parameters of IBrateuk,t×LEV ERAGEuk,k
are negative and ranges from -0.240 to -0.285 depending on the control variable used
in the model. This implies that in the presence of higher cost of trade financing the
UK exports less in sectors characterized by higher values of leverage. This result seems
reasonable because the leverage indicates the riskiness of a firm. A firm with larger values
of leverage is more risky than a firm with a lower value of the leverage. So, it is likely
that firms characterized by higher leverage face problems in getting funds from financial
institutions. However, this effect is statistically significant only in case the model 2.
Moreover, Column 3 and 4 of the Table 20 indicate that the coefficients of the DCrisis ×
IBrateuk,t × LEV ERAGEuk,k is positive and ranges from 0.036 to 0.040 which implies
that the exports of the leveraged sector have increased during the financial crisis 2007-
2009. Specifically, Column 4 of the Table 20 indicates that one unit rise in leverage of a
firm increases the UK exports by 0.036. This effect of the leverage on the UK exports is
statistically significant. The leveraged firms have exported more during the financial crisis
2007-2009 because in general, the highly leveraged firms are big in their sizes and have
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more collateralizable assets which they can present as a collateral to get funds from the
financial institutions.
Furthermore, similar to Tables 17, 18 and 19, the Table 20 shows that variations in the
UK’s GDP and capital labor ratio and the variations in importing country’s GDP, lending
interest rates, capital labor ratio and credit to private sector as a percentage of the GDP
significantly explain the variations in the UK exports. Increase in the GDP and capital
labor ratio of the UK and the GDP of the trading partner increases the UK exports
because the coefficients of these variables in the Table 20 are positive and statistically
significant. However, increase in the lending interest rates and capital labor ratio of the
trading partner decrease the UK exports significantly because the coefficients of these
variables in the Table 20 are negative and statistically significant.
Overall, Tables 17, 18, 19 and 20 indicate that the financial crisis 2007-2009 had
affected the UK exports significantly. In particular, a decline in UK sector level exports
during the financial crisis has resulted in severe consequences for the real economy. On
one hand the tight conditions for access to financial resources during the crisis severely
affected firms’ ability to invest in new and in existing projects leading to fall in output and
employment. On the other hand, a gloomy picture of the economy along with the rise in
unemployment decreased consumers’ income which shattered consumers’ confidence and
their demand for products fell sharply across the globe. As a result, exports fell down.
3.5.2 Sectoral Analysis
So for we have discussed our finding regarding the overall effects of the 2007-2009 global
financial crisis on UK exports. We presented the evidence that financially vulnerable
sectors export less when they face higher costs of capital and this effect had intensified
during the 2007-2009 financial crisis when financial conditions not only in the UK but in
the whole world became tight. Moreover, these negative effects were more prominent in
the sectors endowed with less tangible assets, having lower access to buyer-supplier credit
and having higher values of leverage.
In this section we report our findings regarding the response of exports of different
sectors to the 2007-2009 financial turmoil. We define a firm as a financially constrained
firms if it require funds from external sources to carry out its production activities and
have a lower access to funds from the external sources. We have used four proxies to
represent financial constraints of a firm. They include the External finance, defined as a
ratio of capital expenditure not financed by the internal cash flows from operation to the
investment (EXTFIN), Trade credit, defined as a ratio of trade credit to the book value
of total assets of firm (TCRED), Tangible assets, defined as ratio of total tangible assets
to the book value of total assets of firm (TANG) and Leverage, defined as ratio of total
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debt to the book value of total assets of a firm. We have calculated these proxies for each
firm included in the sector and then have taken a median value of all the firms in a sector
to represent a financial constraints of a sector. In simple words a sector is a financially
constrained if on average firms included in a sector have lower access to external finance
or have lower access to trade credit or have lesser collateralizable assets to get loans from
banks or other financial institutions. Table B.5 in Appendix B shows the average values
of the proxies used to represent the financial constraints of different sector.
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We classify UK exports at the sectoral level using Standard International Trade Clas-
sification (SITC) Revision 3. Details of these codes are given in Table B.6 in Appendix
B.
Table 21 presents results when we estimate equation 3.4.1 for each sector separately
using external finance as proxy for financial dependence of the sector and lending interest
rate as a proxy for the cost of capital. The coefficients of the Lrate ∗ EXTFIN ranges
from -0.3.469 to 0.839. These coefficients implies that the marginal sensitivity of the
UK sectoral exports to the financial vulnerability caused by the changes in the cost of
the capital varies from sector to sector depending on their sizes, their requirements of
funds from the external sources and availability of the required funds from formal and
non-formal financial institutions. Overall, results given in Table 21 highlight that eight
out of ten sectors tend to reduce their exports when they face higher cost of capital.
However, only five sectors become financially vulnerable when the cost of capital increases
and significantly reduce their exports. These sectors are Beverages and Tobacco (SITC-
1), Crude materials, inedible except fuels (SITC-2), Chemical and related products n.e.s
(SITC-5) and Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC (SITC-
9).
Note that in Table 21, β2 i.e the coefficient of D Crisis∗Lrate∗EXTFIN is less than
zero and statistically significant for all sectors except Beverages and Tobacco (SITC-1)
and Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material (SITC-6) sectors. The coefficient of
D Crisis∗Lrate∗EXTFIN ranges from -284.106 to -0.012 which indicates that financial
crisis 2007-2009 affected the exports of different sector differently. Table 21 shows that
the financial crisis 2007-2009 had the most severe consequences for the exports of the
Machinery and transport equipment (SITC-7) sector and had the least impact on the
exports of beverages and tobacco (SITC-1) sector. Overall the coefficients of the term
D Crisis ∗ Lrate ∗ EXTFIN indicate that the reduction in sector level exports of the
UK intensified during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. Overall, Table 20 and results
reported in Table 21 point out that the UK sector level exports depend more on external
finance. Therefore, they were severely affected by the 2007-2009 global financial crisis.
Other variables which significantly affected the UK sectoral exports are the GDP and
the capital-labor ratio of the UK and the GDP and the capital labor ratio of the trading
partners of the UK. These variables significantly explain the variations in the exports of
all the sectors. Lending interest rates of the UK and the lending interest rates and claims
on private sectors of the importing countries are insignificant in explaining the variations
in the exports of most of the sectors when we consider their impact on the exports of a
single sector at a time.
On the whole, Table 21 provides the evidence that the net effect of the 2007-2009
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financial crisis on UK sectoral exports is negative and consistent with the existing lit-
erature. For instance, Jansen and von Uexkuell (2010) state that the net effect of the
global financial crisis on trade is negative. In fact the loss in economic activity due to
financial turmoil 2007-2009 resulted in a decline in incomes of consumers living in the
UK as well as the consumers living in the other parts of the globe. In turn, demand for
imports declined across the globe leading to a contraction in the volume of international
trade overall . Our finding that exports of ”Food and Live Animals” decreased during
the financial crunch support this fact. Actually, the decrease in economic activity and the
rise in unemployment during the financial crisis resulted in a decrease of incomes of the
people. As a result, demand for food and live animal decreased because a big chunk of the
income, people spend on their food. Jansen and von Uexkuell (2010) report a fall income
of along with a rise in prices of food items during the crisis as major reasons of fall in
export of food items.
Moreover, the results given in Table 21 suggest that the financial crisis created the
rippling effects for sector level export of the UK. Declines in foreign sales of one sector
have generated a decline in exports of the other sectors. For example, negative coefficients
of the triple interaction terms D Crisis ∗ Lrate ∗EXTFIN point out that exports of all
sectors declined during the financial crisis. This overall decline in exports led to decrease
in the demand for transport and allied sectors which contribute to boost the trade. The
results shown in columns 5, 8, 9 and 10 of the Table 21 may support this argument and
point out that the decline in the exports of Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes
(SITC-4), Miscellaneous manufactured articles (SITC-8), Commodities and transaction
not classified elsewhere in the SITC (SITC-9) and Machinery and Transport Equipment
(SITC-7) exports significantly declined during crisis period. As a result demand for lor-
ries and trucks used to transport tradable commodities from one destination to another
destination declined which contributed to the decline in demand for Minerals, Fuels, Lu-
bricants and related material (SITC-3) leading to the decrease in the exports of Fuels,
Lubricants and related material (SITC-3). Results provided in column 4 of Table 21 favor
this observation.
We find that except for Food and live animal (SITC-0) and Animal and vegetable
oils, fats and waxes (SITC-4), all other sectors that require external financing reduce their
foreign sales when they experience a rise in the interest rate. However, columns 3, 4, 7 and
11 in Table 21 show that an increase in interest rates leads to a significant reduction in
exports of Beverages and tobacco (SITC-1), Crude materials, inedible except Fuel (SITC-
2), Chemical and Related Products, n.e.s (SITC-5), Commodities and transactions not
classified elsewhere in the SITC (SITC-9).
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3.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
We check the robustness of our results in two ways. First, instead of the lending interest
rate, we use the overnight interbank rate as the proxy for cost of capital. However, the
proxies to represent financial vulnerability of the sector; EXTFIN, TCRED and LEVER-
AGE remain the same. Second, we apply the instrumental variable (IV) technique to
estimate our model because current period exports may be driven by previous period
exports and may become endogenous. If this is the case then OLS gives biased and incon-
sistent estimates whereas the IV approach takes care of endogeneity problems and gives
unbiased and consistent estimates.
3.5.4 An alternative Proxy for Cost of Capital
Table 22 reports the results when we use external finance as a proxy for financial depen-
dence of a sector and the overnight interbank rate as a proxy for the cost of capital. Once
again, columns 2, 3 and 4 of the Table 22 show that in the presence of a higher overnight
interbank rate, the UK exports less in the sectors which depend more on external resources.
Likewise, we find that the tendency of decline in the UK sector level exports in response to
a rise in the overnight interbank rate became stronger and statistically significant during
the 2007-2009 financial crisis when overnight interbank rates shot up. Hence, our findings
that sector level exports of the UK are finance dependent and become vulnerable when
financial markets face liquidity crisis does not change with the change in the proxy for cost
of capital. Indeed, Table 22 shows that financial variables of the UK significantly affect
UK exports. Moreover, importing country financial variables like interest rates and claims
on the private sector play a significant role in explaining the variations in UK sector level
exports. Furthermore, partner country GDP and capital-labor ratio significantly affect
UK exports. This implies that demand side of the UK exports is as equally important as
the supply side of the UK exports. This indicates that disruptions in financial markets
exert their pressure on exports through interest rates, here the overnight interbank rate,
and affect both demand and supply of exports significantly.
Overall, the results reported in Table 22 and in Tables B.1, B.2 and B.3 in Appendix
B are similar to the results presented in the Tables 17, 18, 19 and 20. Only a slight
variation in values of the parameters exists, but the sign and significance of parameters
do not change when we use the overnight interbank rate as a proxy for the cost of capital
instead of lending rate to measure cost of capital. On the whole, Table 22 and Tables
B.1, B.2 and B.3 in Appendix B show that when the overnight interbank rate increases
UK sector level exports contract. Furthermore, this contraction in exports in response
to a rise in the overnight interbank rate occurs relatively more in sectors which depend
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Table 22: External Finance and Overnight Interbank Rate
Crisis Period=May 07 to Feb 09 Dependent Variable: log (Sectoral Exports of the UK)
(1) (2) (3)
IBrate * EXTFIN -0.013* -0.007 -0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
D Crisis * IBrate * EXTFIN -0.015*** -0.014**
(0.005) (0.005)
IBrate * Pvt Claims 0.010***
(0.002)
UK Interest Rate 0.003 -0.0003 -0.005
(0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
Partner Interest Rate -0.024* -0.024* -0.143***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.026)
UK GDP 5.541* 5.114 5.652
(3.055) (3.039) (3.551)
Partner GDP 1.002*** 1.001*** 1.070***
(0.065) (0.064) (0.026)
UK K/L Ratio -1.872** -1.887** -2.350***
(0.676) (0.674) (0.689)
Partner K/L Ratio 0.546*** 0.545*** 0.617***
(0.089) (0.089) (0.035)
N 13916 13916 12566
r2 0.939 0.939 0.935
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors are clustered by Importers
Country-time, Sector-time and Country-Sector effects are controlled
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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more on external finance, have lower access to buyer-supplier trade credit and have lower
values of the leverage. In addition, this response of UK exports to changes in the overnight
interbank rate intensified further during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
In sum, the results reported in Table 22 and in Tables B.1, B.2 and B.3 in Appendix
B indicate that our results are robust and do not change with the change in proxy used to
measure the cost of capital. UK exports behave in a similar way in response to variations
in overnight interbank rates and in response to fluctuations in the lending rates which we
have used to measure the cost of capital.
3.5.5 Instrumental Variable (IV) Technique
Current period exports may depend on exports in the previous period. If this is the case
then OLS estimates become inconsistent due to possible endogeneity between errors and
the lagged dependent variable. Therefore, to resolve this problem and to get consistent
estimates we estimate equation 3.4.2 using an instrumental variable approach.
Table 23 presents the results when we estimate equation 3.4.2 using the instrumental
variable approach. Columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 23 report the results when use LEVER-
AGE, EXTFIN and TCRED as proxies for financial dependency of the sector. Table 23
shows that previous period exports significantly determine current period exports. More-
over, coefficients of lag period exports in Table 23 indicate that previous period exports
positively affect current exports. This finding suggests that the sectors which exported
more in the previous period are likely to export more in the current period.
The results presented in Table 23 also suggest that the UK exports more in the sectors
which are less dependent on external finance when they experience higher cost of capital.
This intensity of decrease in exports due to rise in the cost of capital become more in-
tensified during the financial crisis. For example Column 2 of the Table 23 shows that a
one percent rise in the cost of the capital increases the exports of firms which have higher
leverage value by 0.025 percent. This makes sense because normally the high leveraged
firms are normally bigger in their sizes and can afford and manage to get funds from the
banks even when the cost of the capital has increased. However, during the financial crisis
of 2007-2009 the leveraged firms were unable to get the loans from banks because the
banks were unable to give loans to bigger firms due to the lack of funds. The coefficient
of the D Crisis * IBrate * Fin Vul in Column 1 of the Table 23 shows this phenomenon.
This implies that even the high leveraged firms’ exports declined during the financial
crisis because they were unable to get funds to finance their production to fulfill their
export orders during the financial crisis. The marginal decrease in the exports of the
leveraged firms due to unavailability of the funds during the financial crisis of 2007-2009
is 0.024. In addition, Table 23 shows that a rise in the overnight interbank rate leads to
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Table 23: IV Results new External Finance and Overnight Interbank Rate
Crisis Period=May 07 to Feb 09 Dependent Variable: log (Sectoral Exports of the UK)
Fin vulnerability measure: (LEVERAGE) (TCRED) (EXTFIN)
l.Exports 0.902*** 0.901*** 0.910***
0.011 0.011 -0.008
IBrate * Fin Vul 0.025* 0.072*** -0.001**
(0.013) (0.017) (0.001)
D Crisis * IBrate * Fin Vul -0.024*** -0.077*** -0.0001
(0.007) (0.028) (0.001)
IBrate * Pvt Claims 0.002* 0.002** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0003)
UK Interest Rate -0.005 -0.005* -0.003*
(0.005) (0.003) (0.001)
Partner Interest Rate -0.038** -0.039** 0.019***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.003)
UK GDP 1.498*** 1.503*** 0.910***
(0.193) (0.199) (0.146)
Partner GDP 0.004 0.004 0.036
(0.043) (0.043) (0.037)
UK K/L Ratio -0.342*** -0.338*** -0.232***
(0.065) (0.066) (0.044)
Partner K/L Ratio 0.004 0.005 0.045**
(0.037) (0.038) (0.018)
N 11734 11734 12204
r2 0.351 0.352 0.353
Hansen Test 0.983 0.990 0.912
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors are clustered by Partner
Time, Reporter, Partner and Sector fixed effects are controlled
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
a decline in UK exports, especially in the sectors which depend more on external finance,
have lower access to buyer-supplier trade credit and have higher leverage values.
Moreover, Column 3 of the Table 23 indicates that UK firms with higher access to
buyer-supplier trade credit export more relatively than the firms who are unable to get
buyer-supplier trade credit to finance their production activities to fulfill their export
orders. The coefficient of IBrate * Fin Vul Column 3 of the Table 23 shows that a one
percent rise in the cost of the capital increases exports of firms which have a higher access
to the buyer-supplier trade credit by 0.072 percent. However, the coefficient of the D Crisis
* IBrate * Fin Vul in Column 3 of the Table 23 indicates that during the financial crisis
UK exports decreased by 0.077 percent. This implies that the financial crisis of 2007-
2009 was so intensive that it had depleted the buyer-supplier credit and as a result UK
exports decreased because firms were unable to get finances from the sources other than
the formal financial institutions to finance their production activities to fulfill their export
orders. This implies that financial crisis 2007-2009 has significantly decreased the exports
of the firms who have lesser access to buyer-supplier trade credit.
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Column 4 of the Table 23 shows the results when we use external finance as a proxy
for financial vulnerability of a firm. The coefficient of the IBrate * Fin Vul in Column 4
of the Table 23 indicates that as the cost of capital increases the UK exports significantly
decreases because it raises overall cost of the production and their prices which makes
the UK goods less competitive in the international markets. As a results their demand
decreases leading to decrease in the UK exports. Moreover, the exports decreases because
some firms particularly the smaller firms cannot afford to get loan from the banks at a
higher cost. So their productions and exports both fall. In addition, coefficient of the
IBrate * Fin Vul in Column 4 of the Table 23 indicates that one percent rise in the cost of
capital leads to 0.001 percent decrease in the UK exports. This intensity of the decrease
in UK exports due to rise in the cost of capital intensified further during the financial
crisis 2007-2009 when cost of capital i.e. the interest rate shot up. The coefficient of the
D Crisis * IBrate * Fin Vul in Column 4 of the Table 23 indicates that UK exports have
decreased by 0.0001 percent due to one percent in the cost of the capital but this effect is
statistically insignificant.
From supply side the other variables which effects the UK exports significantly include
GDP of the UK, lending interest rates and the capital labor ratio of the UK. Results given
in the Table 23 shows that GDP significantly increases the UK exports. Whereas the
lending interest rates and the capital labor ratio of the UK significantly decrease the UK
exports. However, lending interest rate is significant only in two models. Furthermore,
one percent rise in the GDP of the UK increases the UK exports more than one percent.
This implies that the UK exports increase with the increase in GDP of the UK . However,
the negative coefficients of the capital labor ratio and the interest rates of the UK indicate
that supply of the UK exports contracts with the increase in capital labor ratio and with
the increase in interest rate.
On the demand side of the UK exports the Table 23 shows that partner country lending
interest rates significantly reduces the UK exports. Whereas partner country claims on
the private sector significantly increases the UK exports. This implies that the increase in
financial resources of the consumers living in the trading partners of the UK significantly
increases UK exports. However, the rise in lending interest rates or the cost of the financial
resources of the consumers living in the trading partner countries significantly reduces UK
exports.
Overall results shown in the Table 23 indicate that UK exports are significantly influ-
enced by the financial variables of the UK as well as the financial variables of the trading
partners. In simple words, both the supply and demand sides matters for UK exports.
Furthermore, we find that the negative impact of a rise in the cost of capital on exports
of the sector which depends more on external finance, having limited access to trade credit
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and higher values of leverage became stronger during the financial crisis 2007-2009. This
implies that the 2007-2009 financial crisis has severely hit UK sector level exports.
Overall, Table 23 shows that exporting country’s financial variables significantly ex-
plain the variations in exports. Similarly, the financial variables of importing country
significantly explain the fluctuations in the UK sector level exports as well. Once more,
we find that GDP and the capital labor ratio of the UK and partner country’s claims on
private sector significantly determine UK exports. In a nutshell our major findings do not
change with the change in methodology adopted to estimate the model.
The results explained in Sections 3.5.3, 3.5.4 and 3.5.5 show that overall our findings
are robust and remain consistent even if we change the proxy to measure cost of capital
or if we change the technique to estimate the parameters of the model.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we analyzed the impact of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis on UK
trade with its major trading partners. Our sample covers monthly exports of ten sectors
going to twenty five major importers of the UK from January 2002 to September 2011.
We applied Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Instrumental Variable (IV) techniques to
estimate our empirical models. Exploiting variations in the cost of capital over time as
well as fluctuations in financial vulnerability across different sectors, we show that credit
conditions are an important channel through which financial turmoil affects the volume of
UK exports. Specifically, we show that with higher lending rates and thus tighter credit
market conditions UK exported less during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Moreover, these
negative effects become stronger for sectors with limited access to buyer-supplier trade
credit, with fewer collateralizable assets and with higher dependency on external financing.
We also find that adverse credit conditions affect both the supply and demand sides of
exports and play a significant role in determining the supply and demand for UK exports.
We find that along with the financial conditions in the trading partners, the volume of GDP
and capital labor ratios of the importing countries are the main factors in determining the
demand for the UK exports, whereas the supply of the UK exports is driven by financial
conditions, GDP and the capital-labor ratio of the UK.
In general, our findings imply that adverse credit conditions are an important channel
through which financial turmoil transmits its effect to international trade flows of the UK.
These effects of the credit crunch on UK exports hold even after controlling for GDP, the
factors of production and the cost of capital in trading partners of the UK as well as the
GDP and the capital-labor ratio of the UK. Moreover, our findings regarding the impact
of financial conditions on the UK exports are robust and do not change with changes in
the proxy used to represent the cost of capital or with change in the measure used to
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represent financial dependency of the sector on external resources.
Overall, our findings suggest that policy interventions that reduce the cost of capital
will be really helpful in reducing substantially the detrimental effects of severe financial
disruptions on international trade flows.
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Chapter 4
Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of the European
Union
4.1 Introduction
Regionalism has re-emerged as one of the key developments in international trade relations.
511 Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) have been notified to World Trade Organization
(WTO) as of January, 2012, out of which 319 RTAs are in force. Among the RTAs 90
percent are Free Trade Areas (FTA) and 10 percent are Customs Unions (CU)10. A Free
Trade Area is an agreement in which two or more than two countries agree
to remove all the tariff and non-tariff barriers and the quantitative restric-
tions on their mutual trade. However, each member of the group is free to
adopt and maintain any tariff or regulations on the trade with non-member
country. However, a Custom Union is an agreement in which two or more
than two countries agree to remove all the tariff and non-tariff barriers and
the quantitative restrictions on their mutual trade, plus a common external
tariff on the trade with non-member countries11. Most global trade takes place
among the countries associated with these agreements. According to Clarete et al. (2003)
97 percent of international trade in 2000 was among the countries that had joined at least
one of the RTAs. However, this share was 72 percent in 1990. Similarly, 21 Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies, collectively, account for 44 percent of world
trade12. Likewise, in the context of European Union (EU), the EUCOM (2009) report
states that EU is the chief economic area in the world with 30 percent of global GDP and
17 percent of the global trade.
Unification of the trade policies changes the consumption and production behavior of
member and non-member countries. In addition, economic integration affects the welfare
of the people living in member and non-member countries. These changes in consumption,
production and in welfare can be measured in terms of trade creation and trade diversion
generated by the RTAs. Trade creation (TC) takes place when production shifts to a low
cost member country, and consumption shifts from domestic goods to imported goods.
Trade diversion (TD) is a phenomenon in which production shifts to a low cost member
country, which may not be the lowest in the world. Moreover, consumption shifts from
imported goods of a non-member country to goods imported from a member country.
10For detail, see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/region e/region e.htm 07-7-2012.
11see Figure 21 in Appendix C for levels of economic integration
12For detail, see http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/japan-korea-apec/apec 08-03-2010.
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The mushroom growth of RTAs in the world and an unprecedented increase in the share
of global trade taking place among the members of these RTAs catches the attention of
researchers and economists to test the effects of RTAs on trade flows. A number of studies
have explored the theoretical and empirical relations between economic integration and
trade flows to seek the answers to questions such as how an RTA affects the trade flows of
members and non-member countries? What are the channels through which an RTA affects
the trade? For example, Viner (1950), Lipsey (1957),Bhagwati (1971), Gehrels (1956),
Riezman (1979) and Kowalczyk (2000) have discussed the theoretical framework about
trade creation, trade diversion and the welfare effects of an RTA. They have developed
the conditions through which we can decide whether an RTA diverts or creates trade.
Empirical investigations of RTAs and trade flows include the studies of Sayan (1998),
Keuschnigg et al. (1996), Radelet (1997), Goto and Hamada (1999), Watcher (2005),
Nguyen and Ezaki (2005), Sarker and Jayasinghe (2007), Georges (2008), Lee et al. (2008),
Lambert and McKoy (2009), Datta and Kouliavtsev (2009) and Vollrath et al. (2009).
These studies give mixed results for the RTA effects on the trade flows. Some of them
conclude that an RTA creates trade and while the other studies point out that an RTA
that diverts trade. Moreover,the effects of an RTA on trade flows vary from bloc to bloc
and from commodity to commodity. These characteristics of the effects of an RTA on
trade flows provides an incentive to carry out this analysis.
There are two main objectives of this chapter. First, to analyze the trade creation
and trade diversion effects of an RTA considering all the commodity groups one by one.
Second, when a new member joins an existing RTA, how much trade it creates and how
much trade it diverts. The motivation behind the first objective is that the most of the
existing studies explore the impact of RTAs on trade flows with reference to a single
commodity or a single sector while few other studies use aggregate trade flows. However,
an analysis based on a single sector will not paint the picture well to understand the
impact of RTAs on trade flows. In other words, we cannot conclude from analysis based
on a single sector which sectors will benefit and which sectors face losses from an RTA.
Similarly, we cannot determine how much displacement in production and employment will
occur in different sectors when an RTA is signed. Overall, generalization of conclusions
about the effects of an RTA on trade flows, on the basis of single commodity or sector
analysis, may lead to the wrong policy implications. A comprehensive, precise and result-
oriented trade policy requires a detailed analysis of the effects of an RTA on all sectors of
a country. Thus, in chapter we estimate the trade creation and trade diversion effects of
the European Union (EU) considering all the ten major commodity groups classified by
the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC).
Specifically, in this chapter we analyze the trade creation and trade diversion effects of
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the European Union (EU). It is worth analyzing because the EU members have initiated
the Single European Market (SEM) program to promote intra-EU trade and to create a
competitive environment for firms operating in the EU member countries. In this program
member countries agreed on the free flow of goods, persons and capital among the member
countries. They also agreed to adopt a common external tariff. These measures may
enhance intra-EU trade volume and raise the welfare of the people living in the EU.
However, they may prove detrimental for the welfare as well as trade flows of the rest of
the world. Thus, we explore trade creation and trade diversion effects of the EU for all
commodity groups classified by the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC).
Through this analysis we determine the commodity groups in which EU stimulate trade
among member countries and the commodity groups in which the EU diverts trade from
non-member countries to member countries. By carrying out this analysis we contribute
to existing literature.
In fact, the European Union (EU) has gone through many extensions. From
time to time new members have joined the EU. When a new country joins an
RTA its pattern of trade with member countries and non-member countries
changes due to changes in the external tariff for member and non-member
countries. According to Baldwin and Wyplosz (2009) the EU applies a com-
mon external tariff for about 10000 products being imported from non-member
countries. The average common external tariff rate applied on all products is
about 6.5 percent. However, the common external tariff varies across the
products. The common external tariff for the industrial goods is 4.1 percent
whereas common external tariff on the agricultural product is 16.5 percent.
The EU member countries’ weighted mean applied tariff rates on the imports
is given in the Table C.7 in Appendix C. The table shows that EU countries
have increased their tariff on the goods imported from non-member countries
from 1988 to 1995 and after that they have decreased their tariff on the im-
ports from non-member countries gradually. The applied tariff on average
and reached to 6.27 percent in 1995 from 3.59 percent in 1988 and then de-
creased gradually. This implies that discrimination against the imports from
non-member countries has decreased over time, particularly after the 4th and
5th enlargement in the EU. Table C.12 in Appendix C also shows the similar
trends in applied tariff rates. The table shows that the average effective ap-
plied tariff rate was more than four percent from 1988 to 1994, before the 4th
enlargement of the EU. This average effective applied tariff rate had decreased
to almost three percent from 1995 to 2003, after the 4th enlargement. With
the extension of the EU membership to ten new eastern European countries
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the average effective applied tariff rate had reduced further and became al-
most two percent from the 2004 to 2008. This reduction in average applied
tariff rate implies that with the enlargement in the EU memberships, the com-
petition in the EU markets has increased not only among the EU members
but among the non-members as well because now there are greater number
of the firms who are selling their goods in the EU markets. This reduction
in the tariff on the imports from non-member countries is important for the
non-EU countries because it indicates that the discrimination against the im-
ports from the non-member countries has been reduced and their access to
the EU markets has become relatively easier over the time though they have
to compete with the member countries who have a duty free access to the EU
markets. Extensions in the EU membership will increase the intra-EU trade
but this increase in the intra-EU trade may be at the cost of decrease in the
trade with non-member countries who do not have duty free access of the EU
markets. The products coming to EU markets from the non-member countries
have to pay tariff and have to face non-tariff barriers as well make them less
competitive in the EU markets and their sale in the EU markets declines. As
a result output and employment may fall in the non-member countries and
the welfare of the people living in the non-member countries may decrease.
Thus, our second objective is to analyze the effects of the 4th and 5th extensions of
the EU on the trade flows. The 4th extension of the EU took place in 1995 in which four
new members joined EU and the 5th extension of the EU took place in 2004 in which ten
new members joined the EU. Through this analysis we look into which commodity group
and how much trade a new creates and in which commodity group and how much trade
it diverts from non-members to member countries.
While carrying out our investigation, we use a correctly-specified gravity model de-
veloped by Kandogan (2005) to measure the effect of the EU on trade flows for a panel
of 27 EU member countries. The EU 27 includes Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. We capture country-specific,
time-specific, commodity group-specific characteristics affecting trade flows by incorporat-
ing country-specific, time-specific, commodity group-specific constants for each country,
time and commodity group. Moreover, in our analysis we consider EU as custom union
because EU countries impose a common external tariff on the imports coming from the
non member countries.
Our results show that, generally, extensions of the EU have a positive impact on in-
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ternational trade and increase trade among members. In particular we found that the
EU’s extension in 1995 increased the exports to member countries and decreased exports
to non-member countries. However, the EU’s extension in 2004 increases export to mem-
bers without decreasing the exports to non-members. Furthermore, our results show that
the EU extensions occurring in 1995 and in 2004 increased exports to members coun-
tries without decreasing exports to non-members in four out of ten commodity groups.
However, both the extensions of the EU increased imports from member countries and
decreased imports from non-member countries. Only in one commodity group both the
extensions in the EU increased imports from member countries without decreasing the
imports from non-member countries. Overall, our results show that both extensions re-
sulted in import diversion and have resulted in relatively less export diversion. Export
diversion has occurred in all the commodity groups except “Mineral, Fuels, Lubricants and
related material”, “Machinery and Transport Equipment”, “Miscellaneous manufactured
article” and in “Commodities and Transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC”.
Whereas, import diversion has occurred in all the commodity groups except “Machinery
and Transport Equipment”.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents a brief history of
economic integration in the EU, followed by a literature review and the methodology in
Sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. Section 4.5 discusses the results and Section 4.6 presents
the conclusion.
4.2 The Background and A Brief History of Economic Integration in
Europe
According to Baldwin and Wyplosz (2009) the European Union (EU) is the world’s biggest
trader and account for about 40 percent of the world trade. Furthermore, he states that
EU’s share of trade in services is even greater than 40 percent. EU’s external trade policies
are harmful to world’s poorest countries because EU puts its highest barriers against
the goods that these poor countries can export. From the perspective of the European
integration, the most important factors that played a key role in increasing the trade
between the European countries and in restoring the financial position of the European
economies, were the establishment of the Organization for European Cooperation (OEEC)
in 1948 and the European Payment Union (EPU) in 1950. The members of OEEC and
EPU not only agreed to remove all the discriminatory trade measures and but also agreed
to reduce the trade barriers by 25 percent of their original values. As a result the intra-
Europe trade boomed and the volume of intra-Europe trade in 1958 reached at a level that
was more than double the volume of intra-Europe trade in 1950 (Baldwin and Wyplosz,
2009). The tremendous growth in the trade between the OEEC countries provided an
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opportunity to the member nations to accumulate substantial dollar reserves necessary to
regain their financial stability.
In spite of the fact that OEEC had succeeded in reviving the economies of member
countries, some members felt that OEEC was not enough for the deeper integration neces-
sary to avoid future wars and for a stable restoration of the economic strength. Thus, six
members of the OEEC, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands
moved forward and established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952
and gave their coal and steel sectors that were considered as a backbone of the industrial
economy, under a supranational authority. Important decisions like pricing, production
and trade for these two critical sectors were given in the hands of this supranational au-
thority. As a result the possibility of the war was reduced and these economies continued
to grow remarkably economically.
Then, in 1957 these six countries signed two treaties in Rome and established European
Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) and
moved forward to a broader economic integration. Later, the institutions of the ECSC
and EEC and EAEC were merged into the European Communities (EC) in 1965. Instead
of coming from the members’ national parliaments, the European Union Parliament was
elected directly in the 1979 for the first time. The Rome Treaty was a far reaching
document for the integration of the Europe because in this treaty the six nations not
only had agreed to remove all tariffs and quotas on intra-EEC trade but also agreed to
adopt a common external tariff on the imports from non-member countries. In addition,
they agreed on free mobility of the labor, capital market integration, free trade in services
and on a wide range of common policies. According to the Rome treaty they promised
to remove all quotas and tariffs on intra-EEC trade in three stages and each stage was
consisted of four years.
However, they achieved their objective, the removal of quotas and tariffs on intra-EEC
trade, almost a year and half before the schedule. The EEC members set a common
external tariff using simple arithmetic average of their pre-EEC tariffs. By this formula
Italy and France had to lower their tariff, Belgium, Luxembourg and Netherlands had to
raise their tariff, whereas the common external tariff of Germany almost remained the
same. As a result the unprecedented economic growth and prosperity started in these
economies leading to an immense growth in intra-EEC trade. According to during the
formation of the EEC Baldwin and Wyplosz (2009) the share of intra-EEC trade increased
from about 30 percent to 50 percent whereas the share of other EEC imports coming
from other six European countries decreased from 8 percent to 7 percent. Furthermore,
Baldwin and Wyplosz (2009) reported that during the era of golden age of growth, 1950-
1975, average unemployment in European countries was 2.5 percent and their incomes
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were either doubled, as in France, Belgium and Netherlands, or tripled as in Germany and
Italy.
Preferential reduction of the tariff and other trade barrier within EEC and within
EFTA but not across the EEC and AFTA caused the discrimination for EEC-based and
EFTA based firms to access each others markets. As a result the profits and the profit-
oriented opportunities for the exporters in each group had reduced over time. The loss of
profit and profit-oriented opportunities was relatively more for the exporters of the AFTA
group because the GDP and the potential market size of 6 EEC economies was more than
twice the GDP and the potential market size of the EFTA economies. Moreover, the
incomes of EEC economies were growing twice as fast as that the incomes of the EFTA
economies. Therefore, the EEC club became relatively more attractive than the EFTA
club for the exporters and ultimately generated the forces in favor of the EEC enlargement
and non-EEC countries started to think about joining the EEC.
Realizing that the AFTA is not a substitute for the free trade access to the EEC
markets because the EEC performance was excellent and their economies were growing
remarkably, the United Kingdom was the first from the EFTA member applied for the
EEC membership in 1961 and joined the EEC in 1973. When United Kingdom will become
the member of the EEC the other AFTA nations have to face discrimination even in bigger
markets because the United Kingdom will also impose tariff on the imports from the non-
member countries. This fear of discrimination generated a tendency to join the EEC in
other members of the EFTA as well. Keeping in view the keenness of the AFTA member
to join the EEC, the ECC enlargement was started and till today EEC membership has
been extended six times.
The first enlargement in EEC took place in 1973 in which Denmark, Ireland and United
Kingdom joined the EEC. Later, Greece joined the EEC in 1981 in the second enlargement
of the EEC followed by Portugal and Spain who joined the EEC in 1986 in the third ex-
pansion of the EEC. The extensions in the EEC membership extended the market for the
firms of the EEC countries because now they can sell their products in a bigger market.
As a result, the production, employment and the exports of the firms operating in the
member states increased leading to the overall increase in the output, employment and
intra-EEC trade of the member countries. In turn, the economic development became the
fate of these countries. Along with removing the tariffs and quotas on intra-EEC trade
the EEC countries erected a series of technical barriers to trade (TBT) such as techni-
cal standards, industrial regulations, capital controls, preferential public procurements,
administrative and frontier formalities. Although these technical barriers were adopted
to protect consumers, workers and environment but they differ from member to member
because the laws and regulations concerning the protection of consumers, workers and
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environment were not same in the member countries. However, these barriers were re-
stricting the intra-EEC trade substantially. Thus to harmonize these technical standards
and regulations the Single Market Programme was initiated. The EEC was promoted to
the Single Market in 1993 by providing four freedoms. These freedoms include the free
movement of goods, services, people and money across the member countries of the Eu-
ropean Union. These freedoms enhanced the development process further and proved a
mile stone in the economic development of the region.
The Single European Market programme strengthened the economic integration pro-
cess in the EEC countries and non-EEC countries once again found themselves threatened
by the discriminatory effects of the integration in the European Union. The AFTA na-
tions reacted to this programme and formed European Economic Area (EEA) which served
as single market for AFTA countries, and many of them also applied for the European
Union’s membership. However, Austria, Finland and Sweden only managed to join the
European Union in the fourth enlargement of the European Union in 1995.
Moreover, with the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the central
and eastern European countries were keen to join the EU and were eager to have a free
trade access to a big EU market. To get a free trade access to the European market
was a commercial necessity of the newly freed eastern and central countries. Therefore,
to extend the enlargement process to these states the European Council formulated the
accession criteria in 1993 at Copenhagen. According to these criteria, accession could
take place as soon as a perspective member country satisfies the economic and political
conditions required for membership. These economic and political conditions are known
as the Copenhagen Criteria13.
The Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 to promote a balanced development of
economic activities including sustainable growth with low inflation, higher quality of life,
and social and economic unity among the members14. The Treaty came in to force in
1993. The Maastricht Accord took the EU to a higher level of economic integration by
establishing the Monetary and Economic Union. This Monetary Union resulted in the
creation of a single currency EURO for the member countries.
In the fourth enlargement of the EU, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in
1995. The Euro zone was created by replacing the national currencies with EURO notes
and coins of 12 member states in 2002. Another big extension in membership of EU took
place in 2004 when ten eastern and central European countries gained the membership of
EU. The new members were Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary,
13Copenhagen Criteria, European Commission Enlargement Process, for detail see
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement process/accession process/criteria/index en.h.
14The Maastricht Treaty, article 2, for detail see http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf.
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Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. Later in January 2007 Romania and Bulgaria joined
the EU. Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey are on the waiting list to join the EU.
Along with the joining the EU, the EU member countries have signed regional trade
agreements with other countries as well which play an important role in promoting trade
with non-members countries as well. The details of these agreements are given in Table
C.1 in Appendix C. However, in this chapter we only consider European Union (EU) in
our analysis to measure of the impact of the EU on trade flows of the member and non-
member countries. We only consider EU because according to EUCOM (2009) EU is the
chief economic area in the world with 30 percent of global GDP and 17 percent of the global
trade. Moreover, its membership has been extended several times and currently consists
of 27 member countries. According to Baldwin and Wyplosz (2009) EU accounts for more
than 40 percent share of world trade in services. Furthermore, he states that almost 90
percent of EU exports consist of manufactured goods and about half of all exports are
machinery and transport equipments. With regards to imports Baldwin and Wyplosz
(2009) reports that two out three euros spent on imports goes to purchase manufactured
goods. Moreover, about one in every five euros spent on imports goes to the pay for
fuel. The EU also puts its highest trade barriers on the goods being imported from the
non-member countries particularly on the imports from poor countries of the world.
The EU applies a common external tariff on the imports from the non-
members countries. This tariff provide an edge to countries who enjoy a duty
free access of the EU markets over the countries who do not have this duty
free access of EU markets. According to Baldwin and Wyplosz (2009) the EU
applies a common external tariff for about 10000 products being imported from
non-member countries. The average common external tariff rate applied on
all products is about 6.5 percent. However, the common external tariff varies
across the products. The common external tariff for the industrial goods is
4.1 percent whereas common external tariff on the agricultural product is 16.5
percent. The EU member countries’ weighted mean applied tariff rates on the
imports is given in the Table C.7 in Appendix C. The table shows that EU
countries have increased their tariff on the goods imported from non-member
countries from 1988 to 1995 and after that they have decreased their tariff
on the imports from non-member countries gradually. The applied tariff on
average and reached to 6.27 percent in 1995 from 3.59 percent in 1988 and
then decreased gradually. This implies that discrimination against the imports
from non-member countries has decreased over time, particularly after the
4th and 5th enlargement in the EU. Table C.12 in Appendix C also shows the
similar trends in applied tariff rates. The table shows that the average effective
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applied tariff rate was more than four percent from 1988 to 1994, before the 4th
enlargement of the EU. This average effective applied tariff rate had decreased
to almost three percent from 1995 to 2003, after the 4th enlargement. With the
extension of the EU membership to ten new eastern European countries the
average effective applied tariff rate had reduced further and became almost two
percent from the 2004 to 2008. This reduction in average applied tariff rate
implies that with the enlargement in the EU memberships, the competition in
the EU markets has increased not only among the EU members but among the
non-members as well because now there are greater number of the firms who
are selling their good in the EU markets. This reduction in the tariff on the
imports from non-member countries are important for the non-EU countries
because it indicates that the discrimination against the imports from the non-
member countries has been reduced and their access to the EU markets has
become relatively easier over the time though they have to compete with the
member countries who have a duty free access to the EU markets. Extensions
in the EU membership will increase the intra-EU trade but this increase in
the intra-EU trade may be at the cost of decrease in the trade with non-
member countries who do not have duty free access of the EU markets. The
products coming to EU markets from the non-member countries have to pay
tariff and have to face non-tariff barriers as well make them less competitive in
the EU markets and their sale in the EU markets declines. As a result output
and employment may fall in the non-member countries and the welfare of the
people living in the non-member countries may decrease.
Thus, time and again extensions in EU and its journey towards deeper integration
add to the importance of investigating the effects of extensions in the EU on the trade
flows of the member and non-member countries. It is important to analyze because when
a new member joins the EU its international trade increases with members because its
goods can move freely in the markets of members countries and become relatively cheaper
which attracts more customers as compared to when it was not a member. Moreover, all
the countries who have joined the EU differ in their economic sizes and in terms of their
economic resources. Therefore, the benefits and the costs of joining the EU may vary from
country to country. Some characteristics of the EU members are given in Tables C.12 and
C.7 in Appendix C. These tables show that over the period of time the weighted applied
tariff has been reduced and EU countries vary considerably in terms of their economic
sizes and in terms of their economic resources. This variation in the economic sizes and
in their economic resources may have different trade creation and trade diversion effects
when they join the EU. Thus, in this chapter we look into how the 4th and 5th extensions
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in the EU affected the trade flows of affiliates. How did the 4th and 5th extensions in the
EU alter the trade patterns of non-member countries? Have these extensions in the EU
membership led to trade creation or to trade diversion? We consider only the 4th and 5th
extension of the EU in this chapter due to two reasons. First, because the thirteen new
members have joined in these two extensions. Second, a comprehensive commodity group
level data of imports and exports is available from 1988 and onward which covers these
two extensions comprehensively.
4.3 Literature Review
The fundamental question regarding how an RTA although the EU is a customs union
affects the trade flows is as important now as at the beginning of the process. What are the
channels through which regional economic integration transmits its effects on member and
non-member nations? How do these trading pacts change the welfare of intra bloc, extra
bloc and the welfare of the global community? These questions need to be considered to
be able to evaluate the performance of the preferential trading agreements. Many studies
in the existing literature provide the theoretical and empirical insights on these issues.
The theoretical framework for economic integration analysis is linked with the seminal
paper of Viner (1950). In this paper Viner (1950) explains the trade creation, trade
diversion and the welfare effects of a customs union. He argues that if trade creation is
higher than trade diversion then the union will raise welfare and if trade diversion is higher
than trade creation then it will reduce welfare of the member states.
Lipsey (1957) states that Viner (1950) has assumed fixed consumption as a sufficient
condition for trade-diverting custom union. Lipsey (1957) allowed substitution in con-
sumption and demonstrated that a custom union increases welfare when trade diversion is
higher than the trade creation. However, this case is valid only if the country forming the
custom union increase the volume of total imports from member country than the volume
of import which she was importing from non-member country. Secondly, the terms of
trade must be better after forming the custom union and importing from the member
country than the terms of trade from not forming the custom union and importing from
the non-member country. Thus, the assumptions of this case are very strong and may not
fulfill in real world. If her imports remains constant after forming a custom union then
trade diversion higher than the trade creation will always lead to a decrease in the welfare.
Now that we know that the condition for welfare improvements of a union depends
on the assumptions made for the analysis of association, by changing assumptions of the
model, the conditions for the welfare enhancing customs union will change. Bhagwati
(1971) interprets Viner’s theory under the assumption of production variability within
the general equilibrium model. He points out that in the absence of substitution in con-
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sumption the sufficient condition to make custom union welfare reducing is not the fixed
consumption but fixed level of imports. Gehrels (1956) argues that if we consider only the
production effects then Viner analysis underestimates the benefits of a custom unions to
member countries and gives biased results.
Riezman (1979) incorporates terms of trade effects into customs union analysis and
reveals that pre-agreement small mutual trade among members is a sufficient condition
to benefit from a customs union. Kowalczyk (2000) also uses terms of trade and volume
of trade to explain trade creation and trade diversion effects of the trading bloc. He sup-
ports the findings of Riezman (1979) and Lipsey (1957) regarding the pre-agreement trade
volume to select the partner country to establish the union. However, he articulates that
given the total volume of imports of a country who imports larger share of goods from the
member country and lesser share of goods from the non-member country , if the country is
small and can discriminate among its trading partners through preferential tariff strategy,
the goods imported from member country and non-member country are substitutes and
the members are ready to reduce their mutual tariff rate equiproportionately then the best
choice for a small country is to go for membership of multiple trade areas.
Recently, Baier and Bergstrand (2004) says that net welfare gain/loss of the two coun-
tries FTA depends on trade creation and the trade diversion of the members and has
categorized the three economic determinants of the trade creation and trade diversion.
These determinants include economic geographic factors, intra-industry trade determi-
nants, and inter-industry trade determinants. Furthermore, Baier and Bergstrand (2004)
state that trade creation is greater the closer are the two countries, and trade diversion
is less the remote are the two trading partners from the rest of the world because the
trade among the countries that are far from each other is less as compared to the trade
among the countries that are closer to each other. In addition, the trade creation is greater
the larger and more similar two countries are in their economic sizes, and trade diversion
is lesser the smaller is the economic size of the rest of the world. Moreover, trade cre-
ation is greater the wider are difference between the relative factor endowments of the two
countries, and trade diversion is lesser the smaller are the difference between the factor
endowments of the member countries and that of the rest of the world.
After discussing the papers on theoretical developments on economic integration anal-
ysis, let’s see what the data say. Do the data support or contradict the theoretical find-
ings regarding the impact of economic integration on trade flows? So for most of the
researchers who assessed the impact of economic integration on trade flows empirically
presented mixed results. However, researchers who study the effect of regional integration
on flow of goods and services crossing the border of a country conclude that, on the whole,
RTAs are beneficial to the member countries. Cooper (2006) divides the existing empirical
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findings into three groups: The first group consists of studies that oppose the integration
and consider regional integration as a stumbling bloc to global trade liberalization. The
second group includes studies that supports economic integration and considers it as a
building bloc to global trade liberalization. The third group encircles the papers that gen-
erally oppose the bloc formation because they believe that impact of trade liberalization
on labor in import-sensitive sectors and on environment is not good instead of presenting
the trade diversion effects of an association to oppose the establishment of the union.
Researchers who believe that the establishment of free trade area is good for multilat-
eral free trade argue that the formation of a union spurts competition and increases trade
among members. For example, Sayan (1998), Keuschnigg et al. (1996), Radelet (1997),
Goto and Hamada (1999), Watcher (2005), Nguyen and Ezaki (2005), Fredrik (2006),
Sarker and Jayasinghe (2007), Georges (2008), Lambert and McKoy (2009)and Vollrath
et al. (2009) have found that regional trade agreements increase trade among the members
of the bloc. However, Kono (2002) has shown that regional trade agreements
can hinder or support multilateral trade liberalization under certain condi-
tions. In these conditions Kono (2002) gives a key position to members intra
and extra-FTA comparative advantage. He states that members with simi-
lar intra and extra-FTA comparative advantages liberalize trade more rapidly
than the members with dis-similar intra and extra-FTA comparative advan-
tages.
In contrast, the first group of economists in Cooper (2006) classification base their
arguments on the trade diversion effect of a free trade area. They believe that free trade
areas are a stumbling bloc for global trade liberalization. For instance, Fredrik (2006),
Clausing (2001), Cuyvers (1997), Lee et al. (2008), Datta and Kouliavtsev (2009) and
Vollrath et al. (2009) who report trade diversion in their analysis of the impact of regional
integration on trade flows. Their findings show that formation of free trade area increases
trade among member countries at the cost of a decrease in trade with non-member nations.
The third group of economist in Cooper (2006) classification argues that FTA-led
shifts in production activities to low cost partner countries lead to unemployment in
countries whose firms are comparatively high cost. As a result, the life standard of labor
worsens, comparatively, in high cost countries. In addition to poor quality of life, these
economists oppose the trade liberalization in the bloc because it degrades environment
due to over utilization of natural resources. They say that FTA-led de-location of the
firm from high cost countries to relatively low cost member states creates environmental
problems. Lindsey (2004) demonstrates that multinational corporations shift jobs to the
countries where wages are lowest and environmental regulations are not strict. Honeck
(2004) shows that 19 percent of job loss in manufacturing sector of Ohio State was due to
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the NAFTA-led increase in imports to Ohio.
The effects of economic integration are not the same across the board. The effects vary
from bloc to bloc, depending on the period of investigation as well as the commodities
and countries involved. Soloaga and Alan (2001) found no indication that regionalism
boosts intra-bloc trade. Their findings also indicate that the EU and European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) result in diversion in the case of non-fuel trade. Balassa (1967)
demonstrates that the European Common Market (ECM) promotes intra-bloc trade in
the cases of non-durable consumption and manufactured goods. In the case of machinery
and transport equipment, ECM boosts trade with the rest of the world. Kandogan (2005)
shows that majority of the Europe’s liberalization agreements have been welfare improving
for all the partners involved, in all sectors, particularly, in human and physical capital-
intensive sectors. Furthermore, he shows that EU partners have experienced welfare losses
in labor-intensive sectors. Similarly, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) also have presented the
evidence that free trade agreements increase trade among the members.
Moreover, Baldwin and Venables (1995) states that regional integration agreements
seem to have generated welfare gains for the member countries but possibly negative
spillovers on to the non-member countries. Clarete et al. (2003) estimate the effects of
regionalism on trade flows in Asia and show that 9 out of 11 preferential trade agreements
(PTAs) divert trade. In their analysis, it turns out that only two PTAs increase trade
among members without affecting trade with the rest of the world. Similarly, Carrere
(2006) analyzed seven different regional trade agreements and found that in general, these
regional trade agreements increase trade among members and reduce trade with the rest
of the world, suggesting the evidence of trade diversion. In a similar vein, Lambert and
McKoy (2009) analyze the impact of preferential trade associations on food and agricul-
tural trade. Their findings demonstrate that preferential trade association formation is
helpful in increasing the trade among members as well as with non-members in both agri-
cultural and food trade. Furthermore, they show that associations formed by developing
countries result in trade diversion.
In fact, economic integration of the countries affects trade and changes the consumption
and production patterns of member countries through two channels. First, the scale and
competition channel. Second, the trade and location channel. Scale and competition
encourage production, employment and stimulate the flow of free trade but only among
members. Trade and location channel deals with the shifts in production activities, changes
in employment and trade patterns of member and non-member countries.
The removal of trade barriers generates greater competition among the member economies
and expands the market for producers of the member countries. Competition among do-
mestic industries improves the productive efficiency of local producers and enhances the
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quality and quantity of the product available in the economy. Cooper (2006) and Clarete
et al. (2003) argue that economic integration creates a bigger market for the producers
of member nations and generates more opportunities for them to export their products,
ultimately leading to more business and employment. Similarly, Wacziarg (1999) reports
that by increasing the size of the market and competition, trade openness policies provide
an opportunity to the trading nations to reap the expected benefits of increasing return to
scale. However, the benefits of the trade openness among the members of a custom union
will be lower than the trade openness at global level because the market size of a custom
union in which a member country can supply its products will be smaller than the size of
global market.
However, policy-generated competition among producers may create non-optimal pat-
tern of specialization. The distribution of resources among different products and countries
within an RTA may not be the true representative of the distribution of resources under the
global free trade. Panagariya (1994) argues that specialization stimulated by preferential
trade associations is not optimal under universal free trade because a capital rich country
within the association may also be a labor rich country in the world. Hence, the RTA-led
reshuﬄing of resources among different products may switch labor-intensive products into
capital-intensive products after joining the RTA. Consequently, an RTA may go against
the spirit of the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade15.
The economic benefits of regional trade agreement depend on the degree of comparative
advantage of the perspective member states. The Ricardian model of international trade
illustrates that the difference in comparative advantage in different products results in
gains for both countries through specialization. The comparative advantage of a member
country relative to the other member states of the RTA and relative to rest of the world
determines the benefits and cost for a particular member country of the RTA.
The comparative advantage of a country in some products may change after joining the
PTA due to the transportation cost involved in supplying the product to other members
of the PTA. The distance between the origin and destination country determines the
transportation costs and results in the variation of prices of the same goods across the
region.
However, transportation cost adversely affects agricultural trade more as compared to
the trade of other durable products because agricultural goods are perishable in nature and
require extra care and special vehicles to transport them. The extra care and refrigeration
increase the transportation cost and the prices of agricultural product for the end user
15Heckscher-Ohlin model says that a country should produce and export the goods which uses the
abundant factor of production of the country in more proportion and import that product which uses its
scarce factor of production more.
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although not all agricultural goods require refrigeration. As a result agricultural goods
trade becomes more sensitive to the distances among the trading partners as compared to
the industrial products trade. Vollrath et al. (2009) have confirmed this hypothesis while
analyzing the factors determining the trade flows in agriculture and clothing.
The existing literature presents the mixed kind of the results with reference to the
effects of economic integration on trade flows. Some studies say regional economic inte-
gration generates trade among the members without affecting the trade with nonmembers,
while, some other papers present that economic integration leads to trade diversion. Most
of the studies cover a single sector agriculture or manufacturing sector in their analysis.
However, a comprehensive studies covering all sectors of the economy and all the commod-
ity groups to evaluate the impact of regional trade agreements on trade flows, particularly
with reference to the new members joining the existing trade agreement are scarce in the
existing literature. The earlier studies analyze the impact of extensions in the trade agree-
ments on overall trade flows or on sector level imports and exports. In this chapter we
analyze the impact of the 4th and 5th extensions of the European Union (EU) on the im-
ports and exports of all commodity groups classified by the Standard International Trade
Classification (SITC) and for each new member joining the EU in these two extension.
4.4 Empirical Model and Methodology
The effects of economic integration is normally viewed in the form of trade creation (TC)
and trade diversion (TD) and its overall gross impact on trade (GTC)16. The TC effect
reflects an increase in the trade flows among member countries. The TD represents the
replacement of the trade flows from non-members especially low cost non-partners to the
partner countries. While, gross effect considers the combined impact of the TD and TC,
which shows as an increase of trade among the signatories of the agreement.
To date researchers have used different methodologies to evaluate the effects of regional
integration. For example Truman (1969) used market share of imports in consumption to
judge trade creation and trade diversion in the EEC. Balassa (1967) and Mordechai (1969)
used import demand equations for analysis of the trade creation and trade diversion effects
of EEC. However, none of these methodologies can be applied to measure the effect of the
extensions in the EU on trade flows countries because the data requirement to use these
methodologies could not be met from the available sources of the data. The procedures
require data on prices of the commodities, which is not available for EU countries. There-
fore, following Kandogan (2005), our methodology to measure trade creation and trade
diversion effects of the extensions in the EU is based on analyzing the error terms of the
correctly specified fixed effect gravity model which does not require the data on the prices
16See Pelzman (1977).
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of goods directly to make the analysis.
The gravity equation model is the most widely used approach to assess the impact of
bilateral trade or multilateral trade. Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen (1963) initiated the
usage of the simple gravity model without any economic foundations for evaluation of the
volume of international trade flows. Later on, with some modifications Pelzman (1977),
Anderson (1979), Krugman (1987), Bergstrand (1989), Deardorff (1998), Evenett and
Keller (2002), Frankel and Rose (2002), Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) applied the
gravity model to reveal the impact of regionalization on the trade flows. The researchers
developed micro foundations for the gravity model and amended the gravity model to
make it consistent with different trade theories.
Although the gravity model is the favored tool in measuring the trade creation and
trade diversion effects of an RTA, the literature differs vastly on the variables that should
be included in the empirical model. The traditional gravity model of Tinbergen (1962)
and Poyhonen (1963) explain as the volume of bilateral trade between two countries by
the size of their economies and the geographical distance between them. These models
also included trade-promoting time invariant factors such as a common border, common
language, colonial relationship etc to explain bilateral trade. These variables explain bi-
lateral trade from different aspects. For example, in order to give the touch of competing
trade theories such as Heckscher-Ohlin Theory and Increasing Return Theory, Balassa
(1986), Balassa and Bauwens (1987) and Helpman (1987) introduced the measure of rel-
ative factor endowment and the measure of similarity of the trading economies, in to the
gravity model. The monetary variables play an important role in explaining the trade
flows. Therefore, over time researchers have added the variables such as real exchange
rates, exchange rates uncertainty, and foreign exchange reserves to gravity model. Par-
ticularly, Bergstrand (1985) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) augmented the gravity
model with real exchange rates, Thursby and Thursby (1987) added exchange rate uncer-
tainty and Ma´tya´s (1997) and Kandogan (2005) included foreign exchange reserves in the
gravity model.
It is a very common practice in literature to include the bloc dummy in the gravity
model to test the significance of regional trade agreements on trade volumes. For instance,
Baldwin and Venables (1995), Frankel (1997), Soloaga and Alan (2001), Lambert and
McKoy (2009) and Vollrath et al. (2009) include a dummy variable to measure the impact
of a regional trade agreement in the gravity model. A positive and significant of coefficient
for the dummy variable is interpreted as the trade creation effect of the trade agreement.
However, on the basis of econometric issues like averaging over time and restricting the
same parameters for all time periods, and also the same coefficients for imports and ex-
ports, Wang and Winters (1992), Baldwin (1994) and Polak (1996) criticized the use of
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the dummy variables directly in the gravity model and termed the inferences drawn from
this model as incorrect and misleading. Later, in order to address these issues Ma´tya´s
(1997) proposed a triple indexed gravity model in which he used separate constants for
each time period, each importer and for each exporter in the gravity model. Furthermore,
Egger (2000) Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) and Kandogan (2005) introduced a bilateral
interaction dummy in the correctly specified gravity model of Ma´tya´s (1997) to control
for time-invariant country pair fixed effects. We use this model in our analysis to cap-
ture trade creation and trade diversion effects of the EU. More detailed discussion on the
development of Gravity model is given in Kandogan (2005), Carrere (2006) and Vollrath
et al. (2009).
4.4.1 Empirical Model
We use correctly-specified fixed effect gravity model used by Kandogan (2005) to estimate
the effects of extension in the EU on the trade flows. Along with time, importer, exporter,
bilateral fixed effects we also include commodity-group fixed effects as well. This will
capture commodity group-specific time invariant characteristics which affect trade flows
of the commodities pertaining to that particular group. The model is given below.
Mijts = λt + αi + γj + δij + θs + β1Yit + β2Yjt + β3dij + β4 4 eijt + β5Rit + β6Rjt
+β7SIMijt + β8RFijt + β9COLij + β10CLij + β11CBij + εijt
(4.4.1)
where Mijts is real imports of commodity group s of country i from country j at time
t. λt, αi, γj , θs and δij denote year, importer, exporter, commodity group, and bilateral
interaction fixed effects, respectively. Year fixed effects, λt, captures time varying factors
that influence the volume of imports from all countries. Importer fixed effects, αi, captures
the effect of time-invariant characteristics of the importer that influence the volume of
imports. Exporter fixed effects, γj , captures the effect of time-invariant characteristics
of the exporter that influence the volume of its exports. θs capture commodity group
specific characteristics that influence the trade flows of that particular commodity group.
Finally, bilateral fixed effects, δij , allows us to capture the effect of time-invariant bilateral
characteristics country pair that influences the volume of trade between exporting and
importing countries.
Furthermore, the demand and supply sides of the imports are represented by real
GDP of the importing and exporting countries and denoted by Yit and Yjt, respectively
in the model. Theoretically, when income changes the structure of final demand changes
leading to changes in the demand for imports. In fact, real GDP of the importing country
indicates the potential demand for imports and has a positive impact on the demand for
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imports. Thus, we expect a positive sign for β1. Furthermore, real GDP of the importing
country also represents the size of the market for export. The greater the GDP of importer
country the bigger the size of market for potential exports. When the size of market for
exports grow, exports also increase which also indicates a positive relation between the
real GDP of the importer country and imports. On the other hand, the supply side of
international trade is covered by using the real GDP of the exporting country. As the
GDP of a country grows, its capacity to export goods and services to other countries,
after meeting the domestic demand increases. Therefore, we expect a positive sign for β2.
However, if the rise in GDP leads to relatively higher domestic demand, then this may
lead to a decrease in exports. Thus, β2 can also have a negative sign. 4eijt represents the
bilateral real exchange rate and is used to capture the effects of fluctuations in domestic
currency on trade flows. We use the official exchange rate as a measure of the exchange
rate. Generally, imports decrease with depreciation of domestic currency and increase
with the appreciation of the domestic currency. Therefore, expected sign of the coefficient
of the 4eijt is negative.
dij is the geographical distance between importing and exporting countries. This is
used as the proxy for the transportation cost of goods being imported. The larger the
distance between the importer and exporter countries is, the higher will be the transporta-
tion cost. This raises the price of the product to the end user and ultimately reduces trade
flows among the countries which are far from each other. Thus, we expect a negative sign
for the coefficient of dij . This also caters for the fact that neighboring countries will trade
more.
Ri and Rj are foreign exchange reserves of importing and exporting countries respec-
tively. Basically Ri and Rj provide the stability to the exchange rates of the importing
and exporting countries. The more the foreign exchange reserves of a country are, the
more stable its exchange rate will be and stability of exchange rate leads to increase in
the trade flows. Thus, Ri and Rj affect trade flows among the trading partners indirectly
through providing the stability to the exchange rate which is closely related with cross
border sale of the goods and services. We expect positive signs for the coefficients of the
Rit and Rjt.
SIM is a similarity index and denotes the similarity in economic sizes of the importer
and exporter countries. Following the Kandogan (2005) we calculate SIM using the
formula given below.
SIM = ln[1− ( Yit
Yit + Yjt
)2 − ( Yjt
Yit + Yjt
)2] (4.4.2)
In fact, SIM captures the similarity of country i and j at time t in terms of their
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GDP. The above formula shows that when two countries are of equal sizes then the term
in side the brackets takes the value of 0.5 and decreases as the countries diverge in their
sizes.
RF denotes the relative factor endowment and in the words of Kandogan (2005) mea-
sures the distance between trading partners in terms of their relative factor endowments.
RF is calculated as below.
RFij = |ln[Kit
Lit
]− ln[Kjt
Ljt
]| (4.4.3)
where Kit and Lit shows the capital stock and labor force of the importer country at
time t, respectively. Kjt and Ljt shows the capital stock and labor force of the exporter
country at time t, respectively. When country i and country j have the same factor
endowment then RFij takes the value zero, and RF increases as the difference between
the relative factor endowments of country i and j increases. In order to calculate capital
stock required to calculate RF , we follow Kandogan (2005) and use perpetual inventory
method given below.
Ki1 = 5(GFCFi0 +GFCFi1) (4.4.4)
Kit = 0.9Kit−1 +GFCFit (4.4.5)
where GFCFit is the gross fixed capital formation in country i at time t. We assume
that the capital stock depreciates at a constant rate of 10 percent.
COL, CL and CB are the dummy variables and capture the effects of previous colo-
nial relationship, common language, and common border between the trading partners,
respectively. COL is equal to 1 if the trading partner have colonial relationship in the
past, otherwise zero. CL is equal to 1 if trading partner have common official language,
otherwise zero. CB is equal to 1 if trading partners have common border, otherwise zero.
It is easier to communicate with each other if both importer and exporter country have
same language. Thus we expect positive sign for the coefficient of CL. Baldwin and
Venables (1995) states that colonial ties always involved important trade relation. Usu-
ally, the mother country’s market was the main export destination for the colony’s traded
goods. When the colonial system came to an end the former colonist typically continued
the preferential treatment for the goods coming from their former colonies. Therefore, we
expect a positive sign for the coefficient of COL as well. Within EU countries, Austria
shares colonial relation with Czech Republic and Slovenia, United Kingdom with Cyprus,
Ireland and Malta, Greece with Cyprus, Hungary with Slovakia, Netherlands with Lux-
embourg, Germany with Poland and Sweden with Estonia and Finland. Moreover, when
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both importer and the exporter country share a common border then it reduces trans-
portation costs and makes the availability of the goods at a cheaper price as compared to
if both countries do not share a common border. Thus we expect a positive sign for the
coefficient of the CB.
Finely, εijt is the error term. According to Kandogan (2005) in presence of the bilateral
variables in the model, the error term, εijt, is more refined and can be interpreted as the
time-invariant bilateral effects on country i’s imports from country j at time t, not taken
into account elsewhere. In simple words, according to Kandogan (2005) the error term εijt
reflects the effect of liberalization agreements. We also use these error terms to measure
the impact of extensions in the EU.
All the variables we use in the empirical model except COL, CL and CB are real
variables and in log form.
4.4.2 Trade Creation and Trade Diversion
Following Kandogan (2005) to measure trade creation (TC), trade diversion (TD) and net
trade (Net) we estimate the empirical model given in the empirical model section before
and after the extension in the EU and estimate the regression errors, εijt, for each model.
Then we calculate the average errors, ε¯ijt, for member countries and for the non-member
countries for the model before the extension and after the extension. Then we take the
difference of the average errors after the extension and before the extension for the trade
creation. Mathematically we can write this process as under in equation 4.4.6.
TC = ε¯ijt after the extension for members − ε¯ijt before the extension for members (4.4.6)
TC > 0 shows that trade has improved among members after the extension. In simple
word TC > 0 shows trade creation
For trade diversion we take the difference of the average errors after the extension and
before the extension for non-member countries. Mathematically we can write this process
as under in equation 4.4.7.
TD = ε¯ijt after the extension for non-members − ε¯ijt before the extension for non-members (4.4.7)
TD < 0 shows that trade of member countries with non-member countries has decreased.
In simple word TD < 0 shows trade diversion.
To measure the net impact of the extension we take the difference of the TC and TD.
Mathematically we can write this process as under in equation 4.4.8.
Net = TC − TD (4.4.8)
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We repeat this process to measure trade creation and trade diversion for each com-
modity group and for each new member of the EU.
We estimate the parameters of the model proposed in 4.4.1 by applying the Ordinary
Least Square (OLS) technique on panel data for 27 EU member countries.
4.4.3 Data and Sample Size
Data used in this Chapter are taken from three different sources and cover
the period from 1988 to 2008 for EU 27 countries. The EU 27 includes Aus-
tria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. Since all these countries have not joined
the EU at the same time therefore our definition of EU 27 changes over time.
Our sample includes a country as a member of the EU 27 from the year it
has joined the EU. Before joining the EU this particular country is consid-
ered as non-member and not included in EU 27 countries. Thus the number
of countries included in the EU 27 increases with the extensions in the EU
membership over the time. The list of trading partners of the EU 27 countries
is given in Table C.14 in the Appendix C. We take into account all developed, de-
veloping and poor countries as the trading partners in our analysis because the developed
countries accounts for about 90 percent of the EU trade. From the remaining 10 percent
of the EU trade nearly 40 percent of EU trade is with the poor countries to whom EU have
signed preferential trade agreements under the Generalized System of preference (SGSP)
and Everything But Arms (EBA) which grants them zero tariff access to the EU markets.
Bilateral imports (M) and bilateral exports (X) of the 27 EU member countries have been
taken from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database; UN COMTRADE
2009. Data on GDP, foreign exchange reserves, labor force, gross fixed capital forma-
tion, and exchange rates are extracted from World Development Indicator (WDI) 2009.
Data on geographical distance between the trading partners, past colonial relationship,
common language, and common border are taken from Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) online. Imports, exports, GDP, foreign exchange
reserves, gross domestic capital formation and exchange rates have been deflated by the
CPI of the respective country. Moreover, Imports, exports, GDP, foreign exchange re-
serves, gross domestic capital formation, exchange rates, labor force, and the distance
between the importer and exporter country are in log form. Now before moving towards
estimation let’s have a look on the trends of intra and extra EU imports and exports.
Table 24, Figure 14 and Figure 15 shows total exports and imports of the EU. Table
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24, Figure 14 and Figure 15 shows that over the period of time exports and the imports of
the EU has increased. But if we have a closer look at the Table 24, Figure 14 and Figure
15 they show a jump in exports and imports of the EU from the EU member countries
in years 1995 and 2004. In fact these two jumps in the EU exports and imports shows
that in these two year new members have joined the EU and due these extensions in EU,
EU exports and imports has increased more than the increase in any other years. The
extension in the EU has boosted the intra EU trade is reflected from the Tables 25,and 27
which shows share of imports and exports coming from the member countries, respectively.
Table 24: Total Imports and Exports of the EU
Exports Imports
Year EU non-EU EU non-EU
1991 897.178 599.212 728.406 691.319
1992 978.662 659.016 780.385 735.160
1993 853.682 631.667 625.977 669.779
1994 997.841 717.866 718.951 759.469
1995 1248.802 857.755 999.024 808.655
1996 1286.715 897.245 1024.682 850.885
1997 1312.686 913.134 1018.747 874.318
1998 1385.83 917.242 1084.673 902.841
1999 1692.766 812.773 1320.102 864.025
2000 1685.791 859.093 1326.308 999.440
2001 1733.482 867.738 1317.510 985.415
2002 1884.879 947.549 1404.801 1013.325
2003 2248.341 1114.12 1694.494 1222.631
2004 2690.877 1330.278 2208.513 1334.170
2005 2916.706 1470.914 2357.005 1526.033
2006 3302.405 1667.333 2665.484 1791.460
2007 3821.73 1934.349 3184.714 2030.862
2008 4167.848 2173.137 3199.224 2191.428
Figures in billion dollars.
This trend indicates that extensions in the EU has resulted in trade creation. In spite
of the fact that EU’s exports and imports from non-member countries have increased over
time, the share of the EU’s imports and exports from non-member countries in the EU’s
total imports and exports have decreased. Tables C.11, C.9 in Appendix C and Tables 28
and 26 reflect this trend. This also gives some indication of the trade diversion.
Table 25 in the main text and Table C.8 in the Appendix C show the share of intra-
EU imports of each commodity group and total intra-EU imports of each commodity
group, over time. Table 25 shows that over time the intra-EU import share of each
group has increased which indicates that over time trade among members of the EU has
increased. Table C.8 in the Appendix C also shows that imports of EU from member
countries have increased over the last two decades. Imports of all the categories from the
member countries are showing the increasing trend. However, major intra EU imports
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Figure 14: Total Exports (in Billion Dollars) of the EU to Member and Non-
member Countries from 1991 to 2008
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Figure 15: Total Imports (in Billion Dollars) of the EU to Member and Non-
member Countries from 1988 to 2008
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are “food and live animal”, “chemical and related products, n.e.s”, “manufactured goods
chiefly classified by material”, “miscellaneous manufactured articles” and “machinery and
transport equipments”. The transport and machinery equipment is the highest tradable
commodity group among the EU member countries. Manufactured goods and the chemical
related products are on second and third position among the intra EU imports.
Table 26 in the main text and Table C.9 in the Appendix C show the share of imports
the EU coming from non-EU member countries for each commodity group and total im-
ports into the EU coming from non-EU member countries for each commodity group, over
time. Table 26 shows the EU’s import share for each commodity group coming from non-
member countries has decreased over time which indicate that with the passage of time
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EU trade with non-members is shrinking. However, Table C.9 in the Appendix C shows
that imports of all the commodities and services from rest of the world have increased over
time. EU member countries fulfill almost 50 percent of their demand for the imports of the
“food and live animal” and 75 percent demand for “mineral fuels, lubricants and related
material” by importing these products from the rest of the world. The EU’s other major
imports coming from the non-members include “chemical and related products”, “manu-
factured goods chiefly classified by materials”, “ miscellaneous manufacture articles” and
“ machinery and transports equipments”.
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Table 27 in the main text and Table C.10 in the Appendix C show the share of intra-EU
exports of each commodity group and total intra-EU exports of each commodity group,
over time. Table 27 shows that over time the intra-EU export share of each group has
increased, which indicates that over time trade among members of the EU has increased.
Table C.10 in the Appendix C also shows that exports of EU from member countries
have increased over the last two decades. presents the exports of EU member countries to
other member states. About 2/3 of EU’s “food and live animal” goods are traded among
the member countries. The “machinery and transport equipment”, “manufactured goods
classified chiefly by material”, “miscellaneous manufactured articles” and “chemical and
related product” are the major exports of the EU. The European Union is the biggest
market of “machinery and transport equipments” produced by other member countries.
Intra EU exports increased tremendously over time.
Table 28 in the main text and Table C.11 in the Appendix C show the share of exports
of EU going to non-EU member countries for each commodity group and total exports
the EU going to non-EU member countries for each commodity group, over time. Table
28 indicates that shares of the EU exports going to non-EU countries is falling over time.
However, Table C.11 in the Appendix C shows that exports of the EU to the rest of the
world are increasing over time. “Chemical and related products, n.e.s”, “manufactured
goods classified chiefly by material”, “machinery and transport equipments” and “mis-
cellaneous manufactured article” are the EU’s major exports the non-member countries.
The “machinery and transport equipments” is the biggest export item of EU countries to
non-member countries. “Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes” commodities are the
least traded commodities of the EU with non-member countries.
Overall, these tables and figures show that the EU trade, both, among the members
and with rest of the world, has increased over time. In spite of the extension to the EU in
1995 and in 2004, the overall volume of imports from and export to non-member countries
has increased. This may due to fact that most of the EU member countries have already
formed free trade areas with each other and details of these agreements is given in the
Table C.1. However, the share of total of imports from and export to the non-member
countries has decreased (see Tables 26 and 28). This rise in the volume of EU’s imports
and exports from non-member countries but the decrease in the share of EU’s imports
and exports from non-member countries induce to empirically analyze the situation. In
addition, whether the increase in the trade of EU with member and non-member nations is
statistically significant or not and whether this increasing trend of EU trade with member
and non-member countries is just because of the formation of EU or other factors are
also playing their role, needs statistical analysis of the EU trade with member countries
and with the rest of world. Therefore, to find answers to these questions we analyzed
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the effect of EU on trade flows by controlling for other factors affecting trade. Using the
total imports of each commodity group as the dependent variable we determine in which
commodity groups the EU creates trade and in which commodity groups the EU diverts
trade from non-member states to member nations. For the sensitivity of our result we also
use total exports of each commodity group as dependent variable to determine in which
commodity groups the EU creates trade and in which commodity groups the EU diverts
trade from non-member states to member nations. Note that summary statistics of the
other variables included in the model are given in the Table C.13 in the Appendix C.
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4.5 Empirical Results
Unification of the trade policies by removing the border-related trade barriers from the flow
of goods and services among the countries alters production and consumption patterns.
These amendments in consumption and production behavior can be measured in terms of
trade creation and trade diversion effects of preferential trade agreements. Furthermore,
when a new country joins an existing trading bloc, it also leads to changes in production
and consumption behavior in this particular country and in its trading partners as well. In
this chapter using correctly specified gravity model we have estimated the trade creation
and trade diversion effects of the 4th and 5th extensions in the EU which took place in
1995 and in 2004, respectively. In this section we discuss these results.
Table 29: Total Imports of the EU from 1988 to 2008
Dependent Variable: log (Imports)
Before 4th Extension Before 5th Extension With 4th and 5th Extension
Yi 1.880*** 1.270*** 0.616***
(0.240) (0.136) (0.103)
Yj 0.133 0.082 0.108
(0.161) (0.078) (0.088)
dij -1.260*** -1.457*** -1.549***
(0.094) (0.079) (0.086)
SIM -0.104 -0.040 -0.023
(0.108) (0.059) (0.060)
eij -0.077*** -0.111*** -0.133***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Ri 0.302*** 0.475*** 0.475***
(0.038) (0.031) (0.033)
Rj 0.144*** 0.163*** 0.177***
(0.025) (0.034) (0.038)
RF -0.085 -0.020 -0.006
(0.075) (0.041) (0.040)
COL 0.682*** 0.561*** 0.561***
(0.110) (0.122) (0.132)
CL 0.471*** 0.563*** 0.597***
(0.102) (0.097) (0.108)
CB 0.397** 0.555*** 0.574***
(0.160) (0.122) (0.128)
N 41824 129811 165901
r2 o 0.597 0.577 0.563
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors are clustered by Partner
Time, Reporter, Partner and Sector fixed effects are controlled
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 29 shows the result for overall imports. Column 2 of the Table 29 shows the
results of regression for overall imports of the EU before the 4th extension. Column 3 of
the Table 29 presents the results of regression for overall imports of the EU before the
5th extension in the EU which took place in 2004. Column 4 of the Table 29 shows the
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results of regression for overall imports of the EU for the entire sample period from 1988
to 2008 which includes period before and after the 4th and 5th extensions of the EU. The
results presented in the Table 29 shows EU imports of the EU are highly sensitive to the
GDP of the member countries. In simple words GDP of importing country is a significant
determinant of its imports. It is shows that demand side plays important role in the EU
imports. Regression results presented Columns 2 and 3 in the Table 29 show that a one
percent rise in GDP of importer country leads to more than one percent rise in its imports.
However, results presented in Column 3 of the Table 29 shows that a one percent increase
in GDP leads to a less than one percent increase in imports. This finding is consistent
with findings of Kandogan (2005) who found similar results. However, Table 29 shows
that exporter country GDP has a positive but insignificant impact on EU’s imports. The
GDP of the trading partners of the EU does not play any role in explaining the EU’s
exports.
Another factor that plays a significant role in explaining the imports of the EU is the
real exchange rate. Columns 2, 3 and 4 in Table 29 shows that as the domestic currency
depreciates the EU imports decreases. In fact, when domestic currency depreciates the
imported goods becomes relatively dearer leading to decrease in their demand. Moreover,
Table 29 shows that one percent decrease in the value of the domestic currency leads to
less than one percent decrease in the EU’s imports. About 10 percent of the decrease the
decrease in EU’s imports is caused by the fluctuations in the real exchange rates. Once
gain our results are consistent the existing literature. For instance, Kandogan (2005) and
Vollrath et al. (2009) report that the depreciation of the domestic currency results in
lowering the volume of the imports of a country.
Furthermore, Table 29 shows that foreign currency reserves of both importer and ex-
porter country significantly determine the volume of the EU’s imports. Actually, foreign
currency reserves indicate the stability of the exchange rates. The more the foreign cur-
rency reserves of a country are the more stable the currency of that country is. The more
stable the currency of a country is the more will be its imports. Kandogan (2005) also
reports similar results.
Trade promoting factors, past colonial relationship, common language, and common
border play a significant role in determining the EU’s imports. Table 29 shows that the
coefficients of the COL, CL and CB are positive and significant. This implies that EU
countries imports more from the countries with whom they have past colonial relationships,
share a common language, and have a common border. Actually, these factors reduce
the cost of imports which results in reducing the prices of the imported goods from the
trading partners with whom EU countries share a common language, have past colonial
relationship and have common border. Kandogan (2005) also reports the positive impact
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of the these variables on imports and exports of the EU.
However, we could not find a significant impact of similarity of the importer and
exporters’ economies (SIM), and the impact of relative factor endowment (RF ) on EU’s
imports.
Another important variable which affects the imports of a country through price chan-
nel is the transportation cost involved in carrying the product from origin place to the final
user of the product. The transportation cost is an important ingredient of the interna-
tional trade and is positively related with the distance between countries where production
unit are installed and the countries where users of the product reside. The transportation
cost increases the prices of the product for the consumers which results in decreasing the
demand for that particular product. Results given in Table 29 support this hypothesis.
We have used the distance between the importing and the exporting country as a proxy
for the transportation cost. The greater the distance between the importer and exporter
country, the higher will be transportation costs. The negative and highly significant co-
efficient for the distance shown in Table 29 implies that transportation cost impedes the
EU’s trade with countries that are far way. Our results are consistent with the findings
of Vollrath et al. (2009) and Kandogan (2005). Our result also shows that neighboring
countries will trade more as compared to the far flung countries. Clarete et al. (2003)
report similar results.
Table 30 and Tables C.5 and C.4 in the Appendix C show commodity group level
results after and before the 4th and 5th extensions in the EU taking place in 1995 and in
2004, respectively. These tables show that importer country GDP significantly explains
the variations in the imports of different commodity groups. Overall, these tables show
that commodity group level results are similar to the results for the total imports reported
in Table 29. Results reported in Table 30 and Tables C.5 and C.4 in the Appendix C show
that EU countries’ commodity group level imports increase with the increase in their
GDPs. This result hold for entire group of commodities and for before EU’s extension in
1995 and in 2004 and for the entire sample period which ranges from 1988 to 2008. This
implies that EU’s demand for the imports for all the commodity groups has increased with
the rise in the income. However, the income elasticities of imports of different commodities
groups varies across the commodity groups and over time. For example, Table 30 show
that income elasticities of demand for imports of “Minerals Fuels, Lubricants and related
Material”, “Miscellaneous manufactured article” and “Commodities and Transactions not
classified elsewhere in the SITC” are greater than one.
146
T
a
b
le
3
0
:
C
o
m
m
o
d
it
y
L
e
v
e
l
Im
p
o
rt
s
o
f
th
e
E
U
fr
o
m
1
9
8
8
to
2
0
0
8
D
ep
en
d
en
t
V
ar
ia
b
le
:
lo
g(
Im
p
or
ts
)
S
IT
C
-0
S
IT
C
-1
S
IT
C
-2
S
IT
C
-3
S
IT
C
-4
S
IT
C
-5
S
IT
C
-6
S
IT
C
-7
S
IT
C
-8
S
IT
C
-9
Y
i
0.
61
1*
**
0.
29
0
0.
40
0*
1.
09
4*
**
0.
34
2
0.
46
9*
*
0.
52
3*
**
0
.3
3
6
1
.2
8
1
*
*
*
2
.4
8
0
*
*
*
(0
.1
88
)
(0
.3
91
)
(0
.2
18
)
(0
.3
64
)
(0
.5
35
)
(0
.2
29
)
(0
.1
79
)
(0
.2
1
0
)
(0
.1
7
1
)
(0
.7
8
7
)
Y
j
0.
05
0
-0
.1
34
-0
.0
13
0.
12
1
1.
03
4*
**
-0
.0
53
0.
14
7
0
.2
0
2
0
.1
5
3
0
.3
2
2
*
*
(0
.1
09
)
(0
.1
60
)
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.3
20
)
(0
.3
50
)
(0
.1
75
)
(0
.1
14
)
(0
.1
4
2
)
(0
.1
3
7
)
(0
.1
5
9
)
d
ij
-1
.5
87
**
*
-1
.1
74
**
*
-1
.6
39
**
*
-2
.4
59
**
*
-1
.4
45
**
*
-1
.6
55
**
*
-1
.7
40
**
*
-1
.5
0
5
*
*
*
-1
.5
0
0
*
*
*
-1
.3
9
8
*
*
*
(0
.1
36
)
(0
.1
33
)
(0
.1
45
)
(0
.2
36
)
(0
.1
53
)
(0
.1
32
)
(0
.1
28
)
(0
.1
3
7
)
(0
.1
4
4
)
(0
.2
2
2
)
S
I
M
-0
.0
00
1
-0
.0
82
0.
04
2
-0
.2
04
-0
.2
35
0.
15
4
-0
.0
21
0
.0
6
7
-0
.1
1
4
0
.0
3
3
(0
.0
99
)
(0
.1
23
)
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.2
05
)
(0
.1
80
)
(0
.0
97
)
(0
.0
89
)
(0
.0
9
4
)
(0
.0
8
6
)
(0
.1
6
1
)
e i
j
-0
.1
52
**
*
-0
.1
37
**
*
-0
.1
70
**
*
-0
.2
21
**
*
-0
.1
03
**
-0
.1
10
**
*
-0
.1
01
**
*
-0
.1
1
5
*
*
*
-0
.1
1
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
7
0
*
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
61
)
(0
.0
43
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
3
1
)
(0
.0
2
7
)
(0
.0
4
1
)
R
i
0.
40
1*
**
0.
54
1*
**
0.
56
1*
**
0.
44
1*
**
0.
35
1*
**
0.
47
8*
**
0.
49
1*
**
0
.5
5
0
*
*
*
0
.4
6
2
*
*
*
0
.0
8
9
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.0
92
)
(0
.0
48
)
(0
.1
05
)
(0
.0
99
)
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.0
47
)
(0
.0
5
1
)
(0
.0
4
5
)
(0
.1
1
8
)
R
j
0.
20
0*
**
0.
28
8*
**
0.
18
5*
**
0.
20
2
0.
10
5
0.
22
9*
**
0.
16
1*
**
0
.1
5
2
*
*
*
0
.1
1
5
*
*
0
.0
2
1
(0
.0
52
)
(0
.0
80
)
(0
.0
45
)
(0
.1
36
)
(0
.0
80
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.0
4
7
)
(0
.0
5
3
)
(0
.0
7
9
)
R
F
-0
.0
23
-0
.0
52
0.
04
2
-0
.0
55
-0
.0
50
0.
11
7
-0
.0
24
0
.0
4
0
-0
.0
3
3
0
.0
4
9
(0
.0
72
)
(0
.0
94
)
(0
.0
73
)
(0
.1
48
)
(0
.1
52
)
(0
.0
73
)
(0
.0
61
)
(0
.0
7
3
)
(0
.0
6
1
)
(0
.1
2
0
)
C
O
L
0.
95
6*
**
0.
69
7*
**
0.
58
1*
**
0.
22
1
0.
45
1*
0.
52
0*
*
0.
56
2*
**
0
.6
3
4
*
*
*
0
.8
8
1
*
*
*
0
.8
9
6
*
*
(0
.2
00
)
(0
.2
29
)
(0
.2
01
)
(0
.3
29
)
(0
.2
34
)
(0
.2
08
)
(0
.1
80
)
(0
.1
9
2
)
(0
.1
7
9
)
(0
.3
7
1
)
C
L
0.
92
7*
**
0.
62
9*
*
0.
41
3*
*
0.
48
2*
0.
34
3
0.
47
1*
*
0.
79
9*
**
0
.5
5
6
*
*
*
0
.5
0
8
*
*
*
1
.1
5
4
*
*
*
(0
.1
68
)
(0
.2
49
)
(0
.1
83
)
(0
.2
83
)
(0
.2
49
)
(0
.2
02
)
(0
.1
79
)
(0
.1
7
3
)
(0
.1
5
9
)
(0
.2
9
4
)
C
B
0.
42
1*
*
0.
57
8*
*
0.
77
8*
**
1.
19
8*
**
1.
45
7*
**
0.
55
2*
**
0.
14
8
0
.3
5
3
*
*
0
.2
1
0
0
.6
2
3
*
(0
.1
91
)
(0
.2
34
)
(0
.1
92
)
(0
.3
15
)
(0
.2
20
)
(0
.2
06
)
(0
.1
74
)
(0
.1
7
8
)
(0
.1
8
6
)
(0
.3
3
6
)
N
23
71
2
12
33
4
20
77
8
83
61
74
01
16
94
8
22
20
1
2
1
4
0
9
2
3
7
5
4
9
0
0
3
r2
o
0.
72
4
0.
58
9
0.
68
5
0.
61
4
0.
60
7
0.
78
8
0.
82
0
0
.8
2
5
0
.8
5
5
0
.5
8
2
R
o
b
u
st
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
,
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
b
y
P
a
rt
n
er
T
im
e,
R
ep
o
rt
er
,
P
a
rt
n
er
a
n
d
S
ec
to
r
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
a
re
co
n
tr
o
ll
ed
*
p
<
0
.1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
S
ee
T
a
b
le
C
.6
in
th
e
A
p
p
en
d
ix
C
fo
r
S
IT
C
C
o
d
e
E
x
p
la
n
a
ti
o
n
.
147
This implies that one percent increase in the GDPs of EU countries leads to more
than one percent rise in imports of ” “Minerals Fuels, Lubricants and related Material”,
“Miscellaneous manufactured article” and “Commodities and Transactions not classified
elsewhere in the SITC”.
These results are consistent with the existing literature. For example, our finding
that rise in the imports of the “Mineral Fuels, Lubricants and related material” due to
the increase in the EU countries GDPs, is consistent with the reports of World Energy
Technology Outlook (WETO) which states that EU countries meet 60 percent of their
demand for oil and gas from domestic sources17 . Almost 75 percent of remaining demand
is met through importing it from non-member countries.
For all other commodity groups the income elasticity of demand for import is less than
one which implies that a one percent rise in the GDP of importing countries leads to less
than one percent increase in imports of commodities included in these commodity groups.
Similarly, tables C.5 and C.4 in the Appendix C also report a positive relation between the
imports of different commodity groups and the GDPs of the importer countries. Kandogan
(2005) also reports similar results.
However, we could not find a significant impact of the exporter countries GDPs on most
of the commodity group level imports of the EU countries. This finding is clear from the
results reported in Table 30 and Tables C.5 and C.4 in the Appendix C. Only in the case of
“Food and Live Animal”, “Mineral Fuels, Lubricants and related material” “Animal and
Vegetable Oils, Fats and Waxes”, “Machinery and Transport Equipments”, “Miscellaneous
manufactured articles” and “Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the
SITC” we found a significant impact of the exporter countries GDP. This implies that in
supply of these commodity groups in the EU countries markets increases with increase in
the GDP of the exporter countries. These results support the findings of Clarete et al.
(2003) Kandogan (2005), Vollrath et al. (2009) and the supply side preposition that the
higher the GDP of a country, the higher will be its exports. This also indicates that
EU countries are diverting their resources from the production of ordinary or low value
products to towards the production of more sophisticated and high value manufactured
goods as their GDP rise.
In addition, results reported in Table 30 and Tables C.5 and C.4 in the Appendix C
show that the impact of the exporter country GDP on the EU imports of the “ Beverages
and Tobacco”, “Crude Materials, Inedible except Fuel”, “Chemical and related products,
n.e.s”, “Food and Live Animal” is negative. However, the coefficients of the exporter coun-
try GDP is insignificant for the commodity groups. This implies that in these commodity
17For further details see; European Commission, World Energy technology Outlook 2050, at
ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/energy/docs/weto-h2 en.pdf.
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groups EU countries may have gained self sufficiency. The negative income elasticity of
exports for “food and live animal” may be due to Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
of European countries which makes difficult for agriculture related product of non-EU
countries to access the market of EU countries.
Furthermore, results reported in Table 30 and Tables C.5 and C.4 in the Appendix
C show that distance between the importer and exporter country, real exchange rate,
foreign currency reserves of the importer significantly explain the commodity group level
imports of the EU. The negative distance elasticity of imports shows that as the distance
between importer and exporter increases their trade relations contract. In simple words,
EU countries prefers to import from relatively nearer countries. The negative exchange
rate elasticity of imports implies that as the domestic currency depreciates the imports of
the commodities included in these commodity groups decrease. The positive coefficients
of the foreign exchange reserves of the importer and exporter implies that increase in
foreign exchange reserves increases the EU countries imports by providing stability to
their domestic currencies.
Similar to the results for overall imports of the EU countries reported in the Table 29
we find the positive impacts of the past colonial relationship of importer and exporter,
common language, and common border on commodity group level imports of the EU
countries. Table 30 and Tables C.5 and C.4 in the Appendix C show that EU countries
import more from the countries with whom they have past colonial ties, share a common
language and have a common border.
Now we discuss results for the trade creation and trade diversion effects of the two
extensions in European Union (EU) which took place in the 1995 and in 2004. We also
discuss here our results regarding the trade creation and trade diversion effects of the
new members joining the EU in 1995 and in 2004. Table 31 shows trade creation and
trade diversion effects of the extensions of the EU taking place in 1995 and in 2004, for
overall imports and for the commodity group level imports. The Table 32 shows the trade
creation and trade diversion effects of the new members joining the EU in 1995 and in
2004. Columns 3rd, 4th and 5th Columns of the Table 31 shows trade creation, trade
diversion and Net trade effects of the extension in the EU respectively, for overall imports
as well as for the commodity-group level imports.
Results reported in Table 31 show that both the extensions in EU membership have
resulted in increasing trade between the EU members. However, this increase in the
trade among the member is at the cost of the decrease in the trade with non-member
countries. Overall, these two extensions in the EU has resulted increasing the trade of
the EU countries. The increase in trade among the members of the EU is more than the
decrease in the trade with non-member countries. Thus, in net these two extension have
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increased the trade of the EU countries. Table 31 also shows that the EU’s extension
which took place in 2004 created more trade among members of the EU as compared to
the EU’s extension which took place in 1995. However, the decrease in imports from the
non-member countries due to the extension in the membership of the EU is relatively more
in the extension which occurred in 2004 as compared to the extension which took place
in 1995. These results make sense because in 1995 only new three countries joined the
EU whereas in 2004 ten new countries became the part of EU, in turn, the overall total
GDP of the EU has increased relatively more after the 5th extensions than the increase in
increase in overall total GDP of the EU after the 5th extensions. This rise in the GDP of
the EU has is playing its role in increasing the intra-EU trade flows because our findings
indicate that an increase GDP of a country significantly increases its trade volume.
Furthermore, 3rd, 4th and 5th Columns of the Table 31 show that the extensions of EU
in 1995 and in 2004 along with the increasing imports from the member countries decrease
imports from the non-member countries, for eight out of ten commodity groups. However,
these extensions in the EU, membership increases imports from member countries more
than the decrease in imports from the non-member countries. This implies that in gen-
eral, extensions in the EU has resulted in improving the net trade of the EU countries.
Specifically, the extension of the EU taking place in 1995 increases the imports of two
commodity groups, “Minerals Fuels, Lubricants and related materials” and “Machinery
and Transport Equipments”, from member and non-member countries and for all other
commodity groups this extension of the EU increases the imports from member countries
but decreases the imports from non-member countries.
However, the extension of the EU which took place in 2004 increases the imports from
both member and non-member countries for only one commodity group named “Machinery
and Transport Equipments” and for all other commodity groups, the extension of the EU
which took place in 2004 increased imports from member countries at the cost of imports
for non-member countries. Our results indicates that both the extensions of the EU
enhance trade with members and non-members in “Machinery and Transport Equipments”
and led to trade diversion in all other commodity groups. Thus, Table 31 shows that the
extension in EU has resulted trade creation and trade diversion as well not only for overall
imports but at commodity level imports as well.
Our results confirm the findings of Commission of the European Communities (2009)
that “machinery and transport equipments” is the key sector of the EU with 27 percent
of world automotive production and a 30 percent global market share automotive prod-
uct trade18. Our results are consistent with the findings of European Commission for
18For further details see; Commission of the European Communities (2009), European industry
in a changing world updated sectoral overview, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2009), at
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Enterprise and Industry (2010) that the “Machinery and Transport Equipments” is the
key sectors contributing to excellent performance of the EU19. Our findings support the
observations of Sura (2009). He found that EU members are the most specialized countries
for these products such as Germany as the most specialized in manufacture of “Machin-
ery and Transport Equipments”, Ireland for chemical and related products, and Bulgaria
and Hungary for refined petroleum and nuclear fuel. Our results are consistent with the
findings of Balassa (1967) that in the case of machinery and transport equipment, the Eu-
ropean Common Market (ECM) boosts trade with the rest of the world. Our finding that
the extensions in the EU membership amplifies the trade among members significantly
is consistent with the findings of Baier and Bergstrand (2007) that regional integration
results in accelerating trade among its members. Our finding that extensions in the EU
diverts trade from non-members to member countries in most of the commodity groups
implies that EU countries have become less dependent on the rest of the world in most of
the commodity groups. Similar results have been reported by the Zahniser et al. (2002)
for MERCOUSER and NAFTA.
Now we discuss our findings regarding trade creation and trade diversion effects of the
new members joining the EU in 1995 and in 2004. Table 32 shows how much trade has
been created and how much trade has been diverted by the new members joining the EU
in 1995 and in 2004. This table shows that of the new members joining the EU in the 4th
extension only Finland increased its imports from members without affecting its imports
from non-members. The remaining two new members, Austria and Sweden increased their
imports from member countries but decreased their imports from non-member countries.
Thus, in the light results reported in Table 32 we can say that Austria and Sweden caused
the trade diversion but Finland leads to trade creation. However, in net terms all the
countries joining the EU in 4th extension of the EU increased their trade.
Moreover, Table 32 shows that 4 out of the 10 members joining the EU in the 5th ex-
tension increased their imports from members countries and also increased their imports
from non-member countries. These new members who increased imports from members
as well as from non-member countries are Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia. These
four countries results in trade creation. All other members joining the EU in 5th exten-
sion increased imports from member countries but decreased imports from non-member
countries. The subset of new members who increase imports from the member countries
at the cost of imports from non-member countries consists of Cyprus, Hungary, Lithuania,
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/industrialcompetitiveness/files/industry/doc/sec 2009 1111 en.pdf
19For further details see; European Commission for Enterprise and Industry (2010),
’EU manufacturing Industry: What are the challenges and opportunities for the Com-
ing years’, First tentative findings of sector-specific analysis carried out in DG Enterprise
and Industry., at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/industrial-competitiveness/economic-
crisis/files/eu manufacturing challenges and opportunities en.pdf
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Table 31: Overall Trade Creation and Trade Diversion Effects of 4th and 5th
Extension in the EU, for Total and Commodity-Group level Import
Imports Extension TD TC Net
Total 4th -0.0262 0.1185 0.1447
Total 5th -0.0322 0.1504 0.1826
S3-0 4th -0.0394 0.2064 0.2458
5th -0.0454 0.2492 0.2945
S3-1 4th -0.0796 0.2373 0.3169
5th -0.1069 0.2662 0.3731
S3-2 4th -0.0288 0.0885 0.1173
5th -0.0525 0.1280 0.1805
S3-3 4th 0.0010 0.0061 0.0052
5th -0.0061 0.0236 0.0298
S3-4 4th -0.0687 0.0835 0.1522
5th -0.1020 0.1256 0.2276
S3-5 4th -0.0139 0.0834 0.0973
5th -0.0266 0.1124 0.1389
S3-6 4th -0.0041 0.0462 0.0503
5th -0.0148 0.0739 0.0886
S3-7 4th 0.0056 0.1101 0.1045
5th 0.0213 0.1600 0.1386
S3-8 4th -0.0077 0.0417 0.0494
5th -0.0069 0.0553 0.0621
S3-9 4th -0.0334 0.2047 0.2381
5th -0.0461 0.4397 0.4859
see Section 4.3 for definitions of TD, TC and Net.
see Table C.6 in Appendix C for SITC codes.
Table 32: Overall Trade Creation and Trade Diversion Effects of New members
joining EU in 4th and 5th Extension in the EU, for Imports
Extension New Member TD TC Net
Austria -0.097 0.147 0.244
4th Finland 0.018 0.112 0.094
Sweden -0.026 0.308 0.334
Cyprus -0.249 -0.090 0.159
Czech Republic - - -
Estonia 0.031 0.184 0.153
Hungary -0.261 0.388 0.648
5th Latvia 0.003 0.210 0.207
Lithuania -0.124 0.220 0.344
Malta -0.121 0.212 0.333
Poland 0.049 0.345 0.296
Slovakia 0.043 0.321 0.277
Slovenia -0.517 0.104 0.621
see Section 4.3 for definitions of TD, TC and Net.
The data of Czech Republic is not available.
152
Malta and Slovenia. Thus, these five countries are causing import diversion. However,
Table 32 shows that all the countries joining the EU in 5th extension of the EU, whether
they are causing imports diversion or not, in net they increase the imports. This indicates
that overall these members increase international trade.
4.5.1 Robustness
In order to check the sensitivity of our results we have applied the model given in equation
4.4.1 using logged exports of the EU member countries as the dependent variable and
calculated the trade creation and trade diversion of the 4th and 5th extensions of the EU.
The results are given in Tables 33 and 34 below and in Tables C.3 and C.2 in Appendix
C. Results reported in these tables show that real GDP of EU countries significantly
explains EU exports. This indicates that with the increase in the GDP of EU countries
their capacity to exports increased. A one percent increase in the GDP of EU countries
leads to a less than one percent increase in their exports before the 4th extension of the
EU. However, a one percent increase in the GDP of EU countries leads to more than one
percent increase in their exports before the 5th extension of the EU. This indicates that
the EU countries’ export performance has improved after the 4th extension of the EU.
However, the GDP elasticity of exports of the EU countries has decreased from 1.469 to
after the 4th extension to 0.929 after the 5th extension of the EU. This suggest that 5th
extension has been relatively less beneficial for the EU’s exports performance.
Table 33 shows that importer countries’ GDP also significantly explains the exports
of the EU. Positive and significant coefficients of importer countries GDP indicates that
demand for EU’s exports increases with an increase in the importer countries GDP. How-
ever, Table 33 shows that a one percent increase in the importer countries’ GDP increases
EU’s exports less than one percent.
However, Table 33 shows that distance between the importers and EU countries and
EU’s exports are negatively related. As the distance between the importer countries and
the EU countries increases the exports of the EU decreases. This indicates that EU
countries exports less to far flung countries. This also implies that as the transportation
cost increases the exports of EU countries decreases.
Table 33 also shows that EU’s exports are sensitive to the variations in real exchange
rates. EU countries’ exports increase with the depreciation of the domestic currency.
This implies that as the domestic currency depreciates the EU’s goods become relatively
cheaper in the foreign markets leading to an increase in their demand. However, the
exchange rate elasticity of the EU’s exports is less than one. Furthermore, Table 33 shows
that sensitivity of the EU’s exports to real exchange rate has decreased with extensions in
the EU’s membership. The elasticity of the EU’s exports to real exchange rates decrease
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Table 33: Total Exports of the EU from 1988 to 2008
Dependent Variable: log(Exports)
Before 4th Extension Before 5th Extension With 4th and 5th Extension
Yi 0.273** 1.469*** 0.929***
(0.113) (0.120) (0.213)
Yj 0.205** 0.239** 0.296**
(0.086) (0.097) (0.121)
dij -1.711*** -1.629*** -1.506***
(0.100) (0.094) (0.097)
SIM -0.036 -0.084 -0.066
(0.058) (0.064) (0.084)
∆eij 0.222*** 0.173*** 0.124***
(0.037) (0.026) (0.040)
Ri 0.601*** 0.565*** 0.267***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.032)
Rj 0.063*** 0.055** 0.028
(0.024) (0.023) (0.037)
RF -0.008 -0.030 -0.044
(0.039) (0.041) (0.063)
COL 0.848*** 0.834*** 0.914***
(0.123) (0.117) (0.135)
CL 0.690*** 0.703*** 0.726***
(0.107) (0.104) (0.118)
CB 0.595*** 0.596*** 0.298*
(0.127) (0.123) (0.178)
N 196770 155293 51099
r2 o 0.643 0.665 0.708
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors are clustered by Partner
Time, Reporter, Partner and Sector fixed effects are controlled
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
to 0.173 from 0.222 after the 4th extension and it further decreased to 0.124 after the 5th
extension in the EU.
In addition, Table 33 indicates that foreign reserves of the importer and exporter
countries Rit and Rjt significantly explain variations in the EU’s exports by providing the
stability to the real exchange rates of the EU’s countries with it trading partners.
Moreover, Table 33 shows that past colonial relationship of exporter and importer
country, common language, and a common border also significantly explain variations
in the EU countries’ exports. These trade promoting factors positively effects the EU’s
exports. EU countries exports more to the countries with whom they have past colonial
relationships, share a common language and have common border.
Now we discuss our results for commodity group level exports of the EU. Tables C.3
and C.2 in the Appendix C show the results for commodity group level exports of the EU
before the 4th and 5th extensions of the EU and Table 34 shows the results for commodity
group level exports of the EU for the whole sample period which contains the time period
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before and after the 4th and 5th extensions of the EU.
Results reported in these Tables C.3 and C.2 in the Appendix C and Table 34 indicate
that for most of the commodity groups, commodity group level results for exports are
similar to results reported in Table 33 for overall exports of the EU. These tables show that
importer and exporter country GDP significantly explains the variations in the commodity
level exports of the EU. This implies that both the demand and supply side play their
role in determining the commodity level exports of the EU. However, the GDP elasticity
of the exports varies across the commodity groups. For example, Table 34 shows that
one percent change in exporter’s GDP leads to 2.488 percent change in exports of the
commodities included in SITC-9 commodity groups. For all other commodity groups one
percent change in exporter’s GDP leads to less than one percent change in exports of the
commodities included in these groups.
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Similarly, results given in Tables C.3 and C.2 in the Appendix C and Table 34 indicate
that an increase in the distance between the importer and exporter country significantly
decreases the commodity level exports of the EU. A one percent increase in the distance
between the importer and exporter country leads to more than one percent decrease in
EU’s exports of all the commodity groups This implies that transportation cost is really
an important factor in determining the commodity level exports of the EU. This also
indicates that EU countries export more to neighboring countries.
Furthermore, Tables C.3 and C.2 in the Appendix C and Table 34 show that the
real exchange rate is another important factor in explaining the variation in commodity
level exports of the EU. Depreciations of the domestic currency significantly increase the
commodity level exports of the EU, and vice versa. Moreover, increase in the exporter
country foreign exchange reserves significantly increase the EU commodity level exports.
In fact, foreign exchange reserves of the EU countries provide the stability to exchange
rate of their currency which in turn provide confidence to importer and exporter that price
of the product of the EU countries in international markets remains stable and leads to
increase in the exports of the EU. In addition, the foreign exchange reserves of the importer
countries also significantly explain variations in the EU’s commodity level exports.
Moreover, results reported in Tables C.3 and C.2 in the Appendix C and Table 34
show that past colonial relationships between the EU countries and the countries that
import EU products significantly increase the EU commodity level exports. Similarly, EU
countries exports more to the countries with whom they share a common language and
have common borders. In simple words, trade-promoting factors significantly explain the
variations in the EU’s commodity level exports.
Overall, Tables C.3 and C.2 in the Appendix C and Table 34 show that the above
mentioned results holds for commodity level exports of the EU before and after the 4th
and 5th extensions in the EU. However, the results reported Tables C.3 and C.2 in the
Appendix C and in Table 34 show that the signs of the coefficients of the exporter’s GDP
and importer’s GDP for some commodity groups differ the signs of the parameters of
the exporter’s GDP and importer’s GDP for overall exports results reported in Table 33.
Variations in the signs of the coefficients of exporter’s GDP for different commodity groups
basically indicate the nature of the products included in different commodity groups.
Now we discuss the trade creation and trade diversion caused by the 4th and 5th
extensions of the EU with reference to exports of the EU. The 3rd, 4th and 5th Columns of
the Table 35 show the trade creation, trade diversions and net trade effects of the 4th and
5th extensions of the EU considering the total exports of the EU as well as the commodity
group level of the exports of the EU countries. The negative value of the TD in 3rd
Column of the Table 35 indicates trade diversion. Positive values of TC in 4th Column
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of the Table 35 indicates trade creation and the values given 5th Column of the Table 35
presents the net trade effects. Table 35 indicates that with regard to total exports the 4th
extension of the EU increases exports of the EU to EU member countries but decreases
the decreases the exports to non-member countries. This implies that 4th extension of
the EU caused the exports diversion. The new members joining the EU in 1995 increase
exports to member countries at the cost of reducing exports to non-member countries.
However, the increase in the exports of new members joining the EU to member countries
is more than the reduction in exports to non-member countries.
Table 35: Overall Trade Creation and Trade Diversion of 4th and 5th Extension
in the EU, for Total and Commodity-Group level Export
Exports Extension TD TC Net
Total 4th -0.0078 0.1192 0.1270
Total 5th 0.0092 0.1607 0.1515
SITC3-0 4th -0.0212 0.2587 0.2798
5th -0.0203 0.3234 0.3437
SITC3-1 4th -0.0294 0.1962 0.2256
5th -0.0013 0.2721 0.2734
SITC3-2 4th -0.0114 0.0624 0.0738
5th -0.0242 0.0748 0.0990
SITC3-3 4th 0.0210 0.0029 -0.0181
5th 0.0251 0.1125 0.0873
SITC3-4 4th -0.0606 0.1852 0.2458
5th -0.0352 0.0847 0.1199
SITC3-5 4th -0.0086 0.1382 0.1468
5th -0.1035 0.1832 0.2867
SITC3-6 4th -0.0187 0.1221 0.1408
5th -0.0175 0.1384 0.1559
SITC3-7 4th 0.0240 0.0851 0.0611
5th 0.0439 0.0880 0.0441
SITC3-8 4th 0.0088 0.0684 0.0597
5th 0.0143 0.0714 0.0571
SITC3-9 4th 0.0021 0.2441 0.2419
5th 0.4027 0.7173 0.3146
see Section 4.3 for definitions of TD, TC and Net.
see Table C.6 in Appendix C for SITC codes.
Furthermore, Table 35 shows that in contrast to 4th extension of the EU, the 5th
extension of the EU, along with increasing the exports to member countries increases
exports to non-member countries as well. This implies that the 5th extension of the EU
lead to trade creation. Overall, Table 35 indicates that the 4th extension of the EU diverts
trade from the non-member countries to member countries but the 5th extension of the
EU increases trade with members and non-member countries.
However, with regard to commodity level trade creation, trade diversion and net effects
of the 4th and 5th extension of the EU varies across the commodity groups. Table 35
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indicates that 4th and 5th extensions of the EU increase exports to member countries with
decreasing the exports to member countries in “Minerals Fuels, Lubricants and related
material”, “Machinery and Transport Equipments”, “Miscellaneous manufactured items”
and Commodities and “Transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC” commodity
groups. For all other commodity groups, 4th and 5th extension of the EU increase exports
to member countries but decrease the exports to non-member countries. Our results
consistent with the findings of Commission of the European Communities (2009)20, Sura
(2009) and with the findings of Balassa (1967).
Table 36: Overall Trade Creation and Trade Diversion of New members joining
EU in 4th and 5th Extension in the EU, for Exports
Extension New Member TD TC Net
Austria -0.123 0.085 0.207
4th Finland -0.009 0.078 0.087
Sweden 0.105 0.319 0.214
Cyprus -0.444 -0.443 0.001
Czech Republic - - -
Estonia -0.081 0.016 0.097
Hungary -0.023 0.289 0.312
5th Latvia 0.056 0.352 0.296
Lithuania 0.035 0.515 0.480
Malta 0.171 0.209 0.038
Poland 0.060 0.560 0.501
Slovakia 0.016 0.364 0.348
Slovenia -0.030 0.181 0.211
see Section 4.3 for definitions of TD, TC and Net.
The data of Czech Republic is not available.
Table 36 shows the trade creation, trade diversion and net trade effects of new mem-
bers joining the EU in 4th and 5th extensions of the EU. This table indicates that from
the members who joined the EU in the 4th extension only Sweden increased its trade with
both members and non-member countries. The other two countries, Austria and Fin-
land increased exports to members countries but decreased their exports to non-member
countries. This implies that Austria and Finland have diverted their exports from non-
members to member countries and caused trade diversion. However, Sweden the third
member joining the EU in the 4th extension of the EU presents evidence of trade cre-
ation. However, the increase in the exports of Austria and Finland to members countries
is greater than the decrease in exports to non-member countries.
In addition, Table 36 points out that from the countries who joined EU in the 5th
extension of the EU, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungry and Slovenia caused export diversion as
the values of TD are less than zero for these countries. This implies that these new
members of the EU increase their exports to member countries at the cost of decrease in
20see footnote 19 for the reference
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the exports to non-member countries. However, their increase in the exports to member
countries is greater than the decrease in the exports to non-member countries.
Moreover, Table 36 indicates that Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland and Slovakia led to
trade creation and increase their exports to member and non-member countries. However,
the increase in the exports of these countries to member countries in greater than the
increase in their exports to non-member countries. Thus, these countries lead to trade
creation after joining the EU in 2004.
Overall, Table 35 indicates that for total exports trade creation and trade diversion
effects varies across the 4th and 5th extensions of the EU. This table also presents the
evidence that trade creation and trade diversion effects of the 4th and 5th extensions of the
EU differ across the commodity groups. Moreover, Table 36 indicate that trade diversion
and trade creation effects of the extensions in the EU not only vary from country to
country but also differ across the extension in the EU.
4.6 Conclusions
Regionalization has re-emerged as a trade policy option in the last two decades. Many
new regional trade agreements have been formed and existing regional trade agreements’
memberships have been extended. These trends in the development of the regional trade
agreements raises the importance to analyze the impact of the regional trade agreements
and their extensions on the trade with members of trade agreements and trade with the rest
of the world. In this chapter we have analyzed the impact of 4th and 5th extensions of the
EU on the trade with members as well as with the rest of the world. Particularly, we have
estimated the trade creation and trade diversion impact of 4th and 5th extensions of the
EU. Using both imports and the exports of the EU member countries we have estimated
trade creation and trade diversion of 4th and 5th extensions of the EU for total imports
and exports as well as for each commodity group classified by SITC. Furthermore, we have
also analyzed the trade creation and trade diversion impact of new members joining the
EU in these two extension.
We have used correctly specified fixed effect gravity model on the panel of 27 EU
member countries spanning from 1988 to 2008. The regression errors of the model have
been used to measure the trade creation and trade diversion overall impact of 4th and 5th
extensions of the EU as well to measure trade creation and trade diversion impact of the
new members joining the EU in these two extensions. The results provide evidence that
the effects of the 4th and 5th extensions of the EU on trade flows are mixed. In some
product groups the EU creates trade among members without affecting their trade with
non-member countries and in some other product categories EU diverts trade from the
rest of world to member countries. In most of commodity groups, our results support
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the finding of the existing literature that regional economic integration boosts trade flows
among the members. These results are consistent with the results of Clarete et al. (2003)
for APEC and the EU and with the findings of Kandogan (2005) for EU.
Specifically, we find that both 4th and 5th extensions of the EU causes the import di-
version. After 4th and 5th extensions of the EU, the member countries have decreased their
imports from non-member countries and have increased their imports from the member
countries. However, the decrease in imports from non-member countries is lower than the
increase in imports from member countries. This implies that intra EU trade has strength-
ened after 4th and 5th extension of the EU and EU member countries’ trade with rest of
the world has suffered. These findings provide the evidence of trade diversion taking place
in results of 4th and 5th extensions of the EU.
Moreover, we find that after the 4th extension of the EU the member countries divert
their exports from non-member countries to member countries. However, this diversion
of exports from non-member countries to member countries is lower than the increase in
their export to member countries. Furthermore, we find that after the 5th extension of
the EU the exports of the EU countries has increased to both member and non-member
countries. These findings indicate that 5th extension has resulted in trade creation but 4th
extension has resulted in trade diversion.
In addition, our findings indicate that from new members joining the EU in 4th exten-
sion in 1995 Austria and Sweden lead to import diversion and Austria and Finland cause
the export diversion. Similarly, from the countries who became the member of the EU
in 5th extension of the EU in 2004, Cyprus, Hungary, Lithuania Malta and Slovenia in-
crease their imports from member countries but decrease their imports from non-member
countries. Moreover, after joining the EU in 2004, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, and Slove-
nia have decreased their exports to non-member countries and their exports to member
countries have increased.
Our results regarding trade creation and trade diversion impact of the extensions in the
EU for commodity level imports and exports indicate that after the 4th extension of EU,
intra EU imports has increased at the cost of decreasing imports from the rest of the world
in all the commodity groups except “ Minerals Fuel, Lubricants and related material” and
“Machinery and Transport equipments”. This indicates that except these two commodity
groups the 4th extension of the EU leads to trade diversion. The trade creation effects
for these two commodity groups may indicates that EU countries imports intermediate
products from the rest of the world. The evidence of the trade diversion impact for all
other commodity groups is an indication that EU countries are becoming self sufficient
in fulfilling the domestic need for the products included in the commodity groups. The
dependence of the EU countries on the non-member countries has further decreased after
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the 4th extension of EU that has led to imports diversion in all the commodity groups
except “Machinery and Transport Equipments”.
Similarly, our finding show that both 4th and 5th extensions in the EU diverts exports
of all the commodity groups except “ Minerals Fuel, Lubricants and related material” and
“Machinery and Transport equipments” from non-member countries to member countries.
In fact, in these two commodity groups EU countries imports as well exports more to
non-member countries relative to member countries. So, we can say that in these two
commodity groups EU countries promotes trade with the rest of the world. Actually, for
these two commodity groups, EU countries imports raw material or intermediate products,
process them and then re-export to members as well as to the non-member countries.
Our findings that 4th and 5th extensions in the EU lead to trade diversion in most of
the commodity groups implies that employment opportunities in the EU countries have
increased after the 4th and 5th extensions in the EU, whereas the employment opportu-
nities in the rest of the world may have decreased after the 4th and 5th extension of the
EU because the demand for their products in the EU countries have decreased after the
extensions in the EU.
In addition, we found that the geographical distance between importer and exporter
country’s significantly affects the trade flows of the EU member countries. This observation
implies that transportation cost is a major hurdle in promotion of the trade. The negative
distance elasticity of imports and exports indicate that neighboring countries will trade
more as compared to far away countries. We also found that real GDP significantly affects
the trade flows. Both the imports and exports of the EU countries increase with the
increase in the real GDP of these countries. This indicates that not only the demand for
imports increases with the increase in the real GDP but the capacity to export also rises
with the increase in the GDP.
Another crucial finding is related with the impact of real exchange rate on the trade
flows. Our findings indicate that depreciation of the domestic currency decreases the im-
ports but increases the exports of the EU which implies that fluctuations in real exchange
rates play a significant role in determining the trade flows of the EU countries. Foreign
currency reserves of a country also play their role in determining the trade flows by pro-
viding the stability to the exchange rate. Moreover, we found that common language,
common border and colonial relationship between the importer and exporter significantly
determine the trade flows of the EU countries.
Similarly we found that “machinery and transport equipments”, “chemical and related
products” and the “manufactured goods chiefly classified by material” are the major con-
tributors in the excellent export performance of the EU. EU imports the intermediate
goods used in these sectors from the non member countries and process them and then
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re-export the final product to non member nations. Our results strengthen the arguments
of the Commission of the European Communities (2003) that the automotive sector is
backbone of the EU economy.
On the whole our finding suggest that trade creation and trade diversion effects of the
extensions in the EU vary across the extensions, across the commodity groups, and across
the new members joining the EU in fourth and fifth extensions of the EU.
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Chapter 5
Summary, Conclusions and Policy Implication
5.1 Summary
The advocates of trade believe that international trade provides lifeblood to world economies.
They suggest that global trade increases the income and welfare of the countries by in-
creasing the efficiency of the productive resources through specialization and sharing the
knowledge and technology, and by providing a wide range of products at relatively lower
prices. Moreover, these benefits of trade are not free. Several costs are attached with them
that trading partners have to bear. These costs reduce the net benefits of the trade. Many
factors impede cross-border flows of trade leading to a reduction in the overall volume of
trade. Therefore, it is important to study the factors that influence costs and benefits of
international trade.
Specifically, three main issues related to international trade are examined in this thesis.
First, we analyzed the impact of real exchange rate-led changes in exports on employment
in the UK manufacturing sector and identified whether the adjustment process in the
employment works through job creation or job destruction job. We also checked whether
the effect of real exchange rate of the UK relative to the EU and non-EU trading partners
on the employment is same. Moreover, we tested whether the impact real exchange rate
on employment in exporting and non-exporting industries differs.
Second, we explored how firms external finance dependence affects the UK exports.
Particularly, we tested whether the effect of financial dependence on the UK exports
becomes stronger during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Moreover, we also examine
whether financial dependence affects the exports of different sectors differently, particularly
during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
Finally, we explored the impact of a Regional Trade Agreement( RTA) on
trade flows of member and non-member countries of the RTA. Specifically, we
studied the impact of the 4th and 5th extensions in the European Union (EU)
on the trade flows of the member and non-member countries and determined
whether 4th and 5th extensions in EU creates trade among members or diverts
trade from member countries. We also examined whether the 4th and 5th
extensions in EU increases trade among member without effecting the trade
with non-member countries. We also examined whether the new members
joining the EU in 4th and 5th extensions of the EU have similar effects on the
trade flows of the member and non-member countries.
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In Chapter 2, the GMM method was used to estimate the dynamics of employment in
the UK manufacturing sector arising from a shock to the real exchange rate. The findings
of the analysis show that the real exchange rate significantly affects employment in the
UK. Specifically, we show that a rise in UK wage costs relative to its trading partner
leads to a significant reduction in net employment in the UK manufacturing sector. This
tendency of a reduction in employment is more pronounced for industries that export
relatively more.
Chapter 2 shows that adjustments in net employment to a shock in competitiveness
mainly occurred due to job creation. Our results also show that the adjustment is not
significantly affected by job destruction. Moreover, Chapter 2 reports that smaller firms
contribute more towards job creation and slightly less towards job destruction than larger
firms. Furthermore, the size of labor adjustment in UK manufacturing sector in response
to real exchange rate led fluctuations in competitiveness of the UK with European and
non-European countries differs.
Moreover, the findings of Chapter 2 show that fluctuations in real exchange rate may
not affect net employment in non-exporting firms. However, an increase in real exchange
rate significantly reduces net employment in exporting firms.
In Chapter 3 OLS with dummies to control sector-time, country-time and
country-sector fixed effect and IV techniques have been used to analyze the
impact of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis on UK trade with its 25 major
trading partners. The findings of this chapter show that credit conditions are
an important channel through which financial turmoil affects the UK exports.
Specifically, the results indicate that with higher lending rates and tighter
credit market conditions the UK exported less during the 2007-2009 financial
crisis. Moreover, these negative effects become stronger for sectors with lim-
ited access to buyer-supplier trade credit, with lesser collateralizable assets,
with higher dependency on external financing and with lower values of the
leverage.
Chapter 3 also shows that adverse credit conditions affect the supply and
demand side of exports significantly and play a significant role in determining
the supply and the demand of the UK exports. Moreover, it shows that the
demand for exports is primarily driven by the importing country’s GDP, cap-
ital labor ratio, interest rates and the credit to private sector. Whereas UK’s
GDP, capital labor ratio, interest rates and availability and the accessibility of
the external funds significantly determine the supply of UK exports. The ob-
servation that financial markets disruptions reduce UK exports is robust and
does not change with the change in proxy used for the cost of capital and the
165
change in measures used for the financial dependency of a sector on external
resources.
In Chapter 4, we use correctly specified fixed effect gravity model to es-
timate the effects of the 4th and 5th extensions in the European Union (EU)
on the trade flows of member and non member countries. The findings show
that the effects of 4th and 5th extensions in the EU on trade flows are mixed.
Only in two out of ten commodity groups does the EU create trade among
members without affecting the EU trade with non-member countries while in
all other product categories the 4th and 5th extensions in the EU diverts trade
from member countries to rest of the world. In general, Chapter 4 shows that
the EU boosts the intra-bloc trade at the cost of reducing the trade with extra
bloc trading partners. However, in case of “Minerals Fuels, Lubricants and
Related material” and “Machinery and Transport Equipments” commodity
groups, 4th and 5th extensions in EU results in increasing the trade with mem-
ber countries without affecting the trade with non-member countries. In these
two commodity groups 4th and 5th extensions in the EU increase trade with
non-member countries along with increasing the trade with member countries.
These finding make sense because the EU member countries are oil deficient
countries and they meet their energy and fuel demand by importing fuels and
related products from the non-member countries. Moreover, the EU coun-
tries import raw material or the intermediate goods, process them and then
re-exports the final products.
Furthermore the findings of the chapter show that trade creation and trade
diversion effects of the extensions in the EU vary across the extensions, across
the new members joining the EU in these extensions and across the commodity
groups. This finding make sense because the extensions of the EU vary across
time, in the number and the sizes of the countries joining the EU in these
extensions and in variations in the nature of the products included in different
commodity groups.
Finally, in this chapter, we show that the major share of “food and live animal” prod-
ucts is imported from non-member countries and the EU is the net importer of the food
and agriculture products. Furthermore, the analysis shows that “machinery and trans-
port equipments”, “chemical and related products” and the “manufactured goods chiefly
classified by material” are the major contributors in the excellent export performance of
the EU.
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5.2 Conclusions
The fluctuations in real exchange rates significantly affect the employment in UK manu-
facturing sector and the adjustment in net employment to a shock in the real exchange
rate mainly works through job creation. The UK labor market responds to shocks sig-
nificantly and induces the employment smoothing accordingly. That is, the workers fired
in bad times will be rehired in good times. So, employment will be high in good times
and unemployment will be high in bad times. Moreover, the employment in small firms
is more sensitive to fluctuations in competitiveness than large firms. The employment in
exporting and in non-exporting firms behave differently in response to the change in the
real exchange rate. Furthermore, the insiders (employed) benefit from the higher wages
while outsiders (unemployed) bear the cost of the job reallocation process.
Overall, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 has significantly affected the UK exports.
Specifically, the exports of the sectors that depend more on external finance, have limited
access to buyer-supplier trade credit and have lesser tangible assets, were severely damaged
during the crisis. Adverse credit conditions are important channel through which financial
turmoil transmit its effect to international trade flows of the UK. Rises in cost of the capital
significantly reduce the UK exports and this reduction even became more intensive during
the financial crisis of 2007-2009.
On the whole our finding suggest that trade creation and trade diversion
effects of the extensions in the EU vary across the extensions, across the com-
modity groups, and across the new members joining the EU in fourth and fifth
extensions of the EU. These findings indicate that 5th extension has resulted
in trade creation but 4th extension has resulted in trade diversion. In some
commodity groups the EU increases trade among member countries while in
other commodity groups the EU diverts trade from member countries to non-
member countries. Specifically, the EU results in trade creation in 8 out of 10
commodity groups. The EU is net importer of the food and agricultural prod-
ucts. Moreover, the “machinery and transport equipments”, “chemical and
related products” and the “manufactured goods chiefly classified by material”
are major exports of the EU.
5.3 Policy Implications
Our findings show that the loss in international competitiveness significantly decreases
the employment in the UK manufacturing sector. Particularly, we observe that decrease
in the international competitiveness leads to a significant reduction in employment in the
exporting industries. These findings are useful in policing making as they suggest that
167
there is a need to take policy measures that encourage job creations in non-trading indus-
tries, improve labor productivity and encourage domestic consumption-led growth. These
policy measures will be helpful in reducing the negative effects of the loss of international
competitiveness on employment and strengthens the labor markets to absorb the negative
shocks to international trade.
Our findings also suggest that policy interventions that reduce the cost of capital
will be really helpful in reducing substantially the detrimental effects of severe financial
disruptions on international trade flows. Particularly, ensuring the provision of the credit
at affordable rate to financially constrained firms during the crisis will enhance the exports.
Our findings suggest that the EU countries should take measures to improve
the productivity of the members countries so that they fulfill export order
from the members and well from the non-member countries. By improving
the productivity and the productive capacity of the member countries the EU
can reduce at least the exports diversion caused by the new members joining
the EU in the extensions of the EU.
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Appendix A: Trade Competitiveness and Employment: Job
Creation or Job Destruction ?
Table A.1: Job Creation in Manufacturing Sector of the UK (Exporting In-
dustries)
Dependent Variable: Job Creation Rate
1 2 3 4 5
L.Job Creation 0.163 0.131 0.148 0.064 0.321**
(0.165) (0.185) (0.181) (0.149) (0.15)
L. Job Destruction -0.229 -0.193 -0.160 -0.123 -0.208
(0.193) (0.222) (0.209) (0.194) (0.304)
Average Wage -0.102* -0.094** -0.069* -0.083* -0.165***
(0.061) (0.042) (0.039) (0.049) (0.061)
GDP Growth .003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** .002** 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sales Growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Size -0.003 -0.159 -0.105 -0.026 0.026
(0.039) (0.089) (0.085) (0.058) (0.054)
Competitiveness -0.174*
(32 Partners) (0.104)
Competitiveness -0.159 -0.056 0.060
(EU Partners) (0.116) (0.15) (0.349)
Competitiveness -0.105*** -0.097** -0.068
(non-EU Partners) (0.032) (0.046) (0.102)
Competitiveness 1.983
(Interaction) (3.318)
Constant 0.072 0.072 0.066 0.072*** 0.072***
(0.02) (0.019) (0.017) (0.02) (0.025)
Arellano AR(2) Probability 0.785 0.595 0.783 0.596 0.864
Hansen Test Probability 0.974 0.881 0.826 0.960 0.811
Total Observation 198 198 198 198 198
No. Of Groups 22 22 22 22 22
Observation per group 9 9 9 9 9
Robust Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
Standard Errors are clustered by industry.
∗ ∗ ∗ = Significant at 1 percent. ∗∗ = Significant at 5 percent. ∗= Significance at 10 percent.
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Table A.2: Job Destruction in Manufacturing Sector of the UK (Exporting
Industries)
Dependent Variable: Job Destruction Rate
1 2 3 4 5
L.Job Creation 0.078 0.089 0.071 0.087 0.113
(0.155) (0.128) (0.125) (0.128) (0.139)
L. Job Destruction 0.401*** 0.392*** 0.391*** .404*** .476***
(0.133) (0.134) (0.125) (0.124) (0.148)
Average Wage -0.178* -0.181* -0.191** -0.176** -0.169**
(0.101) (0.098) (0.092) (0.088) (0.083)
GDP Growth -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Sales Growth 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Size -0.062 -0.044 -0.043 -0.046 -0.041
(0.082) (0.076) (0.076) (0.073) (0.087)
Competitiveness 0.071
(32 Partners) (0.0732)
Competitiveness 0.087 0.011 0.276
(EU Partners) (0.083) (0.125) (0.323)
Competitiveness 0.022 -0.015 -0.045
(non-EU Partners) (0.041) (0.064) (0.087)
Competitiveness 2.200
(Interaction) (3.165)
Constant 0.094*** 0.091 .093*** .090*** 0.082***
(0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.03)
Arellano AR(2) Probability 0.209 0.214 0.235 0.252 0.234
Hansen Test Probability 0.521 0.534 0.586 0.534 0.532
Total Observation 198 198 198 198 198
No. Of Groups 22 22 22 22 22
Observation per group 9 9 9 9 9
Robust Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
Standard Errors are clustered by industry.
∗ ∗ ∗ = Significant at 1 percent. ∗∗ = Significant at 5 percent. ∗= Significance at 10 percent.
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Table A.3: Gross Job Flows in Manufacturing Sector of the UK (Exporting
Industries)
Dependent Variable: Gross Job Flow Rate
1 2 3 4 5
L.Job Creation 0.125 0.107 0.070 0.107 0.129
(0.273) (0.253) (0.267) (0.25) (0.272)
L. Job Destruction 0.149 0.127 0.163 0.160 0.245
(0.226) (0.231) (0.211) (0.203) (0.313)
Average Wage -0.398*** -0.411*** -0.366*** -0.393*** -0.371***
(0.091) (0.08) (0.106) (0.083) (0.093)
GDP Growth -0.003* -0.003** -0.003* -0.003** -0.003**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)) (0.002)
Sales Growth 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Size -0.035 -0.030 -0.032 -0.030 -0.027
(0.155) (0.148) (0.152) (0.145) (0.135)
Competitiveness -0.091
(32 Partners) (0.103)
Competitiveness -0.102 -0.029 0.165
(EU Partners) (0.116) (0.148) (0.495)
Competitiveness -0.050 -0.063 -0.100
(non-EU Partners) (0.044) (0.063) (0.09)
Competitiveness 2.479
(Interaction) (5.348)
Constant 0.195*** .199*** .191*** 0.194*** 0.182***
(0.031) (0.03) (0.031) (0.03) (0.402)
Arellano AR(2) Probability 0.318 0.380 0.313 0.260 0.278
Hansen Test Probability 0.792 0.820 0.829 0.836 0.722
Total Observation 198 198 198 198 198
No. Of Groups 22 22 22 22 22
Observation per group 9 9 9 9 9
Robust Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
Standard Errors are clustered by industry.
∗ ∗ ∗ = Significant at 1 percent. ∗∗ = Significant at 5 percent. ∗= Significance at 10 percent.
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Table A.4: Job Creation in Manufacturing Sector of the UK (Non-Exporting
Industries)
Dependent Variable: Job Creation Rate
1 2 3 4 5
L.Job Creation -0.110** -0.118*** -0.093* -0.117*** -0.166***
(0.044) (0.046) (0.054) (0.046) (0.047)
L. Job Destruction -0.211 -0.201 -0.164 -0.175 -0.387
(0.277) (0.273) (0.257) (0.269) (0.438)
Average Wage -1.429* -2.112* -1.358** -2.539* -2.296*
(0.781) (1.136) (0.647) (1.472) (1.371)
GDP Growth 0.009* 0.013* 0.003** 0.012* 0.042*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.025)
Sales Growth -0.008 -0.011 -0.002 -0.010 -0.012
(0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
Size -0.062 -0.060 -0.065 -0.060 -0.058
(0.047) (0.049) (0.051) (0.051) (0.045)
Real Exchange Rate -0.172
(32 Partners) (0.153)
Real Exchange Rate -0.296 -0.310 15.062
(EU Partners) (0.214) (0.219) (10.117)
Real Exchange Rate 0.204 0.264 78.990
(non-EU Partners) (0.189) (0.24) (52.63)
Real Exchange Rate -72.226
(Interaction) (48.305)
Constant 0.318 0.419 0.059 0.383 -16.449
(0.229) (0.265) (0.059) (0.257) (11.035)
Arellano AR(2) Probability 0.125 0.127 0.280 0.192 0.527
Hansen Test Probability 0.821 0.742 0.885 0.875 0.939
Total Observation 198 198 198 198 198
No. Of Groups 22 22 22 22 22
Observation per group 9 9 9 9 9
Robust Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
Standard Errors are clustered by industry.
∗ ∗ ∗ = Significant at 1 percent. ∗∗ = Significant at 5 percent. ∗= Significance at 10 percent.
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Table A.5: Job Destruction in Manufacturing Sector of the UK (Non-
Exporting Industries)
Dependent Variable: Job Destruction Rate
1 2 3 4 5
L.Job Creation -0.019 -0.019 -0.018 -0.018 0.008
(0.059) (0.056) (0.058) (0.06) (0.086)
L. Job Destruction 0.289* 0.288* 0.276* 0.282* 0.336*
(0.151) (0.154) (0.157) (0.161) (0.154)
Average Wage 0.726 0.823 0.185 0.355 0.363
(0.801) (0.922) (0.9) (1.091) (1.105)
GDP Growth -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 (-0.015)*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
Sales Growth 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.01) (0.009) (0.01)
Size 0.116 0.114 0.102 0.110 0.104
(0.108) (0.103) (0.105) (0.101) (0.099)
Real Exchange Rate 0.069
(32 Partners) (0.098)
Real Exchange Rate 0.046 0.046 -5.362
(EU Partners) (0.126) (0.127) (3.619)
Real Exchange Rate 0.176 0.177 -27.724
(non-EU Partners) (0.192) (0.197) (18.508)
Real Exchange Rate 25.545
(Interaction) (16.945)
Constant -0.062 -0.026 -0.001 -0.053 5.887
(0.133) (0.147) (0.057) (0.144) (3.982)
Arellano AR(2) Probability 0.216 0.187 0.251 0.261 0.261
Hansen Test Probability 0.293 0.289 0.276 0.223 0.215
Total Observation 198 198 198 198 198
No. Of Groups 22 22 22 22 22
Observation per group 9 9 9 9 9
Robust Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
Standard Errors are clustered by industry.
∗ ∗ ∗ = Significant at 1 percent. ∗∗ = Significant at 5 percent. ∗= Significance at 10 percent.
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Table A.6: Gross Job Flows in Manufacturing Sector of the UK (Non-
Exporting Industries)
Dependent Variable: Gross Job Flow Rate
1 2 3 4 5
L.Job Creation -0.331 -0.289 -0.405 -0.293 -0.301
(0.254) (0.259) (0.286) (0.26) (0.27)
L. Job Destruction 0.220* 0.285* 0.230* 0.315* 0.299**
(0.126) (0.158) (0.117) (0.165) (0.139)
GDP Growth 0.005 0.008 -0.002 0.008 0.010
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.013)
Sales Growth -0.002 -0.004 0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Size 0.262 0.280 0.332 0.307 0.307
(0.323) (0.342) (0.401) (0.361) (0.362)
Real Exchange Rate -0.189
(32 Partners) (0.242)
Real Exchange Rate -0.300 -0.291 0.757
(EU Partners) (0.321) (0.321) (5.407)
Real Exchange Rate 0.244 0.199 5.593
(non-EU Partners) (0.244) (0.207) (27.991)
Real Exchange Rate -4.941
(Interaction) (25.688)
Constant 0.314 0.373 0.022 0.313 -0.837
(0.276) (0.289) (0.091) (0.279) (5.917)
Arellano AR(2) Probability 0.353 0.328 0.415 0.361 0.327
Hansen Test Probability 0.834 0.904 0.884 0.932 0.909
Total Observation 198 198 198 198 198
No. Of Groups 22 22 22 22 22
Observation per group 9 9 9 9 9
Robust Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
Standard Errors are clustered by industry.
∗ ∗ ∗ = Significant at 1 percent. ∗∗ = Significant at 5 percent. ∗= Significance at 10 percent.
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Table A.7: Manufacturing Industry Classification (UK SIC 2003)
Code Industry
15 Food products and Beverages
16 Tobacco products
17 Textiles
18 Wearing apparel; dressing & dyeing of fur
19 Tanning & dressing of leather & leather products
20 Wood and of products of wood and cork except furniture
21 Pulp, paper and paper products
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
23 Coke refined petroleum products
24 Chemicals and chemical products
25 Rubber and plastic products
26 Other non-metallic mineral products
27 Basic metals
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
29 Machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified
30 Office machinery and computers
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus not elsewhere classified
32 Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
35 Other transport equipment
36 Furniture; manufacturing not elsewhere classified
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Figure 16: Average Share of Export in Total Sale in UK Manufacturing In-
dustries
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Figure 17: Employment in Manufacturing sector of the UK
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Figure 18: Average UK’s Real Exchange Rate with top 5 Trading Partners
from 1999 to 2010
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Figure 19: UK Manufacturing Exports by Industry from 1999 to 2010
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Appendix B: Financial Turmoil, External Finance and UK
Exports
Table B.1: Trade Credit and Overnight Interbank Rate
Crisis Period=May 07 to Feb 09 Dependent Variable: log (Sectoral Exports of the UK)
(1) (2) (3)
IBrate * TCRED 0.572*** 0.444** 0.463***
(0.141) (0.146) (0.148)
D Crisis * IBrate * TCRED 0.179*** 0.138**
(0.054) (0.057)
IBrate * Pvt Claims 0.010***
(0.002)
UK Interest Rate -0.050** -0.058*** -0.061***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
Partner Interest Rate -0.024* -0.024* -0.142***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.026)
UK GDP 4.107 3.620 4.300
(2.907) (2.952) (3.484)
Partner GDP 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.070***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.027)
UK K/L Ratio -1.902** -1.903** -2.366***
(0.680) (0.678) (0.695)
Partner K/L Ratio 0.547*** 0.546*** 0.618***
(0.090) (0.090) (0.036)
N 13916 13916 12566
r2 0.939 0.939 0.935
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors are clustered by Importers
Country-time, Sector-time and Country-Sector effects are controlled
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.2: Tangible Assets and Overnight Interbank Rate
Crisis Period=May 07 to Feb 09 Dependent Variable: log (Sectoral Exports of the UK)
(1) (2) (3)
IBrate * TANG 0.022 -0.013 -0.006
(0.040) (0.044) (0.044)
D Crisis * IBrate * TANG 0.048*** 0.040**
(0.013) (0.014)
IBrate * Pvt Claims 0.010***
(0.002)
UK Interest Rate 0.004 -0.002 -0.007
(0.017) (0.017) (0.021)
Partner Interest Rate -0.024* -0.024* -0.143***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.025)
UK GDP 5.179* 4.312 5.001
(2.887) (2.945) (3.281)
Partner GDP 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.070***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.026)
UK K/L Ratio -1.865** -1.861** -2.326***
(0.675) (0.674) (0.691)
Partner K/L Ratio 0.546*** 0.545*** 0.618***
(0.088) (0.088) (0.035)
N 13916 13916 12566
r2 0.939 0.939 0.935
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors are clustered by Importers
Country-time, Sector-time and Country-Sector effects are controlled
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.3: Leverage and Overnight Interbank Rate
Crisis Period=May 07 to Feb 09 Dependent Variable: log (Sectoral Exports of the UK)
(1) (2) (3)
IBrate * Leverage 0.154*** 0.123** 0.131**
(0.049) (0.054) (0.051)
D Crisis * IBrate * Leverage 0.050*** 0.041**
(0.014) (0.015)
IBrate * Pvt Claims 0.010***
(0.002)
UK Interest Rate -0.049** -0.059*** -0.064**
(0.020) (0.019) (0.023)
Partner Interest Rate -0.024* -0.024* -0.142***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.025)
UK GDP 4.466 3.849 4.497
(2.938) (2.975) (3.509)
Partner GDP 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.070***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.026)
UK K/L Ratio -1.889** -1.882** -2.348***
(0.678) (0.677) (0.692)
Partner K/L Ratio 0.547*** 0.546*** 0.618***
(0.090) (0.090) (0.035)
N 13916 13916 12566
r2 0.939 0.939 0.935
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors are clustered by Importers
Country-time, Sector-time and Country-Sector effects are controlled
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 20: Monthly Share Price Index of the UK
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Table B.6: Standard International Trade Classification, Revision 3
SITC Code Explanation
SITC-0 Food and Live Animal
SITC-1 Beverages and Tobacco
SITC-2 Crude Materials, Inedible except Fuel
SITC-3 Minerals Fuels, Lubricants and Related material
SITC-4 Animal and vegetable oils, Fats and Waxes
SITC-5 Chemical and Related Products, n.e.s
SITC-6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material
SITC-7 Machinery and Transport Equipments
SITC-8 Miscellaneous manufactured article
SITC-9 Commodities and Transactions not Classified elsewhere in the SITC
184
Appendix C: Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of
European Union
Table C.1: Trade agreements of Europe
Country EEA ECCU ECFTA EA CEFTA MCA EMA
Algeria - - - - - 1976 2002
Austria 1994 1995 1973 - - - -
Belgium 1994 1957 1957 - - - -
Bulgaria - - - 1993 1999 - -
Croatia - - 2002 - 2003 - -
Cyprus 2004 2004 1973 - - - -
The Czech Rep. 2004 2004 - 1992 1993 - -
Denmark 1994 1973 1973 - - - -
Egypt - - - - - 1977 2004
Estonia 2004 2004 - 1995 - - -
Finland 1994 1995 1973 - - - -
France 1994 1957 1957 - - - -
Germany 1994 1957 1957 - - - -
Greece 1994 1981 1981 - - - -
Hungary 2004 2004 - 1992 1993 - -
Iceland 1994 - 1973 - - - -
Ireland 1994 1973 1973 - - - -
Israel - - - - - - 2002
Italy 1994 1957 1957 - - - -
Jordan - - - - - 1977 2002
Latvia 2004 2004 - 1995 - - -
Lebanon - - - - - 1977 2003
Lithuania 2004 2004 - 1995 - - -
Luxembourg 1994 1957 1957 - - - -
FYR Macedonia - - 2001 - - - -
Malta 1994 2004 1971 - - - -
Morocco - - - - - - 2000
Netherlands 1994 1957 1957 - - - -
Norway 1994 - 1973 - - - -
Palestine - - - - - - 1997
Poland 2004 2004 - 1992 1993 - -
Portugal 1994 1986 1973 - - - -
Romania - - - 1993 1997 - -
The Slovakia 2004 2004 - 1992 1993 - -
Slovenia 2004 2004 - 1997 1996 - -
Spain 1994 1986 1986 - - - -
Sweden 1994 1995 1973 - - - -
Switzerland 1994 - 1973 - - - -
Syria - - - - - 1977 -
Tunisia - - - - - - 1998
Turkey - 1996 1963 - - - -
The UK 1994 1973 1973 - - - -
source; Kandogan (2005)
EEA= European Economic Area. ECCU= European Community’s Customs Union.
ECFTA= European Free Trade Area. EA= Europe Agreements. EMA= Euro-Mediterranean Agreements
CEFTA= Central European Free Trade Area. MCA= Mediterranean Cooperation Agreements
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Table C.6: Standard International Trade Classification, Revision 3
SITC Code Explanation
SITC-0 Food and Live Animal
SITC-1 Beverages and Tobacco
SITC-2 Crude Materials, Inedible except Fuel
SITC-3 Minerals Fuels, Lubricants and Related material
SITC-4 Animal and vegetable oils, Fats and Waxes
SITC-5 Chemical and Related Products, n.e.s
SITC-6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material
SITC-7 Machinery and Transport Equipments
SITC-8 Miscellaneous manufactured article
SITC-9 Commodities and Transactions not Classified elsewhere in the SITC
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Table C.13: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max
Yj 480496 425054.5 2377581 0.018 37800000
Yi 564322 12954.03 31730.91 28.2841 227918.2
Rj 472632 612000000 29400000000 0.0007 1.95E+12
Ri 564322 413.0327 1361.989 1.0921 43515.38
eij 294619 1020000000 1.42E+11 9.42E-10 2.41E+13
SIM 464623 -1.75128 1.318097 -15.85478 -0.6931472
RF 337910 1.932992 1.676233 0.0001331 11.80068
dij 557095 5555.734 3913.962 59.61723 19586.18
Values are the average of all the countries included in the sample
Values of Yj , Yi, Rj and Ri are in billions and others are in units
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Table C.14: Trading Partners of the EU
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, American Samoa, Andorra, Angola, Antarctica, Antigua and
Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bouvet Island, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Bunkers,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Cayman Island, Chad, Chile,
China, Christmas Island, Cocos Island, Colombia, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo
Republic, Cook Island, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Arab
Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Faeroe Islands, Falkland
Island, Fiji, Finland, Fmr Arab Republic of Yemen, Fmr Democratic Republic of Germany,
Fmr Democratic Yemen, Fmr Ethiopia, Fmr Fed. Republic of Germany, Fmr USSR, Fmr
Yugoslavia, France, French Guiana, French Polynesia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana,
Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guam, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Guyana, Haiti, Heard Island and McDonald Islands, Holy See (Vatican City State), Honduras,
Hong Kong SAR China, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea Democratic Republic, Korea
Republic, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macao SAR China, Macedonia, FYR, Madagascar, Malawi,Malaysia,
Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Martinique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mexico,
Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Montserrat, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,
Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,
Niue, Norfolk Island, Northern Mariana Islands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua
New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Pitcairn, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian
Federation, Rwanda, Saint Helena, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome
and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Island,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan,
Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand,
Timor-Leste, Togo, Tokelau, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Turks
and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United
States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, RB, Vietnam, Virgin Islands (U.S.),
Wallis and Futuna Island, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen, Republic, Zambia, Zimbabwe
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Figure 21: Levels of Economic Integration
 
Free Trade  
among Members 
Common  
External Tariff 
Free Factor  
Movements 
Macro Policy  
Harmonization 
Free Trade Area ✕       
Custom Union ✕ ✕     
Common 
Market ✕ ✕ ✕   
Economic Union ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ 
 
A Free Trade Area is an agreement in which two or more than two countries agree to 
remove all the tariff and non-tariff barriers and the quantitative restrictions on their 
mutual trade. However, each member of the group is free to adopt and maintain any 
tariff or regulations on the trade with non-member country. 
 
A Custom Union is an agreement in which two or more than two countries agree to 
remove all the tariff and non-tariff barriers and the quantitative restrictions on their 
mutual trade, plus a common external tariff on the trade with non-member countries. 
 
A Common Market is an agreement in which two or more than two countries agree to 
remove all the tariff and non-tariff barriers and the quantitative restrictions on their 
mutual trade, adopt of a common external tariff on the trade with non-member 
countries, plus a free movement of the factors of production among the member 
countries.  
 
An Economic Union is an agreement in which two or more than two countries agree 
to remove all the tariff and non-tariff barriers and the quantitative restrictions on their 
mutual trade, adopt a common external tariff on the trade with non-member countries, 
a free movement of the factors of productions, and harmonization of the macro 
economic policies. 
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